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Preamble 
 
Paul Keating will be remembered by some Australians as a visionary. As 
Prime Minister he outlined the structure of external and domestic reform 
that he believed would guarantee global security for all Australians. 
  
Driving these reforms, more often than not, were interstate agreements, 
often in the form of multilateral treaties, sometimes in the guise of bilateral 
compromise, rarely as unilateral declarations. 
 
In areas as diverse as collaborative scientific research or the protection of 
children in the workplace, the Keating Executive set out, through 
codification, to transform Australia’s political landscape. 
 
The fields of trade, military, environmental and human rights were all 
included in the attempts by Keating to forge a new image of and for 
Australia in the Asia Pacific region. 
 
Treaties were vital agents of change in this milieu in the bid to reformulate 
regional perceptions of Australia.  
 
The path of inquiry in this thesis stemmed from a quest to examine the 
origin, role, purpose and efficacy of treaties in the Keating Government’s 
foreign policy aimed at regional military security. 
 
In order to make this examination it develops a polyphonic1 analytical 
model whose purpose is to explore the psychopolitical underpinnings of 
these agreements. 
 
Thus the thesis has a two fold task. To develop an analytical model of how 
treaties work as tools of foreign policy and to outline and assess the Keating 
treaty strategy. Its principal contribution is on the theoretical side.  
 
In an attempt to extend the comprehension of the effect of treaties in 
international politics, the thesis is a wide ranging survey and synthesis of 
possible theoretical tools from a range of disciplines and traditions.
                                                 
1 Polyphonic: consisting of many voices  
Chapter One 
 
Treaties as Vital Mainstays of Australia's Evolution  
 
Treaties have long been major determinants of Australia’s foreign policy, 
while their domestic impact has also been considerable. When Great Britain 
passed legislation to be implemented by its Australian colonies, usually at 
their behest, British foreign policy was being determined by externally 
generated impetuses, and imperatives. Resultantly a pattern of attempts by 
Australia at gaining autonomy within the Empire could be identified. 
Throughout Australia's constitutional history such forms of agreement have 
been a mainstay of the evolution from independent colonies occupying a 
continental territory, and demonstrating allegiance to the British Crown, to 
an independent federation of states.  
 
Early instruments of international law, which created political entities in the 
colonies and the nation, included The Australian Colonies Government Act 
of 1850, which granted Australian colonies a form of responsible 
government, and The Commonwealth Constitution Act 1901, passed by the 
UK Parliament, which federated the Australian Colonies. While both pieces 
of legislation are commonly understood as British Laws, their very 
enactment brought into effect agreements between recognisably separate 
sovereign bodies, the basic premise of a treaty. In fact, before Federation 
consultations with regard to commercial treaties occurred between 
Australian colonies and the United Kingdom Government [Trick or Treaty: 
95:46], another indication of the UK's acceptance of a legally prescribed 
autonomy in the Australian colonies, or at least of the need to consult. 
 
 The Statute of Westminster, passed by the UK Parliament in 1931, and 
based on the Balfour Declaration of 1926, which formally transferred full 
control of external affairs from the British Home Office to the Dominions, 
gave Australia the potential to be an independent contributor to global 
political activity. But, curiously, the ratification of the Statute of Westminster 
wasn't forthcoming until 1942. Australia's reticence suggested a lack of 
confidence, or at least a less than enthusiastic acceptance that Britain was 
setting Australia free to find its own way in the world. Admittedly the 
ratification removed any residual legal constraint on Prime Minister John 
Curtin and the War Ministry of the Commonwealth of Australia to conduct 
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its own foreign policy and to negotiate alliance guidelines with regional 
states, European colonial powers and, particularly, the United States of 
America. But while this began a new era in Australia’s foreign relations, in 
essence Australia simply replaced the guiding principles of the Empire with 
the alliance guidelines of its fighting partner in the Pacific, the United States. 
Independence was beckoning, but the young federation was still uncertain 
about its ability to stand alone. This uncertainty has rarely abated. 
 
Significant bilateral, trilateral and multilateral agreements have contributed 
to the evolution towards independence. With the ANZAC Agreement of 
1944 Australia and New Zealand declared that at the conclusion of World 
War 2 they would be responsible for regional security in the South-West and 
South Pacific areas, along with the UK, USA, France, Portugal and the 
Netherlands. In 1945 Australia participated in the San Francisco Conference, 
which agreed upon the UN Charter, and the following year Australia sat on 
the UN Security Council.  Its External Affairs Minister became President of 
the UN General Assembly in 1948. This was the same year that ANZAM 
was initiated by Australia, New Zealand and the UK, to quell a communist 
insurrection in Malaya.  
 
The most dramatic evolution was the coming into force of security networks, 
which included the ANZUS Treaty of 1951. This was a compact between 
Australia, New Zealand and the United States, which was widely seen as a 
trade-off for Australian acceptance of a "soft" Peace Treaty with Japan. The 
South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) was created by the Manila 
Treaty of 1954.  This pact was drawn up by Australia, France, the USA, New 
Zealand, the UK, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand. It was designed to 
ensure that any threat from China, or from communism in Indochina, to the 
security of the region, and thus of Australia, was contained on the Asian 
mainland. The Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC), an anti-communist 
association between Australia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand 
the Philippines, Thailand and South Vietnam, was formed in 1966. 
Australia's involvement in the Vietnam War as an ally of the US, intimately 
bound up with being a signatory to SEATO and ASPAC, was a statement of 
filial association, and also a strong indicator of how external agreements 
could generate considerable and serious domestic impact, especially with 
the loss of Australia soldiers lives in battle in Vietnam. Eventually the 
Australian constituency would react against this impact, electorally, 
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although it would continue to overlook the premise of the agreement with 
the US, dependence on a powerful ally. 
  
But this challenge could well have been the result of Nixon's Guam Doctrine 
of 1971, which stipulated that US allies should begin a process aimed at 
achieving self reliance in military affairs, and reducing their dependency on 
the US. That year the Five Power Defence Arrangement or FPDA, was 
drawn up between Malaysia, Singapore, Britain, Australia and New 
Zealand. This could be construed as the Conservative Coalition Government 
in Australia looking to the old friend, the UK, after the new friend, the US, 
had denoted a reduced commitment. The Whitlam Labor Government, that 
won office the next year, began a process of withdrawing Australian troops 
from Vietnam, and brokered a rapprochement with the PRC. There seemed 
to be a willingness for Australia to branch out from its long dependence on 
"great and powerful" friends, although the US was also shifting its China 
policy. While the US may well have been the catalyst of  moves towards 
independence and self-reliance, the negative reaction of the Australian 
people to the on-going Vietnam War and conscription can also be construed 
as leading to a commitment to change. For a substantial moment Australia 
seemed intent on standing alone. 
 
In fact Australia's commercial networks were developing in wider spheres 
compatible with the US alliance; the Australia-Japan Commerce Agreement 
of 1957; [Rix:97:198] the creation of ASEAN, in 1967, with whose members 
Australia was to also engage in expanded trade [Ingleson:97:27] ; and the 
initiatives of the Whitlam Government to venture into the Asian region, 
which were supported and pursued by the Fraser Government, in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, through the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council 
(PECC) and the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC) [Cotton & 
Ravenhill:97:8] Such initiatives gained prominence under Labor Prime 
Minister Hawke, with the realisation of the Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation forum (APEC) in the late 1980s. Thus for a significant part of 
the late twentieth century Australia projected an image of an independent 
self reliant state confident of its role in global affairs.  
 
APEC became an absolute priority for the Keating Government, as it 
incorporated Asian, American and Australasian nations in free trade 
oriented commercial exchange. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), 
developed under the guidance of Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans, 
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launched in 1994, and aimed at enhancing military security, was another 
highly significant regional cooperation initiative of that era. In addition, the 
Australia-Indonesia Agreement on Maintaining Security (AMS), signed in 
1995, was a final act of amelioration, which occurred when Keating relieved 
the pressure that had existed between Indonesia and Australia, since the 
former achieved independence and had taken a confrontationist approach to 
the post colonial order through to 1965. The AMS, based on Australian-
Indonesian cooperation and partnership, promised to be as significant  at the 
beginning of the twenty first century as the Japan Trade Treaty had been in 
the previous 40 years. 
 
It is two of these major agreements, the ARF and the AMS, that led to the 
line of enquiry of this thesis. The model developed in this thesis views both 
the external and domestic psychopolitical impact of treaties. The focus of the 
analysis of the ARF is essentially external. The data available to analyse 
domestic reaction was minimal, as multilateral regional cooperation on 
security appeared to be of limited significance to the Australia domestic 
constituency. As a result the domestically oriented component of the model 
with regard to the ARF had a limited perview. 
 
The AMS, on the other hand, while a component of regional enmeshment, 
and viewed as a vital element in the construction of regional security, was 
analysed from a primarily domestic viewpoint. This occurred because the 
AMS, from its inception, was a point of contention within the Australian 
constituency, who were influenced by the troubled relationship between 
Australia and Indonesia. While the import of the AMS, as the beginnings of 
the construction of a network of bilateral security arrangements within the 
region, was shared by regional political elites, this comprehension eluded 
the Australian public. This meant that the externally oriented elements of the 
model had less pertinence. 
 
Space did not permit a detailed analysis of APEC. However, the fact that the 
economic arrangement has an impact both externally and domestically, and 
that the model would be tested in both respects with the ARF and AMS 
agreements, rendered an in-depth examination redundant. Further, unlike 
the security agreements discussed APEC enjoys widespread regional 
application, bipartisan support in the Australian polity and the acceptance of 
the domestic constituency.  In that sense, it does not offer the lackadaisical 
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treatment meted out to the ARF, nor is it an issue like the AMS, which was 
always a point of contention. 
 
The Keating Governments of 1992 to 1996 were censured in the Australian 
Parliament for allegedly engaging in less than democratic practices in their 
treaty making processes. In response to the Keating Government signing the 
Australia-Indonesia Agreement on Maintaining Security (AMS) in December 
1995 the Liberal-National Coalition launched a strategy aimed at 
‘democratising’ the treaty making process. Foreign Minister Alexander 
Downer informed the House of Representatives, on May 2nd 1996, that the 
treaty making system would be reformed and updated so that a treaty 
would not be ratified without parliamentary analysis of its impact. 
[Hansard, HoR: 2-5-96:233] 
 
This activity by the Coalition followed previous attempts by the Australian 
Democrats, in 1994 and 1995, to introduce legislation into the Senate, to 
achieve a similar end. On the 29th June 1994, Senator Vicky Bourne first 
introduced a bill for an act to provide for the parliamentary approval of 
treaties which the government proposed should apply to Australia. Bourne 
and the Democrats were concerned that the Australian Government should 
be made more accountable to its domestic constituency. Their belief that 
treaties should be approved by Parliament went back to the mid 1980s, 
when the nuclear debate had revealed that Australian governments had 
signed agreements which "made Australia a nuclear target", and later in 
1988, when the Hawke Government “signed new ten-year agreements 
covering the US - Australian facilities at Pine Gap and Nurrungar.” 
[Hansard, Senate: 29-6-94:2206]  
 
The essential issue was that Parliament did not vote to approve treaties, and 
that even in instances where the provisions of a treaty required domestic 
legislation and thus some parliamentary debate, this was “an incidental and 
marginal form of accountability...” [Hansard,Senate:29-6-94:2206]  Although 
then Opposition Leader Alexander Downer, on the 8th of June 1994,  told the 
National Press Club that “...the Australian Parliament should have a ‘proper 
say’ in our international treaty making processes...”, Bourne’s legislation did 
not gain the requisite support for passage. Bourne renewed her efforts the 
following year and when launching the “Parliamentary Approval of Treaties 
Bill 1995” spoke of the “annual treaties farce”. [Hansard, Senate: 31 -5-
95:661] She recognised that historically treaty making was “an executive 
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prerogative” but contended that change was in order due to the “growth in 
the number and scope of international agreements...” [Hansard,Senate:31-5-
95:661]  
The calls for reform of the treaty making system had occurred as treaties 
were having greater domestic implications. Australia now had the ultimate 
responsibility for its own international affairs, and there was “growing 
popular pressure for greater executive accountability...” [Hansard,Senate:31-
5-95:661] Bourne proposed that “the Government be prevented from 
entering into a treaty...unless both Houses of Parliament g(a)ve their 
approval”. [Hansard,Senate:31-5-95:661] Her major concern was with 
parliamentary sovereignty, and while accepting that the Commonwealth’s 
ratification of a treaty may rely on existing legislation to comply with the 
treaty, she contended that “legislation should be entrenched by 
parliamentary rather than executive act”. [Hansard,Senate:31-5-95:663] 
 
But the parliamentary process was only one aspect of treaty making activity 
with which the Australian polity was concerned. Creative interpretation of 
international treaties by the High Court of Australia had vested greater 
power in government to influence and affect domestic political activity by 
applying external law and norms. An instance of this was the High Court's 
adjudication of the Teoh case, through Mason CJ and Deane J, which was a 
discussion about how the deportation of a non citizen, for drug offences, 
which would result in his children remaining in Australia, was a breach of 
the international covenant against cruelty to children. [Galligan:97:35] While 
accepting that treaty provisions are not a direct source of rights and 
obligations, unless they have been "incorporated by statute into municipal 
law", the Justices rejected the notion that a "...ratified but unincorporated 
convention 'could never give rise to a legitimate expectation' that an 
administrative decision-maker would act in conformity with the treaty." 
[Alston:95:19] 
 
According to Bourne's speech to the Senate on May 31st 1995, both justices 
also found that where “a statute or subordinate legislation is ambiguous, the 
courts should favour that construction which accords with Australia’s 
obligations under a treaty or international convention to which Australia is a 
party... It is accepted that a statute is to be interpreted and applied, as far as 
its language permits, so that it is in conformity and not in conflict with the 
established rules of international law...” [Hansard,Senate:31-5-95:662] It was 
further argued that international conventions, or treaties, may play a part in 
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the development by the courts of common law. One argument from the 
High Court put it that “ratification of a convention is a positive statement by 
the executive government of this country to the world and to the Australian 
people that the executive government and its agencies will act in accordance 
with the Convention." The counter argument within the High Court was that 
“the ratification of a treaty ...(was)... not a statement to the national 
community, but only to the international community.” [Hansard,Senate:31-
5-95:663] Thus, according to McHugh J. “ if the result of ratifying an 
international convention was to give rise to a legitimate expectation that that 
convention would be applied in Australia, the Executive Government of the 
Commonwealth would have effectively amended the law of this country”. 
[Hansard,Senate:31-5-95:663] 
 
Sir Ninian Stephen used the expression “democratic deficit” in regard to his 
concern with “treaties which transfer power from national to supranational 
bodies.” [Hansard,Senate:31-5-95:663] Then Chief  Justice Anthony Mason 
raised the issue of the federal executive government committing Australia 
“to  an international convention which obliges the Australian Government to 
regulate conduct as between citizens within national boundaries...” 
[Hansard,Senate:31-5-95:663] Bourne concluded that Australia’s role in 
international law making could not be confined “to the secrecy of the 
Cabinet room”. [Hansard,Senate:31-5-95:665] 
 
 The implication of the attacks on Labor, especially from the Coalition's 
perspective, was that Executive Government was working beyond the reach 
of the Parliamentary process and thus treaty making was seen as an 
excessive abuse of power. The Coalition Government may have been 
responding to Keating’s hasty and secretive signing of the AMS in December 
1995. But the underlying disagreement between the Labor administration, 
which had favoured multilateralism, and by implication a 'rationalist' 
perspective, and the Coalition, with its penchant for bilateral forms of 
exchange between nations, a 'realist' approach, seemed more to do with 
party traditions than with the actual practice of international relations. But 
Labor had used bilateral strategies, too, as evidenced by the AMS. Keating 
and Evans justification for employing so called ‘secret diplomacy’ was also 
based on common practice, whereby bilateral treaties were usually 
negotiated in secret to avoid "premature disclosure", as "the international 
convention amongst countries is to treat the text of such treaties as 
confidential until signature." [Trick or Treaty:94:99] But this stance was seen 
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as anachronistic by the Liberal Opposition, a position held even more 
strongly by the Australian Democrats. 
 
Curiously, both the Liberal Prime Minister, Howard, and Foreign Minister, 
Downer, on attaining power, went on to enunciate Realism as the overriding 
tenet of their policy making teams. The basis for negotiation of treaties for 
Realists is secret diplomacy. In fact in the Review of Treaty Making, the final 
reform envisaged wider parliamentary and community consultation, except 
when such consultation would impede the realisation of  the national 
interest. In the end the real objections of the Coalition may have been to the 
successes, at least internationally, of a proactive foreign relations team under 
the guidance of Labor, and this indicated that leadership is a crucial element 
of foreign policy. However, it seems it was only with the Australia-
Indonesia Security Agreement of 1995 that partisan sentiment became 
sharply defined, but this may have been mere window dressing  by 
oppositionist groups to attract the attention of the domestic constituency.  
 
The nation’s foreign policy, that appeared to be based on national interest, 
and the interest of the Australian population, may well have been guided, 
outlined and defined by ‘external’ determinants. Treaties,  which 
encompassed the trade and security relationship between Australia and 
Indonesia, the relationships between Australia and its regional neighbours, 
and Australia’s entrenched loyalty to the USA and western values, were 
instruments of foreign policy for the Keating Government.  Equally they 
may have impacted as external agents of influence and of change in the 
domestic economic, military, and social arenas.  
 
Thus it must be asked to what extent was Keating challenging the dominant 
social paradigms? Underpinning the Australian discourse on values and 
attitudes was the legacy of the White Australia Policy, fear of Asia, 
protecting Australia's membership of the West, and maintaining Australia's 
allegiance to great and powerful friends. Keating's vision, as presented here, 
seemed to be seen by some as heralding a new age of hope, and by others as 
a betrayal of all things sacred. 
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Keating's Vision for Australia 
 
"By the turn of the century, by the centenary of our nationhood, I hope this 
will be a country in which more and more Australians speak the languages of 
our neighbours; our business people are a familiar and valued part of the 
commercial landscape of the Asia-Pacific; we are making full use of the great 
resource of the growing number of Australians of Asian background; our 
defence and strategic links with countries around us are deeper than ever; 
our national identity is clearer to us and our neighbours through the 
appointment of an Australian as our head of state; and our national culture is 
shaped by, and helps to shape, the cultures around us." 
  
Asia-Australia Institute , Brisbane , October 1994 
 
Was it simply the effect of the entrenched conservatism of the Australian 
constituency, complemented by historically based negative attitudes 
towards "Asia", which made Keating's reform program much less digestible 
than logic would suggest? Or was there another element, an apprehension 
about 'sinister' motives due the Keating's secrecy? Because he excluded 
parliament and thus the Australian people from the treaty making process 
was he attempting to impose a regime of change on the Australian 
community without their knowledge? Was the rejection of Keating's vision 
thus more a rejection of Keating's secretive method, and less to do with that 
vision?  Or was the essence of the rejections premised on something much 
deeper in the national psyche, an innate fear of the unknown? 
 
An analysis of how Keating used his foreign policy tool-kit will allow an 
understanding of both the conventional use of varying forms of agreements, 
and a more qualitative exploration of the ways in which treaties contribute 
to and can contrive to change the constituents world-view. In short, how did 
Keating challenge Australian attitudes? 'Arrogance' was often used to 
describe Keating's attitude. Just two  days prior to the signing of the 
Australia-Indonesia AMS, Opposition leader Howard, speaking on National 
Identity,  described national leadership under Keating as "arrogant, 
proscriptive, divisive and manipulative" [Howard:95:7] . 
Keating's attitude to change purportedly demonstrated his disregard for the 
opinions and attitudes of the Australian constituency, and this seemed 
evident when he suggested that the Government had not referred to the 
Australian people about the Agreement on Maintaining Security with 
Indonesia, because if they had there would have been no agreement. 
[Smith.H:97:17-18] His contention seemed to be that it was in the national 
interest to reach that agreement with Australia's northern most neighbour, 
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but that the animosity felt by Australians against Indonesia, because of East 
Timor, meant the domestic constituency would have rejected such an 
agreement. This, in turn, was seen by Keating as a position untenable in light 
of the developing economic power of Asia. He argument appeared to be that 
pragmatism should prevail regardless of historical legacies.  
 
In light of these psychosocial insights there is a need to consider Treaties 
Beyond the Text - imbued with the author's  technical predilections, 
influenced by the initiators thoughts, constructed to achieve widespread 
acceptance if possible, and essentially an ideational compilation. Thus the 
context in which it is presented is vital, and the concepts on which it is 
based, as well as what is ultimately written on the page. The agreement 
could be even more elusive and not be readily found on the document 
which underpins it, but be premised on perceptual comprehensions 
inherently historic, persuasively futuristic or pragmatically centred in the 
present. 
 
Exploring the psychological dimension of treaties is the major focus of this 
analysis.  An attempt will be made to assess the impact of Keating’s 
experiments from a psychopolitical perspective. The existing outcomes and 
probable future attainments stemming from Keating’s stratagem will be 
analysed. How should he have dealt with the domestic constituency to 
achieve success? The essence of the discussion presented here is to delve into 
the psychosocial and psychopolitical elements of attitudinal conservatism in 
a bid to identify how Keating breached those protocols, and how he may, 
perhaps,  have avoided the pitfalls of rejection that stemmed from 
challenging the constituency's comfort zone. 
 
The value of the tools chosen by Keating will be assessed. 
 
Thus the underriding discussion throughout this thesis explores the 
following hypothesis:  
To achieve success as tools of foreign policy treaties  must be 
 constructed  and construed so as to satisfy the psychopolitical 
 necessities of all key actors, external and domestic. 
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Synthesis and Analysis 
 
This thesis follows two lines of inquiry. One explores theoretical 
comprehensions of how treaties may be utilised as tools of foreign policy, 
while the other looks at particular examples in practice. At the theoretical 
level, the thesis is an examination of the possible ways in which treaties can 
effect change in not only global policy but in domestic policy, as a general 
rule. This entails an excursion through social theory which is driven by the 
pragmatic needs of the investigation. There is no well developed body of 
theory which focuses on how treaties effect change. Thus a wide variety of 
literatures have been examined for what they have to offer, by extrapolation, 
to this question. The larger part of this thesis is an exercise in theoretical 
argument, speculation and synthesis of literature on International Relations 
(IR), Organisation Studies, Political Communication and Social Psychology, 
to develop a multifaceted theoretical insight into treaties, their aims and 
effects, and to identify the psychopolitical elements within those 
agreements. 
 
Theoretical Understanding of Treaties  
 
While thoughts about treaties lead naturally to considering their legal 
implications or the strategic ramifications, a less obvious but arguably 
essential consideration must be paid to the psychological impact that 
compacts can have. Such an approach will go some way towards explaining 
Keating's attempt to shift Australia's primary allegiances away from a 
singular dependence on the USA, militarily, and Great Britain and Europe, 
culturally. Such activity drew attention to the elements of perception 
formation or perception enhancement that treaties bring to interstate 
relations. For Australia this dimension was particularly pertinent at the 
closing of the Cold War period, when foreign policy makers in the Keating 
Government, in collaboration with Foreign Minister Evans, were 
constructing regional 'architecture' with both military and economic 
dimensions. The architecture was intended, in part, to impress on regional 
neighbours Australia’s full hearted intent to participate interdependently 
with regional states.  
 
The Keating Government expanded on the work of its predecessors, the 
Hawke Ministries, and with Evans program as the cornerstone of Keating’s 
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foreign policy, Keating proactively pursued multilateral assent for both 
military and economic strategies in the region.But foreign policy making is 
not only targeted towards the external. The domestic constituency must be 
convinced that such policy is in the "national interest". This was the task of 
several members of the Keating Ministry, with Keating and Evans taking the 
lead, but McMullan must also be recognised as a major contributor to raising 
Australia’s profile in the region, through his work as Australia’s Trade 
Minister.  Both Keating and McMullan had the task of convincing the 
domestic constituency of the pertinence, salience and efficacy of Australia’s 
push in to the region, in the hope that electors would assist in the quest 
rather than act as inhibitors.  In gauging the success or not of this strategy 
this thesis searches for an understanding of how social psychology works to 
form or enhance perceptions, or not.  
 
Psychopolitics Explored 
 
Perception and misperception featured in Pettman’s work on Human 
Behaviour and World Politics, wherein he describes how “social 
psychological research is largely ...(focussed)...upon individual 
behaviour...and upon human behaviour in groups.” [Pettman:75:201]  
Although he cautions that the relevance of social psychology to world 
politics will be a "partial and conditional one”. Pettman’s work is a sound 
basis for developing an appreciation of the psychopolitical aspects of 
Keating’s foreign policy.  
 
Essential to understanding Pettman’s argument is his view that individual 
performance will be modified by ‘objective constraints’, but that a good deal 
may be learned about a state’s foreign policy “in terms of the personality, 
the motives, the attitudes, the beliefs, the stereotypes, the emotions and 
perceptions of its key decision-makers and their advisers, or in terms of the 
psychological attributes of its people, or at least those sections of it which the 
decision-makers take into account...” [Pettman:75:202] Thus his caution, 
which rests on the premise that the informative nature of the psychological 
picture depends upon the “influence of role constraints and the immediacy 
of systemic imperatives”. He further qualifies this judgement when he 
contends that “the individual and the constraints that enclose him are in 
constant interaction and will to some extent reorganise each other... as... 
human beings act upon their understanding of reality”. [Pettman:75:203] 
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Having established a base from which to mount an argument concerning the 
pertinence of socio-psychological analysis of decision makers Pettman then 
explores the structural cornerstones of the psychopolitical analytical 
approach. To best illustrate this he comes to a position where he states that 
“(m)isperception - wilful or unconscious - will distort the most objective 
seeming realities, running before the policy-making process and 
conditioning it at every point.” [Pettman:75:207] But what are these systemic 
imperatives which act to modify or control policy? He writes of how images 
are mapped "...for their selective effects upon the perceptions of elites and of 
the led; personality traits are scrutinised for possible political implications; 
psychological drives are assessed for their part in producing aggressive 
behaviour and war or in maintaining the peace; and public opinion, or 
rather the opinions of diverse publics, are plumbed as contributing causes of 
one external stance or another” [Pettman:75:203]. 
 
The argument, according to J.D.Singer, is that the key to national character is 
the statistical aggregation of the modal personality of a state’s citizens; that 
the mass ideology is representative of the sum of personal attitudes; and that 
“the sum of individual opinions on a matter is a climate of opinion”. 
[Pettman:75:204] Attitudes are seen by Singer as major incentives and 
constraints on foreign policy while ideology is viewed as an aggregate of 
those attitudinal configurations. 
 
Thus Pettman invites his readers to “probe the central concept of ‘attitude’ 
for its psychopolitical effects upon world affairs.” [Pettman:75:204] He 
contends that ‘attitude’ is construed as an implicit disposition which exerts a 
general but consistent influence over evaluation responses. It is learned, not 
innate, and as a phenomenon it is cognitive, in that it underpins believing 
and knowing; it is affective, in that it is constructed in terms of what is seen 
as good or bad; and it is behavioural, in that it is reflected in what is done. 
Thus he identifies a direct relationship between thinking and feeling, and 
behaviour. 
 
Behaviour can be determined by thinking and feeling, but equally the 
pattern and form of behaviour can have a guiding influence over thinking 
and feeling. As a result of the influence of pattern and form, images become 
entrenched. These images act either to enhance creative ways of thinking or 
as retardants to proactivity, resulting in pathological retreats. Images are 
investigated extensively by Pettman as being spatial, temporal, relational, 
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personal, value oriented, affectional, public or private. He then adds to this 
the Freudian dimensions of conscious, subconscious and unconscious minds 
[Pettman:75:205-6]. Thus he concludes that these images and attitudes act a 
prejudgments, as simple models of the world, as working hypotheses which 
make sense of what is perceived but at the cost of complexity. These 
prejudgments are resistant to change and act to set entrenched patterns of 
behaviour within the greater polity and within the policy making elite, in 
responses where images either precede action or partly predetermine it, and 
this can lead to selective attention, selective remembering and forgetting, 
and distorted perceptions, and misperceptions. 
 
In a further explanation of this phenomenon Pettman discusses the role of 
cognitive consonance and cognitive dissonance in the making of 
perceptions, of the intolerance of ambiguity, the theory of pattern 
preservation and of how simplistic thinking leads to simplistic perceptions 
in a bid to avoid any confrontation with ambiguity, as there is a reluctance to 
deal in anything less than certainty. A clearer understanding of cognitive 
dissonance makes Pettman's argument more pertinent. 
 
Cognitive dissonance is identified as a major element in psychopolitical 
activity. Festinger's theory about this process, developed in 1957, is based on 
the reasoning that "...when a person holds two cognitions (ideas about the 
world) that are consistent with each other, he or she experiences a satisfying 
state of consonance. However, two (or more) cognitions that are inconsistent 
(one cognition implies the opposite of another) result in dissonance, and an 
unpleasant state of arousal." Thus, "...people are motivated to reduce the 
unsettling state of cognitive dissonance." [Gergen:81:178] It then follows that 
the more important the cognitions in opposition, the greater the dissonance 
and the greater the motivation for dissonance reduction.  
 
Two common ways of reducing dissonance are by altering behaviour, 
whereby the action related to a cognition in contention is abandoned in 
favour of the status quo, or where the interpretation of that cognition is 
altered to make it less oppositionary. Hence members of the political 
constituency in Australia, when faced with Keating's proposition that 
Australia was part of Asia, came up against a societally entrenched fear of 
Asia. One group reacted by rejecting Keating's message and staying with the 
entrenched attitude, while the other group adopted his vision by placing the 
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entrenched opinion in an historic context, which allowed for a contemporary 
shift in attitude.  
 
However, Jervis suggests that in reducing dissonance, "people alter their 
beliefs and evaluations, thereby changing the premises of later 
deliberations..." thus cognitive dissonance has "...implications for the 
person's future decisions, actions and perceptions." [Jervis:83:387] This 
suggests that regardless of the form dissonance reduction takes, attitudes are 
affected, dissonance can be a means for realising change, and while a leader 
opposed to change may elicit cognitive consonance as a pacifying force in 
the short term, this actually leads to opportunities for change agents to 
create dissonance and achieve attitudinal shifts.   
 
Pettman's discussion continues to elucidate in this manner offering an 
insight in perception formation [Pettman:75:215], the role of conformity and 
loyalty in policy making and patterns of group communication. Pettman 
draws on both Burton's and Hoffman’s work on perceptions to further 
explain psychodynamics in the international system. Burton states that 
reality is a “contest of active perceptions competing for the privilege of 
defining reality... "[Burton, cited by Pettman:75:230], while Hoffman 
suggests that "International politics ...was often an arena of coercion without 
persuasion; ...(while now)...it is tending to become an arena of persuasion, 
more or less coercive.” [Hoffman, cited in Pettman:75:230] Pettman 
concludes that “(t)he arts of persuasion are first and foremost psychological 
ones, and their political implications are profound.” [Pettman:75:230] 
 
 It can be seen from Pettman etal. that the psychopolitical has pertinence as 
an analytical tool. But what can be discovered from this perspective? Was 
the destination to which Keating and his lieutenants were attempting to 
propel the Australian public a desirable one, from the public’s viewpoint? 
The March 1996 election result, when Keating lost government, suggests it 
was not.  
 
An opening question, raised by reading Pettman, is related to how 
'psychological manipulation' was used in a bid to convince Australians of 
the salience of the shift into Asia. Thus it is possible to view the objective of 
that psychopolitical analysis as one of illuminating manipulation. And yet 
were the foreign policy makers aware of this manipulative dimension? Thus, 
at first glance this appears to be a psychological assessment, but if it is 
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necessary to ascertain the raison d'etre’ of the elite it becomes a political 
assessment of how psychological tools were utilised. But if that elite was 
intent on psychological manipulation, to achieve political outcomes, was this 
then a conscious application of psychopolitical tools to achieve political 
ends? Put simply, is the task at hand one of discerning the extent of the 
conscious application of psychopolitical tools?  
 
Practical Understandings of Treaties. 
 
The thesis is also an investigation, an analysis, into how the Keating 
Government may have attempted to use treaties, in their various forms, to 
persuade Australians to accept a new outlook with regard to the Asia Pacific 
region, in a project articulated by Keating's vision, and to gauge his success. 
To achieve this objective the two agreements creating the ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF) and the Australia-Indonesia Agreement on Maintaining 
Security (AMS) are examined. Their aims and effects will be outlined in the 
case studies presented in the last part of the thesis. Each Agreement will be 
subjected to a series of questions constructed to identify likely helpful 
theoretical comprehensions which will provide qualitative and quantitative 
insights into the role, purpose and effect of treaties in general, and then of 
those cited above.  
   
Of prime importance at the early stage in the project was the need to address 
the diverse understanding of what a treaty actually is. Thus a brief 
exploration of the various comprehensions of what constitutes a treaty, 
drawing on both international law and the Australian Government's 
declared interpretation serves as a preamble to the development of 
analytical tools with which to assess the efficacy of treaties. 
 
Introducing Treaties
 
 The definition of what constitutes a treaty is varied and contested.  The 
view expressed by Professor at Law, D.P. O'Connell, in the Report by the 
Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee of November 1995, 
entitled Trick or Treaty? Commonwealth Power to make and Implement 
Treaties, was that  
 
"There is no general touchstone for determining what is a treaty. Everything 
depends upon analysis of the instrument in question, whether its contemplated 
goal is juridically significant, whether the language used is indicative of 
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juridical intent, and whether the signatories acted in a manner consistent with 
the view that they intended to enter into a binding arrangement as distinct from 
merely assenting to an ad hoc political aim." 
 
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia 
November 1995. 
 
O'Connell seems to imply that a treaty must have application at law to be 
salient and efficacious. He appears to denigrate the symbolic treaty, which 
has the purpose of binding without legal constraint. 
 
Another view stems from Article 2(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties  states that a treaty is "...an international agreement 
concluded between States in written form and governed by international 
law...(which is)... binding on any nation state which enters into it... The term 
'treaty' covers a range of international agreements including charters, 
conventions, covenants, protocols, pacts and exchanges of notes.” [Trick or 
Treaty: CofA: 95:31]  
 
A variant on this focusses more closely on the intent of the treaty, which is 
defined as a contract or other written instrument binding two or more states 
under international law. The term treaty is confined to the more important 
international agreements, whereas those agreements of lesser or subordinate 
importance have been called conventions, agreements, arrangements, 
protocols and pacts. A treaty is normally negotiated between 
plenipotentiaries provided by their respective governments with "full power 
' to conclude the treaty within the scope of their instructions. Signature, 
however, is presumed to be subject to ratification by the government unless 
explicitly waived. Apart from such express provision, the instrument does 
not become formally binding until ratifications have been exchanged. 
[Encyclopedia Brittanica: 87:11-907] 
 
International jurists have classified treaties in a practical way according to 
their object, as follows: ( I ) political treaties, (2) commercial treaties,  (3) 
constitutional and administrative treaties,  (4) treaties relating to criminal 
justice, (5) treaties relating to civil justice, and (6) treaties codifying 
international law. In practice it is often difficult to assign a particular treaty 
to any one of these classes, or simply as general (multilateral) or bilateral 
treaties, [EB:87:11-907] 
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 International organisations play an important role in international law 
matters. They are usually established by multilateral agreements and have 
independent legal personalities, meaning that they can enter into treaties in 
their own right. Two major international organisations are the United 
Nations and the International Labour Organisation. The fundamental goal of 
the United Nations is to ensure international peace and security. The 
purpose of the International Labour Organisation is to establish labour 
standards. 
 
Bilateral treaties usually come into force upon signature. In contrast a 
multilateral treaty must be ratified before coming into force for a state. 
When state representatives sign a treaty it usually denotes that they agree to 
the content of the agreement. When a state ratifies a treaty it expresses its 
consent to be bound by the treaty. Bilateral treaties are by far the easiest to 
realise if both polities share a vision, or when one side can influence, 
encourage or coerce the other side to cooperate, or when two dictators meet 
in agreement; but when two democracies meet and attempt to come to an 
agreement, both are subject to domestic judgement and thus agreement 
becomes less than relevant if it does not enjoy widespread constituent 
support. 
 
When the aim is to reach an agreement on terms negotiated between treaty 
makers, free of domestic intervention, short term success is possible. 
However, a change in attitude within the domestic constituency can limit the 
life of such an agreement, even though it enjoyed multipartisan support at 
the moment of signing or ratification. Thus the successful treaty must 
promise whatever the constituency affected by that treaty is hoping for, so 
that that constituency is not challenged and forced to retreat to a comfort 
zone or attitudinal plateau as a result of cognitive dissonance. 
 
One successful path is to construct an agreement that is so loosely defined, 
and so encumbered with essentially contested concepts that it can always be 
accepted, regardless of the political outlook of the constituent members. 
Such an agreement may serve little purpose as a useful tool, or become a 
powerful tool of persuasion in the right hands. It can be used to shore up 
certainty; to create boundaries for action to occur within; to delineate; to 
define; include; maintain; retain; exclude; instigate; prevent; initiate; launch; 
halt; cease; ensure; guarantee; or stymie. 
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However, a more radical view, as expressed by McDougal and Lehmann 
[1995] suggests that a treaty, or international agreement, is "not that of a 
mere collocation of words or signs on a parchment, but rather that of a 
continuing process of communication and collaboration between the parties 
in the shaping and sharing of demanded values." [McDougal etal:95:xxiii]  
Here we encounter the possibility of psychosocial elements influencing 
interaction between states in how they interpret their relationship and the 
agreements which underpin such exchange. 
 
The hopes and aspirations of the treaty makers must serve as an indicator of 
their intent in, and of, the agreements which they entered into. This outline 
allows for the development of questions with which to construct a further 
research agenda, the objective of which is to identify likely helpful 
theoretical approaches which will provide insights into the origin, role, 
purpose and efficacy of treaties in general, and as illustrated in particular 
case studies. 
  
The thesis concentrates on treaty making from a theoretical perspective, and 
develops a multivoiced or polyphonous analytical model to test the efficacy 
of a treaty. This model is a synthesis of various comprehensions drawn from 
a range of disciplines, in a bid to address the claims of the hypothesis. This 
multiperspectival approach hinges on the focus on norms, perceptions and 
discourses as the primary targets and tools of change agents, and thus the 
test is essentially aimed at treaties likely to effect change domestically. 
 
Two case studies are included where the polyphonic analytical model is 
applied to the agreements underpinning the ASEAN Regional Forum, 
revealing an external concern not matched domestically, and the Australia-
Indonesia Agreement on Maintaining Security, which discloses significant 
interest in the Australian political arena. A detailed summary of how the 
thesis evolves indicates the development of that model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 19
How the Thesis Evolves.
 
The thesis is divided into five sections, the first three of which are surveys of  
theoretical comprehensions which throw light on the psychological 
underpinnings of political activity. Each Chapter  of the three theoretical 
sections is based on seminal works from which clear conceptual outlines are 
drawn. The purpose of the enquiry into each perspective is to identify the 
basic concepts, and no enquiry into the contestability of concepts is pursued. 
The purpose of these examinations is to extrapolate conceptual applications 
to treaties, and to identify likely psychopolitical elements. Section Four 
presents the polyphonic analytical model that is a synthesis of the pertinent 
insights gleaned from the survey of theoretical data and Section Five is 
comprised of the two aforementioned case studies.  
 
Section One, External Comprehensions, begins with insights into treaties 
borne by examinations of international law comprehensions, conventional 
international relations theories and the more contemporary outlook of social 
constructivism. The prime objective of this section, which targets the 
external application of treaties, is to identify psychopolitical elements which 
have a domestic impact, and take the form of norms, perceptions or 
discourses.  
 
In Chapter Two, initial reference is made to Gerhard von Glahn's text, Law 
Among Nations : An Introduction to Public International Law,  published in 
1970. His discussion about the traditional role of treaties as sources of 
international law, led onto an extended insight into interpretation, the basis 
of which was the divide between the content of a treaty and the intent of the 
treaty maker. This raised the notion of how cultural norms can interpose on 
intentionalities and guide interpretation. In more contemporary works, by 
McDougal, Lasswell and Miller in 1994, and McDougal and Lehman in 1995, 
the process of interpretation and the context in which it is performed are 
explicated, with the conclusion being reached that when deciphering a treaty 
the peremptory norms of general international law must be paid due regard. 
In this manner the interpreter can be guided by the community's wants or 
needs. Thus norms are identified as a major element of international law and 
as a consideration for treaty makers as change agents. 
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Chapter Three deals with a grouping of conventional international relations 
theories, which were selected due to their focus on the state as primary 
actor, within a system. NeoRealism, refers to the work of Waltz, and critical 
comments by Cox and Ashley, as summarised in Burchill and Linklater's 
1996 text, Theories of International Relations.  The expose' is used to identify 
how systemic constraints can lead to socialisation of states whereby, in a bid 
to influence, leaders may be forced to adapt to dominant discourses, or in 
pursuit of perception enhancement, adopt new behaviours, often 
engendered by norms amended by treaty action.  
 
Hegemonic Stability Theory, draws on work by Cox, who offers an outline 
of how leadership can be exercised by a benign power, in pursuit of 
universal or general interests, or as a facilitator of collective action. The 
crucial point here is that the hegemon is assuming the role of agent by acting 
beyond the constraints of structure. Thus the hegemon enters the field of 
psychosocial influence once it exercises agency. Kono's overview of regional 
regimes, published in 1998, although critical of the hegemon's role in regime 
formation, supports this argument, while Min and Waldron, in their 1998 
paper titled Emergence of  Synergistic Hegemony in International Relations,  
offer a further complexion to the comprehension of a hegemon as an agent 
based construct, whose emergence can be an expression of efforts for 
collective action. 
 
In a like manner arguments put forward by Krasner and Keohane feature in 
Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger's conclusion about international regimes, 
presented in their journal article, Integrating Theories Of International 
Regimes, published in 2000. In their own right, Hasenclever etal present 
views on the role of agency with insights into cognitivism, a counterpart of 
constructivism. Regime Theory informs of how the treaty can be utilised to 
impose a set of principles or norms on states to construct order. Kono also 
features in this discussion with his articulation of possible gains realised 
through regime activity and the role of transactionalism. 
   
The comprehensions of NeoLiberal Institutionalism presented here stem 
from Martin's work at Harvard, and her 1997 paper titled An Institutionalist 
View: International Institutions and State Strategies. Martin further 
articulates the impact of regimes, looking at how interdependence is 
engendered and enhanced through the imposition of norms in the guise of 
rules and regulations, and applied by international institutions. Thus, again 
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norms figure prominently as elements with which change agents must 
contend, or utilise, to achieve their objective. 
 
The more contemporary theory of social constructivism, presented in 
Chapter Four, draws on the work of  both Ruggie, who delves into 
comprehensions of structure and agency  emanating from Giddens, and 
notions on ideas originating with Goldstein and Keohane. This data is 
presented to better explain the role of ideational motives within 
international relations, as it focusses on structure and agency. But also 
because it introduces the notion of how beliefs can underpin political 
comprehensions, contending that for change to occur intersubjective beliefs, 
that are social facts based on collective intentionality, must be addressed. 
Thus shared narratives are established, which are based on evolving societal 
norms, influenced by discourses, and with an awareness of maintaining 
perceptions. An afterword from Sliker, from her 1992 publication 'This Small 
Planet' Multiple Mind : Healing the Split in Psyche and World,  extends the 
base of ideational influence, by linking the actions of the individual to global 
patterns of political activity, when she outlines how a growing 
interdependency between states is partly an outcome of the sharing of 
beliefs and the convergence of ideas between peoples across cultures which 
is redefining state relations. 
 
Section Two, External / Internal Perspectives, examines norms, perceptions 
and discourses, by illustrating how they serve to bridge the gap between 
external and domestic political activity, particularly with regard to change 
elicited by treaty making activity. 
Chapter Five begins by demonstrating how pertinent domestically 
generated impetuses and imperatives are in the development of treaties. It 
draws on Saunders text, Officials and Citizens in International Relations, as 
presented in Volkan's publication of 1991, The Psychodynamics of 
International Relations, where he contends that interstate exchange is a 
dynamic political process which involves not only states, but includes 
human dimensions. 
such as ideational elements like norms.  
 
While this chapter looks at norms, it then proceeds to develop the links 
between norms, perceptions and discourses. As an expose of these three 
elements it examines norm dynamics, perception mechanics and discourses.  
Finnemore and Sikkink's article, International norm dynamics and political 
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change, as presented in International Organisation in 1998, is the main 
source of data. In this work a variety of norm types are identified to aid in 
understanding what treaty makers must work with before the role of the 
norm entrepreneur is outlined, as a way of explaining the requisite actions of 
the treaty maker as change agent. The process of internalisation of norms is 
described as this is a vital outcome if change is to occur. With this work the 
authors are used to offer an explanation of how socialisation works, and to 
illustrate possible challenges for change agents.  
 
The work on perception formation, modification and enhancement is 
essentially an explication of how perceptions are constructed, and what they 
are premised on. Jervis's 1983 text, Perception and Misperception in 
International Politics, is the primary source for this insight, and is used to  
offer explanations of intentionality and the impact of 'evoked sets' on 
perception and interpretation. Ekecki's work, on the formation of 
perceptions, extends the notion of evoked sets, by looking at stocks of 
knowledge as ideational benchmarks. To conclude this part of the chapter 
Jervis is drawn on again to enunciate the relationship between perceptions, 
attitude and change. This comprehension is a necessary guide if the treaty 
maker is to achieve success. 
 
Discourses as the basis of perceptions, or the outcome of norms, are a vital 
and intrinsic element in this troika of psychopolitical comprehensions, 
spanning the external and domestic polity.  Fairclough's expose, Language 
and Power, published in 1989, is used to look at the relevance of discourses 
to language, the order of discourses, and at how a particular discourse can 
achieve dominance. The connection between discourses and common sense 
and ideology, both of which can be either conducive or oppositionary to the 
treaty makers actions, is examined as a means to explaining the origins of 
discourse, and to give a clue at to how a discourse may come about or be 
constructed. Fairclough is drawn on further to examine the  naturalisation of 
discourses, which correlates with the work on the internalisation of norms. 
This chapter concludes by examining the relationship between norms, 
perceptions, discourses and treaties, and overall is a necessary introduction 
to the next section, which identifies the salience of these three ideational 
elements as tools of political communication.   
 
Section Three, Internal Comprehensions, moves into the realm of the 
domestic constituency, by enquiring into the psychosocial and thus 
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psychopolitical bases of implementing change, and the likely impediments 
to or strategies for achieving attitudinal shifts domestically, to ensure the 
success of a treaty regime. 
 
Chapter Six approaches cultural change from an organisational viewpoint. 
Its selection was premised on the simplistic notion that the domestic political 
constituency is essentially an organisation, in that it has leaders and 
followers. The discussion, which draws on the resources presented in Bate's 
text of 1994, Strategies for Cultural Change, revolves around the forms of 
cultural change that can be actualised, and the effectiveness of each of those 
realisations. Bate's work is used to explain the strategies for cultural 
development, a method which maintains the status quo while allowing for 
change; and cultural transformation, whereby a fundamental change within 
the culture occurs.  These explanations are complemented by an outline of 
the possible means of implementation of strategies, and the variant styles of 
leadership, which can be appended to those forms of cultural change. This 
material is aimed at elucidating possible cultural changes and there 
execution, and thus can be utilised to examine the actions of leaders and to 
assess their successes as change agents. 
 
 In Chapter Seven reference is made to data drawing on social psychology, 
as a way of identifying possible challenges to be met by treaty makers intent 
on change. The discussion revolves around intangibles like beliefs, desires 
and opinions, as outlined by Money-Kyrle in his articulation of  general 
principles cognitive development, in his text 1977 publication, 
Psychoanalysis and Politics, and complemented by conceptual explanations 
drawn from Eysenck's insights into the relationship between opinions, 
attitudes and ideologies, as presented in his 1968 publication, The 
Psychology of Politics. This expose offers a deeper understanding to the 
change agent of what processes must be utilised. Sarbin's work, drawn from 
the 1986 text, Narrative Psychology, is used to further extend this 
comprehension with the identification of narrative structures, akin to 
discourses, which influence thinking and attitudinal stance. Gergen and 
Gergen, in the same publication, offer another dimension by linking 
narrative and interpretation. The chapter concludes with the presentation of 
concepts articulated by Volkan, in the 1990 text, The Psychodynamics of 
International Relationships, where other psychodynamic elements, like 
identification, rituals of identification, proper interpretation, message 
receptivity and cognitive dissonance, all receive necessary explication as a 
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guide to better understanding possible tactical measures that could be 
employed by treaty makers as change agents, or which could act as 
impediments to the implementation of change engendered by a treaty. 
 
The final theoretical explanations are contained in Chapter Eight, which has 
two major focuses, one on the methods of political communication, with 
insights into persuasion, propaganda and indoctrination. The outline of 
persuasion is premised on insights drawn from Pratkanis and Aronson's 
1991 text, Age of Propaganda, where they look at the relationship between 
persuasion and behaviour, before an examination of mass persuasion 
techniques, which undergo explication. Using this material the link is made 
between persuasion and propaganda. At this point the 1989 publication, 
Propaganda, edited by Smith III, is used to identify variant forms of 
propaganda, and there mechanisms, with the work of MacDonald [1989] 
looking at propaganda and order, Burnett's insights [1989] into ideology and 
propaganda; and O'Donnell and Jowett's views [1989] on propaganda as a 
form of communication. The arguments taken from the authors are 
synthesised to an end point where indoctrination is viewed as a possible 
outcome of persuasion, or as an underpinning of propaganda.  
 
The text, Concepts of Indoctrination, published in 1977 and edited by Snook, 
is an articulation of educative techniques, and presents a discussion on 
philosophical and psychological mechanics of persuasion, in its variant 
forms, and is used to set the context in which to consider the ways that 
attitudinal shifts are possible using political communication. These 
discussions are intended to elucidate the various approaches that a treaty 
maker may adopt to implement change, but also to alert the change agent to 
the barriers to achieving attitudinal shifts and redefinitions of cognitive 
frameworks.  
 
The second focus is on the machinery of political communication, which 
concerns strategies employed in advertising and media communications, 
and elements of those processes, including the variant forms that the 
communications can take. McNair's An Introduction to Political 
Communication, published in 1995, provides the starting point for this 
discussion, with his explanation of  what characterises political 
communication. Huckfeldt and Sprague's publication of the same year, 
Citizens, Politics and Social Communication, is used to make the link 
between social communication and persuasion techniques, to tie in this 
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section on the  machinery to the previous section on means of political 
communication. The discussion on persuasion is extended by referencing 
Petty and Cacioppo's articulation of central and peripheral routes to 
persuasion, contained in the 1983 publication, Advertising and Consumer 
Psychology, edited by Percy and Woodside. While this work if focussed on 
advertising, it combines concepts from psychology and communications, 
and applies cognitive frameworks from social psychology to suggests 
possible avenues to achieve successful attitudinal shifts. This second part of 
the chapter concludes with Zanna's examination of message receptivity and 
the processes which can be used to enhance or inhibit attitudinal change in a 
constituency, as contained in Advertising Exposure, Memory, and Choice, 
published in 1993 and edited by Mitchell, and drawn from the consumer 
psychology discipline. This latter section has been excluded from the case 
studies as the analysis mostly depends on data obtained at the point of 
implementation, and is difficult to access or collect beyond that time. 
 
Section Four presents the polyphonic analytical model, developed as a 
synthesis of these multiperspectival insights. The model has four essential 
concerns of assessment, and they are,  
 
 How do the theoretical perspectives of international relations  explain 
the origins, role and purpose of a treaty?, 
 What influences must treaty makers contend with?,  
 What challenges to change, as presented by psychopolitical 
 understandings, are to be overcome and what actions must be 
 taken to achieve successful acceptance of a treaty ?, and  
 Was the attempt at effecting change a success?  
 
These questions are then applied to ascertain the viability of treaties as 
change agents, discovering the extent to which treaties were used by the 
Keating government to achieve aims that would have been stymied 
domestically, and estimating how much Australia was guided in its 
adherence to treaties by  external forces, be they other nation states or 
institutional processes like globalisation. 
 
Section Five is based on analysis, and contains the two case studies 
considered appropriate to demonstrate the saliency of the model, and a 
conclusion which contains a diagnosis of treaties as tools of foreign policy, 
the theoretical component of the thesis, and a prognosis of Keating's legacy, 
where comment is made regarding the likely long term outcomes of the 
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strategy employed by Keating to persuade the Australian community of the 
relevance of Asia to Australia's destiny. 
A primary objective of the theoretical synthesis, herein, was to create a 
model with which to test the efficacy of any treaty or international 
agreement. The Keating treaties provided test cases, as they were topical at 
the moment the project was conceived. It is intended that the theory 
developed here is useful in understanding the Keating period, and this 
utility suggests a wider applicability of the model in approaching a little 
understood area of treaties in world politics. 
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Section One  
 
External Comprehensions 
 
The initial focus of this section is on the role and purpose of treaties in the 
external context, while it also aims to identify the forces behind the genesis 
of a treaty. Thus treaties may be systemic outcomes, concoctions of a ruling 
elite intent on creating or maintaining hegemonic positions, ideological 
imperatives, or devices constructed to assist in policy implementation. The 
exercise, then, is aimed at gauging the extent to which a treaty regime may 
be understood as an outcome of neorealist systemic constraints, an extension 
of the aspirations of expansionary states, or the neoliberal penchant for 
creating institutions. 
 
However, while the study of international relations traditionally revolves 
around the system of states, characterised as anarchic, or the society of 
states, where order is maintained through cooperation, the nuanced 
arguments about whether a society is a system, or whether anarchy creates 
order, contributed to the recent adaptation into the International Relations 
discipline of a systemically located, and state centric sociological 
perspective, social constructivism, an ideational insight. 
 
The constructivist perspective introduces the notion of attitudinal change, 
and the role of norms, perceptions and discourses as the locales where 
change occurs, or as the agents used to effect change. The prime objective of 
this section, which allows an appreciation of the validity of psychopolitical 
elements as intrinsic components of change imbued by treaty makers, is to 
identify those elements which have a domestic impact, and take the form of 
norms, perceptions or discourses.  
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Chapter Two  
  
Treaties :  
Instruments of International Law or Social Constructs? 
 
This Chapter takes a more than legalistic approach to an evaluation of a 
treaty's role and purpose by focussing on the interpretive nature of legal 
activity and contending that the prognostications about legal elements like 
justiciability, whether the court can pass judgement on an issue, are always 
prone to subjective comprehension or auto-interpretation. Thus the real 
value of the legal construct, known as a treaty, may lie less with its addition 
to the codification of behaviour, both externally and domestically, and more 
with its symbolic resolution of construed difference between states, the 
social contracts which develop between those states and the attitudinal shifts 
within domestic constituencies which are a legacy of treaty making. 
 
When attempting to identify why a treaty was created, what its possible role 
could be, and how it might function, commentators can be drawn to 
legalistic perspectives, whereby treaties are seen to be a source of 
international law. This is due in part to the fact that while treaty makers may 
be politicians or diplomats, invariably the architects, the authors, of a treaty 
are trained in law. Thus the treaty can be considered primarily a legal 
construct and its efficacy assessed according to how it succeeds as an 
instrument of law.  
 
While it can be argued that this is a narrow view, as this chapter suggests, it 
may be necessary to take that path as a way of building the structural profile 
of a treaty, in short, its content. However, sparse reference is paid to this 
conventional insight, as the objective of this thesis is to identify the deeper 
underpinnings of an agreement. These hinge on the intent of the treaty 
maker, the treaty and its interpreters, and allude to the import of agency as a 
further and meaningful element of treaty making. Thus, while this chapter 
begins with the conventional comprehension of treaties as the source of 
international law, it moves on to inquire into the possible effect of a treaty as 
an agent of social change, and the role of interpretation in this process. 
 
In his text Law Among Nations, an introduction to public international law, 
von Glahn comments on common types of treaties and their role as a source 
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of international law. His work is used here to create the context for an 
examination of traditional legal comprehensions, but it also extends into the 
area of interpretation. Von Glahn considered treaties to be "generally 
accepted as a major...source of international law", but cautioned that the 
bulk of treaties did not create "one single general rule of international law". 
[von Glahn:70:11] This was the function of the law making treaty.  
 
Thus the first questions to apply to a treaty under investigation are  
 
"Is it 'an instrument through which a substantial number of states declare their 
understanding of what a particular rule of law is, by which new general rules 
for the future conduct of the ratifying or adhering states are laid down, by 
which some existing customary or convention rule of law is abolished or 
modified, or by which some new international agency is created.'"? [von 
Glahn:70:11] 
 
To identify the categories of law making treaties von Glahn based his 
differentiation on whether the intent of a treaty was in transforming existing 
law and legal rules by altering the content; reinterpreting existing customary 
or conventional rules, without changing the content; or creating new 
principles of law. He stated that this divide was contingent on "the basis of 
content and intent" [von Glahn:70:12].  This is a fine point which introduces 
the notion of the dynamic relationship between structure, seen as content, 
and agency, seen as intent, an underpinning already alluded to in the 
introductory remarks to this chapter, and to the thesis in general. It can be 
understood that changing the content of a treaty can transform its impact, 
and it must then be asked what was the intent of the changes that were 
made, and was that intent also the intent of the change makers? 
 
In fact, von Glahn did recognise how intentions can sometimes be subsumed 
by custom, a second source of international law. He contends, and quite 
legitimately from a psychopolitical viewpoint, that while a new law making 
treaty may be intended to override an earlier conflicting rule of customary 
law, "if a custom has been so generally accepted that its provisions could be 
said to be ingrained in national behaviour, a subsequent and contrary rule of 
conventional law may be found to be unenforceable." [von Glahn:70:17] This 
is a significant comprehension in that it countenances the possibility of 
cultural norms interposing a barrier to reformism. Thus intent becomes a 
vital concern when assessing a treaty's efficacy. 
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The intent of the treaty maker, as with the treaty itself, is open to 
interpretation, and this is a major component of justicial activity. 
Interpretation is a vital concern for treaty makers, policy makers and the 
judiciary and it receives due attention in an earlier work on auto-
interpretation from Fried [1968]. He cites Gross as remarking that "each state 
has a right to interpret the law, the right of auto-interpretation..." 
[Fried:1968:115],  but that this right can lead to conflicting interpretations 
and  thus that strict barriers must be raised against excesses of interpretation 
by states in an environment where no overarching authority exists. Fried, 
however, then suggests that interpretation is dynamic and prone to 
determination by 'autonomously acting persons' [Fried:1968:115], suggesting 
a subjective and biased application.  
 
Von Glahn is more subdued in his judgement about the interpretation of 
international agreements, contending that that is the task of international 
courts. He cites the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 as the 
guide to interpretation, detailing the two commonly accepted principles 
which govern commentary on treaties. These are that "the object of 
interpretation is to determine the real meaning of the parties accepting the 
instrument and... that... a treaty must be assumed not to be intended to be 
without effect or even to be absurd."[von Glahn:70:436] Here he may be 
paying regard to the excesses of auto-interpretation raised by Fried, by 
suggesting the application of entrenched interpretive guidelines.  
 
He also contended that interpretation is about ensuring that the parties to a 
treaty have a mutual comprehension of its intent. Further he suggests that 
words used in an agreement should be interpreted in their usual, ordinary 
manner unless "...such would produce absurd, contradictory, or impossible 
consequences." If that occurred it then may be necessary to diverge from a 
literal meaning to avoid conclusions "obviously contrary to the intent of the 
treaty". [von Glahn:70:436]  
 
 Other possibilities relate to an historical interpretation of a treaty, which 
allows for cultural norms to influence comprehension and application, or to 
take into account the intended function of the treaty and to ensure that the 
treaty is interpreted, usually by a court, in such a manner as to ensure the 
realisation of the purpose it was intended to fulfil. It then follows that a vital 
concern for treaty makers must be to ensure that the wording of an 
agreement allows for broad, general and obvious interpretation in order to 
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avoid conflicting understandings. On the other hand, a shrewd application 
of treaty making could result in a seemingly innocuous agreement which, in 
fact, hides breaches of the Law of Treaties, or simply proves to be totally 
ineffective as an instrument of law, while still serving a completely adequate 
and effective role as an agreement. In such an instance the symbolic effect of 
the treaty may far outweigh its salience as an instrument of law. 
 
In a more recent work, McDougal, Lasswell and Miller [1994] also probe 
interpretation, with regard to international agreements. In their introductory 
discussion they examine the process of communication, which depends on 
the dynamic between communicators and audiences, usually involved in  
the supplementary roles of initiator and recipient of messages, respectively. 
But negotiation is another form of communication where two interlocutors 
are engaged in a process of both initiating and receiving messages. Both 
forms are employed in the treaty making process and in interpretation by 
actors charged with the implementation of an agreement. 
 
While the authors identify the component elements of communication, they 
do this to further reveal the workings of the process of interpretation and 
how context is vital, as "each detail in the whole of an act of communication 
is affected by, and in turn, affects all other details..." [McDougal:94:xvi] 
Thereby to achieve success in communication, and thus in ensuring that the 
content of the message will gain widespread support, the communicator, 
who in this instance is the treaty maker, must "discover the shared 
expectations" [McDougal:94:xvi] that the parties to the treaty create in each 
other. Thus attention must be paid to ensure that individuality, 
inventiveness and diversity are allowed to influence the process of 
interpretation. In short, the authors appear to be arguing against a reading of 
an international agreement which is based solely on the text of the document 
and fails to take into account the dynamic developments that have occurred 
around the treaty. Thus the contextuality of the process of communication 
must be heeded, as it "implies that any interpreter ... must be ready and able 
to explore the possible influence...of the identity of communicators and 
audiences,...of significant objectives, of base values and strategies." 
[McDougal:94:xv] The authors advance Fried's argument, while radicalising 
von Glahn's. 
 
In a following work Lehman joins with McDougal [1995] to continue this 
insight into contextuality of interpretation. They mount an argument 
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concerning the application of international agreements, and the procedures 
which may assist in a successful completion of that task. In performing this 
task they encounter the comments of the drafters of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties 1969 with regard to interpretation, who state that 
'"the intentions of the parties" and the "objects and purposes of the 
treaty"...are..."extrinsic evidence", warranting only a "certain place" in the 
process. [McDougal & Lehmann:95:xl] Thus it follows, according to the 
International Law Commission, that "the starting point of interpretation is 
the elucidation of the meaning of the text, not an investigation...into the 
intentions of the parties."[McDougal:95:xli] In fact, the authors are critical of 
the drafters for giving no indication as to how text can be given meaning 
without reference to its full context. 
 
The resultant justification of Lehmann and McDougal's position hinges on 
the principle, espoused by DeCastro, that the purpose of interpretation is to 
"ascertain the true will of the parties" [McDougal:95:xliii] and that the terms 
of a declaration indicate the intent of the authors. But as words change in 
meaning over time it is then necessary to understand the intent of the 
authors at the time of writing and to apply that intent to contemporary 
situations. Thus words have no intrinsic value in themselves and their 
semantic values "depends on the time and the circumstances in which they 
were uttered."[McDougal:95: xliv] Thus "interpretation is not a procedural 
but a substantive process..." [McDougal:95:li].  
 
However, as Falk pointed out, "the orientation of the interpreter is shaped 
by the conception [of interpretation] that he adopts, and this may influence 
the kind of evidence that is relied upon to reach and to explain the 
interpretation of a disputed text." [McDougal:95:lx] Thus the role of agency 
as an element of interpretation is elevated to the level where psychosocial 
considerations must be included in any analysis of the relationship between 
treaties and international law. 
 
McDougal and Lehmann extend this argument along more critical lines with 
the introduction of peremptory norms, which can act as a major obstacle to 
agreement between states on a common acceptance of law, because they are 
taken to refer to the norms "...most intensely demanded by the peoples of the 
world for protecting their most deeply held common interests." 
[McDougal:95:lxxi] A prime example of a peremptory norm being one 
designed to protect the basic values of human existence, as provided in the 
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International Bill of Rights, incorporating the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, its Covenants and Protocols. 
 
Further, Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 
relates to jus cogens ,  a contemporary doctrine premised on the notion that 
"some of the constitutional policies of the larger general community are so 
basic to the common interests of all that particular states, even a number of 
states, are not to be honoured with a competence to make agreements in 
contravention of these policies." [McDougal:95.lxx] In fact, Article 53 states 
that "a treaty is void if,  at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a 
peremptory norm of general international law..." which it defines as "...a 
norm accepted and recognised by the international community of States as a 
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be 
modified only be a subsequent norm of general international law having the 
same character." [Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties :69] The 
sometime reliance on norms by arbiters of change or those opposed to 
change may be comprehended as a psychopolitical manifestation.  
 
So, too, may the elements of interpretation implied by Falk, who extends this 
discussion and notes that "the interpreter of a broad international agreement 
is operating in a largely indeterminate setting...(where)...(t)he making, 
performance, and termination of international agreements, and their 
authoritative application, is afflicted by the same indeterminacy 
...(being)...that of many constantly changing variables in a very large 
context."[McDougal:95:lxxii] This is because "legal rules are inescapably 
expressions of a community's policy." [McDougal:95:lxxiii] In short, the 
interpreter is guided by a comprehension of the community's wants or 
needs when applying the strictures of an agreement, and this might, at 
times, be completely counter to the intent of the agreement or of the authors 
of that agreement, as even the intent is open to interpretation. 
 
Thus this excursion into the explanation of the relationship between law and 
treaties is also an explication of the subjectivity of the practice of law, both 
internationally and domestically. It raises the possibility of how state 
sovereignty can be delimited by external expectations realised as 
peremptory norms. This realisation contributes to the development of the 
argument that the treaty has an existence beyond the text, and is generative 
of norms, perceptions and discourses, that can be viewed as psychopolitical 
elements of foreign policy. 
 35
 
As this thesis is formed on the question of the psychopolitical validity of a 
treaty, a model is sought which allows the evolution of such an insight.  In 
this chapter the overall quest was to gauge the impact of a treaty on 
International Law, but this was extended beyond the legal to the ideational, 
through reference to peremptory norms.  An investigation based on the 
conventional legalistic comprehension of a treaty  illuminates the import of 
an agreement with regard to international law. However, in light of the 
foregoing discussion, wherein that comprehension was essentially relegated 
to a minor concern by the focus on norms, the underlying intent was to 
gauge a treaty's psychosocial impact on domestic lawmakers, judiciary and 
political constituency. 
 
In developing an analytical model, reference must be made to the legal basis 
of a treaty as a way of identifying whether the treaty has a primary role as 
an instrument of law. Hence questions must be asked about a treaty's 
justiciability, which is defined as being proper and thus able to be examined 
in a court of justice; its enforcability, seen as being able to be used to compel 
obedience to, and breachability, which can lead to termination or suspension 
of a treaty. The answers can reveal a treaty's legitimacy in a legalistic frame.  
 
But these answers may also reveal that the treaty has no legal impact on 
international law, and thus content is unaffected.  However, the treaty may  
be a symbolic manifestation of diplomatic exchanges between states, and 
appear to be a simple representation of arrived at common interest, with 
little or no influence beyond its facade. Curiously that very facade may act to 
have influence in the area of intent, by working to modify the nature of legal 
interpretation, as a result of the pursuit of common interest developed 
between states. 
 
The modification to legal interpretation can then overlap into domestic legal 
activity. An insight into the domestic impact of a treaty can reveal how state 
actions can be determined by external influence. Such an examination can 
reveal a psychosocial underpinning, in that particular constituent activity 
can be aroused in response to a treaty. This may occur where a treaty 
engenders change which advances the salience of international law, concurs 
with the pertinent peremptory norms, and enjoys the support of the 
domestic constituency.   
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A further possibility is that a treaty may be construed to have aspirational 
elements aimed at change but which is considered to be an assault on the 
peremptory norms that underpin international law, or as a clash with 
common domestic law. Moreover, there is a need to consider whether a 
treaty is in line with a peremptory norm, but as a result countermands 
domestic legislation, and is thus likely to attract external support, but be 
liable to domestic rejection. Regardless of likely impact each type of treaty is 
worthy of investigation to subject the triggers of cognitive action to 
illumination. 
 
Bearing this in mind, the treaty maker must not only be aware of how a 
treaty contributes to the development of international law, but also the 
manner in which that treaty may act to redefine a state's external or 
domestic interests, or work to catalyse attitudinal shifts and to then flow on 
into domestic law, as a prescriber or proscriber of change. 
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Chapter Three  
 
Treaties and Systemic Constructs 
 
Treaties generate change within the international system. Such change can 
manifest as the removal of uncertainty. Thus the treaty has a dual role as a 
tool with which to create order, and as a reformist prescription aimed at 
modification. In either instance implementation leads to structural change. 
The preceding chapter delved into the relationship between treaties and 
international law. It found that treaties serve either as instruments of law, 
symbolic manifestations of diplomatic exchange between states, or as  
catalysts of or mechanisms for attitudinal change. The following discussion 
examines the genesis of treaties, either as outcomes of systemic structures, or 
as the origin of those structural elements. In this sense it outlines 
conventional international relations comprehensions of systems, hegemons, 
regimes and institutions. But it also probes the psychosocial impact of 
treaties. It does so by suggesting that treaties may arise from instigations 
that are less concrete, and realisable, than they are aspirational, as treaty 
makers are influenced by an evolution in thinking and behaviour which is 
premised on the ideational advances and cultural progressions related to the 
pursuit of power, the quest for stability and security, or the crusades of 
universalism. 
 
The bid to identify how the varying systemic structures encountered in the  
global arena influence the development of treaties elicits questions about the 
extent to which a treaty regime is an outcome of  
 (i) neorealist systemic constraints and the search for order  leading to 
the creation of regionalised security agencies;  
 (ii)the neoliberal institutionalist penchant for creating economic 
 institutions aimed at maintaining free market ideology;   
 or simply 
 (iii) the proto-globalists attempt to create organs of world justice.  
But a second, and equally important consideration is the extent to which a 
treaty impacts internationally by initiating an hegemon, a regime or an 
institution or, for that matter, a system.  
 
This quest leads the enquirer to engage with recent but mainstream theories 
of international relations, through the neorealist systemic constraints model, 
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hegemonic stability theory, regime theory, and neoliberal institutionalist 
exchange and interdependency, all of which have systemic bases. These 
perspectives were identified as a means whereby the motivating forces 
behind treaty makers could be identified, or at least postulated. Thus by 
looking at each theoretical view it may be possible to posit the impetus for 
the genesis of treaties. Different perspectives may suggest that treaties are 
systemically generated, concoctions of a ruling elite intent on creating or 
maintaining hegemony, implemental constructs in the guise of regimes, or 
institutions based on ideology. 
 
Thus the structural imperatives of a system may be realised in the form of a 
regime, a hegemon or an institution, all of which possess physical attributes, 
such as buildings and personnel and are capable of generating agreements, 
or as imagined complexes with a like capability. Thus an equally important 
search is on for an indication of psychopolitical elements intrinsic to the 
instigation of a treaty or as a basis for its intent. In effect, instigatory 
elements can be realised, in the abstract, as constructs of the mind, as 
ideational rather than physical entities. And in a space where reality is based 
on implication and realised as an adoption of particular behaviours as 
suggested by actors' interpretations of those ideational constructs. The result 
may be deference to an imagined hegemon, a regime of truth, or an 
entrenched and institutionalised leaning, with all sometimes manifesting as 
ideology, attitude or belief, or an amalgam of these elements of influence. 
Bearing this qualification in mind Hasenclever etal. raise the perspective of 
cognitivism and its focus on the influence of social knowledge, which will be 
aired as an insight into regime formation, and expanded to intuit possible 
psychopolitical insights. 
 
Systemic Constraints 
 
The premise that states cooperate to enhance or guarantee security can act as 
a basis for exchange that can result in treaty arrangements, which ensure 
continued cooperation. Such activity lends itself to the realisation of a 
system within which states practice co-independence. The standard 
explanation of the system in IR theory stems from Waltz's articulation of 
structural realism. According to Waltz, systemic forces homogenise foreign 
policy behaviour by interposing themselves between states and their 
diplomatic conduct. [Burchill etal:96:85] In effect Waltz is saying that 
structural conditions, which belong to a system, impose themselves on all 
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units within that system and determine the outcomes of the interactions 
between those units.  Thus there is an ordering principle at work which 
impacts on the way units behave, as appropriate behaviour is a requisite of 
belonging to the system. But Waltz asserts that the system is anarchic. It 
must then follow that appropriateness is contested and circumstantial, 
unless the units are socialised into behavioural patterns which attract the 
consent of other units within the system. To create such certainty units must 
cooperate, but unilaterally. Thus anarchy leads to order.   
 
Drawing on Burchill's summary, Waltz's unit-structure relationship is seen 
"to leave little or no room for systemic change induced by the units 
themselves", and "to discount the character of the units in the system". This 
is because the units are "all required to pursue security before they can 
perform any other functions" and thus that "...states cannot widen their 
conception of self-interest beyond the egoism of strategic action, despite the 
gains that can be made through cooperation, submission to the rules of a 
diplomatic culture, and membership of international organisations". 
However, Waltz concedes that "...under certain conditions 'virtuosos' can 
resist the constraints of a system." [Burchill:96:86-88]  
 
But, to do what? To abrogate their security? To further enhance it, while 
operating outside the perceived strictures of that system, or to better define 
what those strictures are in a bid to create a more cooperative environment, 
due to the very systemic constraints Waltz contends prevent cooperation. 
Such a virtuoso quest can lead to unexpected bilateral exchanges between 
constituent members of a state system. The result may be a compromised 
position within the system, for a state subjected to pressure from one or 
more other states, or in reaction to a state acting belligerently. This could 
bring to fruition Cox's criticism of a structural realism, which "reduces 
international relations to great power management by legitimating political 
order which favours the powerful..." [Burchill:96:89]   
 
Cox sees structural realism as also hostile to change, and Ashley and Cox 
both suggest that neo-realism naturalises the international system "...by 
treating structures which have a specific and transitory history, as if they 
were 'permanent', 'normal' or 'given' political fixtures" [Burchill:96:88] and 
this then legitimises the status quo.  However, it is possible to envisage 
change as driven by powerful forces within the system, intent on modifying 
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behaviour while maintaining the overall status quo, if that is taken to mean 
ensuring that extant power structures remain intact.   
 
That change would be manifested as action by states, motivated by systemic 
imperatives, such as the quest for security, or more dynamic and 
psychopolitical impetuses, such as a state's quest for increased influence, 
through perception enhancement, or more physical applications aimed at 
enhancing power, or the exercise of power. This last notion taps into the 
darker underpinnings of hegemonic stability theory and regime theory and 
invites the question whether it is the state pursuing influence, or state 
leaders acting as change agents, intent on realising personal power,  
particularly in bilateral relationships. 
 
In a like manner creating a form of interdependence between constituent 
members of a system can take the form of multilateral exchange, through 
consensually realised prognostications, aimed at identifying an umbrella of 
agreement to which reference can be made in times of dispute. Such an 
exchange can also function as a way of ascertaining appropriate action by a 
state or group of states within a system, or as a means to controlling the 
systemic environment to maintain security, to widen the ambit of 
interdependence to ensure wide spread security or to enhance particular 
national interests through covert power exercising.  
 
Again the 'darker underpinnings' may be evident, although the role of state 
leaders appears to be diluted in the multi-state arena. Nevertheless, 
manipulation is still possible in this seemingly more open environment. In 
the end the form of the ordering principle of the system must be identified, 
and it could well be manifested as a treaty, or agreement which contains 
behavioural guidelines, or through the formation of a treaty intended to 
elicit preferred behaviours. 
 
NeoRealism opens an investigation into the relationship between treaties 
and systemic forces. Questions focus on whether or not the treaty was 
devised to satisfy systemic pressure, or if the intent of the treaty was to 
create systemic pressure. If the latter was the intent, the form that that 
pressure took can be identified as having an hegemonic or institutional 
origin, and an ideological or pragmatic philosophical underpinning. This 
process will indicate the physical and psychopolitical impact upon systemic 
constructs. 
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Hegemonic Influence 
 
While a hegemon can be perceived as a self interested agent intent on 
further extending influence and increasing power by assuming a dominant 
role within a system, an equally salient role is as a facilitator of state 
interaction and cooperation, through such devices as treaties. Thus the 
hegemon can exercise leadership, according to Cox, that is expressed "in 
terms of universal or general interests, rather than just serving their own 
interests."[Devetak:96:160] Cox defines hegemony as "a fit between material 
power, ideology and institutions...which...frames thought and thereby 
circumscribes actions."[Devetak:96:160] Devetak describes it as a "form of 
dominance woven from many interlacing threads of social and cultural 
power which assumes the form of a legitimate intersubjective consensus." 
[Devetak:96:160] In both readings the implications are that hegemony can be  
exercised by the hegemon, in the pursuit of self-interest, or on behalf of 
fellow systemic actors, as a quest to realise common interests. 
 
Kono's reading of hegemonic stability theory is that it implies that "...a 
regional hegemon is a necessary condition for regime formation..." as a 
single state must have sufficient interest in a public good to be willing to 
bear "the full cost of its provision."[Kono:98:2] But Kono is critical of this 
stance presenting Snidal's argument that it only makes sense if the regime is 
a public good and that collective action among states is impossible. He then 
outlines how most regimes are characterised by excludability and are thus 
not true public goods, and that collective action is  possible among a number 
of states without a hegemon being present. But he concedes that rational 
hegemons could achieve their ends through either bilateral or multilateral 
arrangements, [Kono:98:2] and commonly realised as treaties. This is an 
admission that while hegemons are not essential for regime formation there 
are benefits from such participation.  
 
In contrast to Kono's dismissive assessment of hegemons, Min and Waldron 
present a more balanced insight by considering three variants: coercive 
hegemony, which is based on exploitation of the weak; benevolent 
hegemony, where the strong provide a collective good, and the form that 
received harsh criticism from Kono, and a third form; synergistic or 
cooperative hegemony. [Min etal:98:1] In essence, the authors contend that 
rather than individual states attempting to maximise their own interests 
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through benevolent or coercive hegemony they, in fact, organise themselves 
for collective action, to overcome the 'tragedy of the commons'.  
 
Thus the emergence of a hegemon is a natural outcome of collective action, 
brought about by the realisation that "as members within a system cooperate 
they become more and more familiar with its benefits" [Min:98:1] and thus 
make a greater commitment and are more supportive. It is in the members 
interest to support the hegemon, or to be involved in creating one. In effect a 
peak body, brought about through a treaty arrangement, can act with 
greater impact within the system, to enhance the regard afforded a 
particular change, either through persuasion or coercion.. 
 
Hence the notion of leadership arises in the context of hegemony as a 
facilitator of collective action. Min and Waldron suggest that the emergence 
of cooperation is dependent on the strong leadership of a hegemon 
committed to a better optima for each member of the hegemonic system. But 
the facilitation role of the hegemon is to ensure compliance of members and 
to punish defectors. This ability depends on whether the hegemon possesses 
enhanced capabilities, which encourages participation, or if they are limited, 
which manifests as members cooperating only if everyone else does. The 
notion of capabilities runs through neorealism and indicates the premise 
that underpins leadership, which is either the ability to mount persuasive 
and encouraging arguments in favour of cooperation, or to apply pressure to 
conform on recalcitrant actors. 
 
In fact, Min and Waldron venture that a hegemon is an agent-based system,  
where "fundamental social structures and group behaviours emerge forming 
the interaction of individual agents...[Min:98:9] Thus "...each agent tries to 
adapt to other's behaviour and the whole system shows ever-changing 
patterns..."[Min:98:9] While this explanation does not seem to allow for the 
possible recognition that human individuals may be relevant in global 
politics, as individual agents here appears to refer to states, or groups of 
states, as is the nature of systemic theories, the discussion certainly advances  
beyond the rigidity of neorealism and Kono's articulation of hegemony. 
Again, the idea of hegemon can have both a physical manifestation and 
provide an ideational influence. 
  
With this excursion into the field of interdependence the hegemon appears 
to  contribute greatly to the possible comprehension of the forces driving 
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treaty makers, in that cooperation is endemic in a bid to deal with the 
"...search for greater local optima in a rugged landscape." [Min:98:11] But 
most importantly it has moved the discussion further on from solely a 
concern with structure to identifying the role of agency, which will be 
expanded on in the following section dealing with regimes and institutions. 
 
In composing the analytical model, an insight into the relationship between 
the hegemon and the treaty maker will contribute to a deeper 
comprehension of the psychological impact of any influence exerted by the 
hegemon. It will also expose the intent of the hegemon or its agent and 
consider if the treaty was developed to bolster the hegemon's self interest or 
to enhance universal interests. 
 
Regimes, Intent and Outcomes 
 
Treaties can be the basis of regimes, which are created in a bid to implement 
the regulatory guidelines outlined within the text, or as a manifestation of 
states' interpretations of the intent of an agreement. Krasner's definition of 
international regimes as "sets of principles, norms, rules and decision 
making processes around which actor's expectations converge", 
[Hasenclever:2000:3] leads Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger to conclude 
that international regimes, as deliberately constructed orders that create 
shared expectations about appropriate behaviour and through enhanced 
transparency, help states "...to cooperate with a view to reaping joint gains in 
the form of additional welfare or security." [Hasenclever:2000:1] Keohane 
extends Krasner's insight by suggesting that regimes are a major type of 
international institution [Hasenclever:2000:1], and are manifested in the 
forms of security regimes, and issue areas encompassing economics, human 
rights and the environment.   
 
Hasenclever etal. attempt to articulate a distinct view of the origins of 
international regimes using  the systemic theories of realism and 
neoliberalism, and the more agency oriented insight of cognitivism. Kono  
delved into  regional trade regimes, by investigating the systemic conditions 
that facilitate regime formation from the neorealist and neoliberal 
institutionalist perspectives, and with a further insight from constructivism, 
which in common with cognitivism, delves into the role of agency. He 
concluded that neorealists were pessimistic about the possibilities for 
cooperation, because competition among states is intrinsic to their relations, 
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and in order to survive states must strive to maximise their power. Thus 
states would shun cooperation that produces asymmetric relative gains - 
and hence security risks- even if such cooperation produces absolute gains 
for all. [Kono:98:1]   
 
Hasenclever etal. concur with Kono that structuralist realists have paid little 
attention to international institutions, however, they suggest that 'post-
classical' and 'modified structural' realists acknowledge that "regime-based 
interstate cooperation is a reality..." [Hasenclever:2000:9] but that states need 
to take into account "...both absolute and relative gains when contemplating  
regime based cooperation with others." [Hasenclever:2000:9] They contend 
that a regime is most likely to be stable "...when the expected gains are 
balanced such that relative losses do not accrue." [Hasenclever:2000:10] They 
contend that the post-classical and modified structural realists, such as 
Gilpin, Krasner and Grieco, who argue that "...power is no less central in 
cooperation than in discord among nations," see that "the distribution of 
capabilities among actors critically affects both the prospects for effective 
regimes to emerge and persist in an issue-area and the nature of the regimes 
that result, especially insofar as the allocation of benefits from cooperation is 
concerned."[Hasenclever:2000:9] 
 
Portraying a neoliberal view Hasenclever etal. suggest that states use 
international regimes to realise common interests, but "as rational egoists 
who care only for their own (absolute) gains." [Hasenclever:2000:7] And 
while cooperation could lead to overall improvement for all participants, it 
is hard to achieve due to an uncertainty about relying on partners' 
commitment. Thus neoliberalism favours the regime as a way of reducing 
uncertainty, and this leads to more stable "...'collaboration regimes' based on 
formal contracts and 'coordination regimes' based on conventions." 
[Hasenclever:2000:8]  
 
Transactional costs figure as an important incentive for states to maintain 
regimes once they are in existence. By coordinating their behaviour states 
can avoid suboptimal outcomes, and although states may lack a sense of 
obligation to a regime they rarely violate the rules as this may impinge on 
their being accepted as partners in a potentially beneficial regime. Thus once 
a regime has been created it appears it is usually in the interests of the 
members to hesitate before putting that regime at risk. This is partly due to 
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possible future benefits, but also to avoid the loss of political investment 
made in the original construction of the regime. [Hasenclever:2000:8]   
 
Kono's articulation of the neoliberal institutionalist comprehension of 
regimes follows a similar path whereby gains are of concern. The neoliberal 
institutionalist literature on regimes is functionalist, in that it explained that 
the function of regimes was to enable states to "... capture cooperative gains 
by providing rules around which actors' expectations converge and 
increasing the provision of information, monitoring and enforcement...", 
[Kono:98:3] thus implying that regimes were welfare improving.  But the 
neoliberal institutionalist approach was also contractualist, whereby it 
portrays regimes as "cooperative, voluntary arrangements, aimed at Pareto-
improving..." [Kono:98:4] which implies joint gains. 
 
This component of the debate concerning gains, both relative and absolute, 
offers insights into possible motivations for states joining international 
institutions. This insight serves to help better appreciate the reasons for 
treaty commitments and what type of approaches are needed to convince 
domestic populations that such actions are in the national interest. 
 
Keohane premises his discussion about gains on the idea that states' interests 
may be interdependent and that mutual interests underpin cooperation. He 
suggests that the realist view that state's pursue relative gains, which Grieco 
explains as "...preventing others from achieving advances in their relative 
capabilities" [Keohane:93:275], is not sustainable. Grieco is critical of the 
neoliberal claim that "...states seek to maximise their individual absolute 
gains and are indifferent to the gains achieved by others." [Grieco:93:117] 
Keohane argues that concerns with relative gains are conditional, as states 
evaluate the intentions of institutional members before cooperating. If the 
acquisition of relative gains is seen as not to inhibit the actions of other states 
those other states may well still participate in the cooperative arrangements. 
In some instances states may join in what Snidal calls "cooperative clusters", 
[Keohane:93:277] a form of defensive cooperation, to achieve relative gains 
collectively. Such a situation may come about in the face of powerful actors 
attempting to gain higher levels of utility "...by blocking the enactment of 
international rules..." [Keohane:93:278]   
 
Kono emphasises similar impetuses related to domestic preference 
formation, a further possible force behind regime formation, which he 
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describes as a situation where "national government leaders are gatekeepers 
between a domestic game of negotiation between interest groups, public and 
government, that is nested in an international negotiation game." [Kono:98:4] 
He outlines two possibilities, the first, commitment mechanisms, focusses on 
how governments create or join regimes in order to demonstrate their 
credibility to domestic actors, or their commitment to policy reforms which 
promote investment, while neoliberal institutional theorists suggest that 
governments join regimes "...to increase the credibility of their commitment 
to other governments."[Kono:98:7] His second insight raises the notion of 
transactionalism. The transactionalist argument posits that  increases in 
cross border transactions, that can be social, economic or political, create 
pressure for further integration, or even a place for "...governance at the 
supranational level." [Kono:98:7] This is the result of the process of complex 
interdependence where members of an international regime realise the 
benefits of the regime, and make further commitments to its extension and 
development. This argument concurs with that presented by Hasenclever 
etal. below. 
 
Both these insights stem from constructivist underpinnings. While  
constructivism will be addressed in a later chapter, a brief foray into its 
premises here will suggest how psychopolitical elements are constitutive of 
the process of regime formation. Kono contends that constructivists see that 
ideas affect choice, but those "...ideas have structural characteristics." And 
ideas, understood in general as "...collective knowledge institutionalised in 
practices..." define what is "...cognitively possible for individuals." 
[Kono:98:5] Thus interests are "...socially constructed by collective 
interpretations..." which are the outcome of interacting individuals who act 
purposively on the basis of their personal beliefs. [Kono:98:5] These interests 
are constituted through communication, interaction and persuasion, rather 
than as being structurally given. Thus the basic premise of constructivism, 
for Kono, is the dynamic relationship between agents and structure, where 
institutions are defined by participant activity. [Kono:98:4]  
 
Hasenclever etal. also venture beyond the systemic purview by introducing 
a cognitivist perspective of international regimes, which emphasises 
"...actor's causal and social knowledge." [Hasenclever:2000:4]  A brief 
overview will be presented here to add to the store of psychopolitical 
indicators in this section. In essence cognitivism has two strands. Weak 
cognitivism focusses on the role of causal beliefs in regime formation, where 
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"(u)ncertainty about causal relationships creates a demand on the part of 
decision-makers for reliable issue specific knowledge, which...can become a 
source of political influence for those who can supply it." 
[Hasenclever:2000:10] Thus the role of epistemic communities in 
international policy coordination is seen as vital.  
 
Strong cognitivism emphasises the social character of international relations 
where social knowledge, in the form of norms and understandings of self 
and other are accentuated. States are seen to be "...as much shaped by 
international institutions as they shape them..." and hence 
"...institutionalised cooperation is likely to initiate a process in which actors' 
egoism is dampened and actors increasingly respect, rather than merely take 
into account, the legitimate interest of others." [Hasenclever:2000:11]  Thus, 
cooperative norms are internalised, even when, initially, they were viewed 
by the actors as mere instruments to further their individual goals. Again the 
insights raised about the longevity of regimes as raised by Kono and 
Hasenclever before are iterated. But norms become a prominent interest 
with the strong cognitivist and open up further thoughts along those lines, 
as they appreciate that "international norms operate as an essential yardstick 
in states' selecting of foreign policy goals and options."  
[Hasenclever:2000:12]   
 
The impact of regimes on treaties is tested in the polyphonic analytical 
model, with an enquiry into that relationship. The question is asked about 
whether regime formation is influenced by a treaty, if the treaty is an 
outcome of regime activity, or both. Influence is further unpacked with an 
enquiry into the treaty’s impact on the Pareto frontier, which implies an 
economic focus, but could be creatively extended to include social capital. In 
this sense the treaty can aid transactionalism, by enhancing cooperation, and 
thus interdependence. 
 
An important component of the discussion on regimes is the repeated use of 
regime and institution interchangeably. Presenting an institutionalist insight 
Martin seems to concur with Keohane's earlier statement, when she defines 
them as not substantially different from institutions, particularly when 
regimes are formalised. [Martin:97:2] Bearing this in mind Martin's work on 
institutions, in the next section, is conjunctive to and complementary of the 
regime outline. 
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Institutions and Norms 
 
Institutions can be outcomes of regime activity, or serve as the foundational 
elements of a regime, after having been brought into focus and applied as 
the policy of a peak group. Their elemental role within regimes gives 
institutions pertinence and their viability can be determined by the 
contribution they make to enhancing the regard paid to a regime. Treaties 
can also serve as major contributors to the development of regimes, through 
the institutional manifestations of underlying commitments contained 
within the text, or due to the enhancement of perceptions of cooperation, 
either implied or conveyed by the symbolism inherent in states' assent to a 
treaty, particularly if the agreement is of a multilateral or plurlateral nature. 
 
Martin's work on international institutions contributes valuable insights  
into understanding both what constitutes an institution and the genesis of 
treaties. While conceding that Keohane's definition of international 
institutions as "related complexes of rules and norms, identifiable in space 
and time" is influential, Martin prefers Mearscheimer's more specific 
explanation, as a "set of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should 
cooperate and compete with one another...(by prescribing)... ...acceptable 
forms of  state behaviour, and ...(proscribing)...unacceptable kinds of 
behaviour." [Martin:97:2] Further, international institutions can be seen as 
"rules of the game and as endogenous descriptions of strategy...", the latter 
recognising that "at some level these institutions are the result of state 
strategies about how they wish to organise their relations with one another." 
[Martin:97:2] Nye's insight into interdependence which underpins regime 
and institutional comprehensions hinges on his notion that a regime is 
essentially a "…framework of rules, norms and institutions" [Nye:97:171] 
 
Martin's elaboration on the functions of institutions closely resembles the 
articulations presented in the materials pertaining to regimes. This acts to 
confirm her claim that regimes and institutions are akin. But Martin extends 
the discussion with insights into the relationship between states and 
institutions charging that they are either endogenous, because they are 
subjects of state's choice, and consequential or exogenous, because they 
change state beliefs and strategies. [Martin:97:6] This claim thus elicits the 
question about what impact or effects international institutions may have, 
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and the response will contribute to the understanding of how treaties are a 
component of the process.  
 
While the form of institutional change engendered by a treaty may have a 
similar appearance to that produced by a regime, the nuanced 
differentiation between the institution and the regime will not be considered 
here. Suffice to say the institution is perceived as benign, while the regime is 
commomly portayed as connoting forceful control. Of concern with this 
component of the analytical model is the likely effect of a treaty and whether 
a new institution may be fomented by the envisaged change. In fact several 
institutions can be realised during the development of a treaty program with 
a wide scope. The whole neoliberal institutionalist quest can be seen as not 
only furthering the global reach of capital, but of implementing a universal 
human rights agenda and the  democratisation of the system of states. Thus 
the types of gains that may be realised by treaty instigators are of value as 
indicators of a treaty’s ability to effect change, as are the distributional 
effects that a treaty regime may realise. 
 
Outlining institutional effects Martin sees international institutions as 
substitutes for the domestic mechanisms, where convergence  of outcomes 
among members may occur as "...state practices are brought more closely in 
line with one another."[Martin:97;7] A second possibility is that international 
institutions might complement the effect of domestic-level processes and 
structures, and "...lead to increasing divergence of state practice" 
[Martin:97:7] as those states "...that already come close to institutional norms 
will move further in that direction, while those who deviate from such 
norms will remain unchanged." [Martin:97:7] 
 
The introduction of norms into an investigation of the effects of international 
institutions allows for a deeper insight into how they are developed by 
states to deal with uncertainty. Martin suggest that what must be considered 
is how the effects of an international institution are distributed  either 
among the members states, or between members and non-members.  In 
short she raises Keohane's argument that "...international cooperation may 
enhance the well-being of cooperating states at the expense of those left 
outside international regimes..." [Martin:97:10] Gruber extends this notion 
and suggests that if a few powerful states create an institution, other states 
may realise that they maybe better off becoming members, but at times that 
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those outsiders may discover they were better off before the institution was 
created. [Martin:97:10]  
 
Hegemonic pressure or indeed systemic pressure could be seen as the 
motivating force behind outsider states seeking membership. In an attempt 
to avoid being excluded those states may undermine their own welfare, 
through fear of it being undermined by the possible impact of the new 
institution. Also current members have "...substantial control over admitting 
new members." [Martin:97:11] and this in turn puts pressure on outsider 
states, seeking membership, to modify their actions in a bid to appeal to 
those members, or to adopt new behaviours that will perceived to be in line 
with institutional requirements. Botcheva and Martin here ponder on "which 
states prevail in an attempt to establish their preferred standard as the 
international norm." [Botcheva:98:4]  
 
What this implies is that norm modification occurs at the state level, as 
norms are a guideline to behaviour, and thus state's will act to modify 
behaviour to satisfy a norm. This understanding serves as a timely reminder 
of the similar position arrived at in International law, where norms were 
considered of major significance in the ongoing development of global 
cooperation. Again here is a further test of the viability of treaties. Can they 
be seen individually as contributing to the evolution and development of 
emergent norms in their areas of pertinence? Equally, behavioural 
modifications must be seen to impact on norms, and this can work to subtly 
change the implementation of a norm, which in turn alters the interpretation 
of that norm. Thus a treaty can initiate behavioural change, which in turn 
generates a redefinition of a treaty's meaning or intent. 
 
The review of how norms, perceptions or discourses have evolved or been 
modified as a result of treaty making is a further and essential component of 
the analytical model arrived at in this chapter. Rather than applying this 
gauge to each theoretical variant in this chapter, an overall assessment 
avoids repetitive responses to the enquiry about the Psychopolitical Impact 
of a treaty, which asks "Is there a noticeable modification of norms, 
perceptions or discourses?" 
 
Overall, this chapter has raised the possibility that treaties can be viewed as 
outcomes of systemic imperatives. However, it suggests more persuasively, 
that those imperatives are less structural than they are aspirational, where 
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state leaders are guided to agreement by the realisation that cooperative 
behaviour is beneficial, either domestically, externally or both. But the 
NeoLiberal Institutionalists focus on norms raises the need to consider social 
constructivism, which is premised on the notion that identities, norms, 
aspirations, ideologies or ideas about cause-effect relations, are important 
factors in international life. 
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Chapter Four   
 
Treaties And Ideational Motives :  
A Social Constructivist Insight 
 
Treaties can be the product of  aspirations aimed at ensuring security,  
redefining identity, enhancing perceptions, modifying extant norms or 
introducing new ones. They can be the outcome of ideological initiative or of 
reactive or proactive measures based on the ideational influences of leaders. 
But there has been a traditional neglect and widespread discounting of the 
role of such ideational elements in the IR discipline. This has led to the 
development of  social constructivism, an insight, according to Ruggie 
writing in the journal, International Organisation, [98:2], that is based on 
"human consciousness and its role in international life". He contends that 
"...not only are identities and interests of actors socially constructed, but also 
that they must share the stage with a whole host of ideational factors that 
emanate from the human capacity and will." [Ruggie:98:2]  
 
Constructivist and Cognitivist comprehensions surfaced in the evolution of 
international relations theory during the 1990s, [Ruggie:98:2] and the 
insights into treaty initiation and facilitation engendered by that 
development are crucial to understanding the psychopoliticality of 
ideational influences. While cognitivism is significant here, it will suffice to 
simply see it as a component of constructivism, in that it has  causal beliefs 
and social knowledge [Hasenclever:2000:4] as the foundation of its outlook, 
which is essentially that epistemic communities and social norms underpin 
the development of international relations.  
 
The intellectual base of constructivism lies in the sociological work of 
Durkheim. In essence he argued that "a variety of social outcomes were 
influenced by the different interpersonal bonds of social order "...embodied 
within..." reference groups to which individuals belong". Thus, "social facts 
are constituted by the combination of individual facts through social 
interaction. These social facts may be 'linguistic practices, religious beliefs, 
moral norms and similar ideational factors...[which]...in turn influence 
subsequent social behaviour." [Ruggie:98:4] These insights explain the 
pertinence of  how social constructivism can contribute to an understanding 
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of the treaty making process, and the cognitive activities of treaty makers 
and their constituencies.  
 
Ruggie pays tribute to Giddens contribution of structuration theory, which 
he saw as profoundly affecting the "...emerging constructivist project". 
[Ruggie:98:8] Structuration theory purports to "...transcend the dualism of 
structure and agency" [Hay:95:197] outlined by structuralism and 
intentionalism. Structuralists "privilege structure within the structure-
agency relationship, seeking to account for observable social and political 
events, processes and outcomes in terms of the operation of unobservable 
social and political structures of which actors are merely bearers." 
[Hay:95:193]  "...(S)tructure is largely seen to constrain and even determine 
agency. [Hay:95:194] "...(E)xplanations are not sought in terms of the 
motivations, intentions, strategies and actions of agents..." as notions of 
causality  "...arise out of consideration of the complex interplay or 'over 
determination' of structures and systems which have their own relative 
autonomy." [Hay:95:194] 
 
Intentionalism focuses on "...social practices, human agency and the rich 
texture of social and political interaction" where structures are conceived of 
as "...the product of intentional action." [Hay:95:195] Constraints and context 
are absent from this comprehension and explanations are constructed "out of 
the direct intentions, motivations and self-understandings of the actors 
involved..." [Hay:95:195]  Thus the focus is "...largely upon the micro-
practices of social interaction as opposed to the macro-embeddedness of 
action within broader social and political structures."[Hay:95:196] Hence 
outcomes are the result of "specific intentional acts ...whose existence is 
largely the product of chance and intention..." [Hay:95:196] But 
intentionalism is criticised for "failing to consider the structural constraints 
on the realisation of actors' intentionality." [Hay:95:196] 
 
Thus Giddens theory is a hybrid "capable of reconciling ...a focus on 
structures which are the very condition of social and political interaction, 
with, ... a sensitivity to the intentionality, reflexivity, autonomy and agency 
of actors." [Hay:95:197] He "introduces the idea of mutual dependency, and 
internal relatedness, of social structures and human agency, where through 
the duality of structure,  "social structures are both constituted by human 
agency, and yet at the same time are the very medium of this constitution." 
[Hay:95:197]  Thus, according to Giddens, social processes and practices are 
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"brought about by the active constituent skills of ...[society's] members... as 
historically located actors, and not under conditions of their own choosing. 
[Hay: 95:197] 
 
Comprehending and accepting Giddens 'duality' is beneficial to this project 
as it gives a possible insight into how structural or systemic constraints can 
propel actors into progressing along a path prescribed by a treaty, or 
alternatively how actors can take the initiative and create an agreement with 
which to change a structure and influence the impact of systemic constraints. 
Thus this latter notion allows for the direct inclusion of psychopolitical 
motivation and opens the path to further investigation of the relevance of 
individual action. 
 
Interests and identity can stem from or be a motivating force for individual 
action. The illumination of these two elements can act to persuade an 
acceptance of social constructivism's pertinence in explaining interstate 
interactivity. Ruggie suggests that it is necessary to ascertain how "...the 
constituent actors- in international relations, territorial states -came to 
acquire their current identity and the interests that are assumed to go along 
with it." [Ruggie:98:9] To do this requires considering how "...specific 
identities of specific states shape their interests and, thereby, patterns of 
international outcomes." [Ruggie:98:9] Further to this he contends that "the 
identity of ...(a)...state can change and pull its interests along." [Ruggie:98:9]  
He implies that a transformation of identity may occur as domestic norms 
and institutions are modified by global activity.  But this can be extrapolated 
to work in the opposite direction, where normative factors, some 
"...international in origin, others domestic..." can shape state's identities or 
behaviour directly. [Ruggie:98;10] This comes about with the "...diffusion of 
identical cultural norms "which lead to the expression of "...identical 
preferences for policies and institutional arrangements." [Ruggie:98:10] 
Diffusion is a "...process through which an innovation is communicated 
within a social system," which notes "...the importance of individuals in the 
process, reflecting the role of social influence." [Borgatta:92:487]  
 
Ruggie's comments on ideational causation suggest that the socialisation, 
whereby states "...learn to conform to the dictates of the system", as 
described by Waltz  [Ruggie:98:11], hinges on ideational elements. Krasner, 
in extending Waltz's argument, explores the role of ideology in negotiation 
and refers to states' ideational interests, while Katzenstein speaks of how 
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further work on Waltz's model introduces ideational factors "...such as the 
role of culture as an instrument of social mobilisation..." [Ruggie:98:12] What 
is common throughout these comprehensions is the notion that ideas are the 
basis of ideological, systemic or cultural expression.  
  
Extending this work Ruggie illustrates how Goldstein and Keohane 
identified three types of ideas which influence policy outcomes. These were  
"world views", which are "entwined with people's conceptions of their 
identities, evoking deep emotions and loyalties" and occur as "civilisational 
constructs, cultural factors, and state identities"; "principled beliefs" which 
"specify right from wrong and just from unjust" and "causal beliefs" that are 
beliefs about cause effect relations. [Ruggie:98:13]  Hence, these views can be 
extended to the treaty making process, whereby the negotiating parties are 
drawn together in the first instance through a commonality that may be 
based on a shared world view, or a shared aspiration. This commonality 
may stem from shared beliefs and is often expressed as a preamble to a 
treaty either as a single or series of principled beliefs, on which the 
agreement is premised. 
 
Ruggie examines each type of idea describing how constructivists are 
interested in world views, and in how civilisational constructs, cultural 
factors, and state identities shape states' interests and patterns of 
international outcomes. He comments on how constructivists document the 
impact of principled beliefs on, interalia, the role of multilateral norms in 
stabilising the consequences of rapid international change, and on how "...in 
certain circumstances...(principles beliefs)... lead states to redefine their 
interests or even their sense of self" [Ruggie:98:14], as illustrated by the 
acceptance of the 'greenhouse' issue as a global concern.  Or at how causal 
beliefs have had an impact by assessing the "roles played by transnational 
networks of knowledge based experts, or 'epistemic communities." 
[Ruggie:98:15] But Ruggies’ most telling comment is on how social 
constructivists view causation, where aspirations are seen not as causes of 
actions but as reasons for actions. This is crucial to understanding intent, as 
causal factors may have their genesis in aspirations, but equally may bring 
about an aspirational realisation. But whose reasons and whose beliefs are 
also of major importance here. 
 
Goldstein and Keohane define ideas exclusively as "beliefs held by 
individuals", but social constructivists prefer the notion of 'intersubjective 
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beliefs' that are social facts based on collective intentionality, where 
individuals function autonomously but with the collective in mind, 
[Ruggie:98:16] and can act to create "...new rights and responsibilities," 
through 'collective legitimation'. [Ruggie:98:17] Thus through establishing a 
shared narrative, collective intentionality can establish standards of 
behaviour and rules of conduct, within regimes, as well as intersubjective 
frameworks of understanding. This results in cohesion and coherence 
amongst individuals acting within the regime and following the shared 
narrative.  [Ruggie:98:17] This shared narrative can take the form of 
constitutive rules. These rules define "...the set of practices that make up a 
particular class of consciously organised social activity" [Ruggie:98:18] 
meaning "they specify what counts as that activity." [Ruggie:98:18] This 
discussion has raised the relevance of the development of societal norms 
practices and Hopf extends the brief insight into Giddens structuration 
theory by arguing that actors and structures are mutually constituted. He 
contends that actors develop "...their relations with, and understandings of, 
others through the media of norms and practices," [Hopf:98:2]  and thus 
norms become constitutive. 
 
Bull has also argued that norms can be constitutive. Thus if constitutive 
rules are the institutional foundation of all social life, and those rules are the 
outcome of collective intentionality, then with an erosion of that 
intentionality the rules can change. But what drives the erosion of 
intentionality  and has a transformative effect? If the exercise of agency is the 
basis  of change whereby actors engage in an "...active process of 
interpretation and construction of reality..." [Ruggie:98:24],  either in 
response to circumstance, or by creating a circumstance within which to 
make the change, then the process must be seen to "...implicate such 
ideational factors as identities and aspirations as well as leaders seeking to 
persuade their publics and one another through reasoned discourse..." 
[Ruggie:98:25]  These insights are particularly pertinent to contextualising 
treaty making and the actions of treaty makers, who are prone to varying 
influences, ranging from lobby groups pursuing self interest, to government 
working in the national interest through to representatives, acting as leaders, 
but constrained by prescribed guidelines on interpretation . 
 
Leadership is delved into by Sliker in her discussion on personalities and 
sub-personalities, where she takes Plato's statement that "(t)he State is the 
individual writ large", and draws attention to "the profound relationship of 
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macrocosm to microcosm." [92:179]  She argues that there is a parallel 
between global patterns of political activity between states and the 
relationship of individual humans within cultures, contending that within 
the individual "subpersonalities develop in response to environmental and 
historical circumstances...", and that in a like manner national cultural 
groups of people develop "individual national 'personalities'". [Sliker:92:190]  
However, sub-personalities develop within nations as cultural groups vie 
for dominance. Fixed ideological positions can become "sacred and 
inviolable..." over time, leading to rivalry for expression of subpersonalities 
resulting in alignments which create opposing camps. Hence change is 
inevitable.  Sliker suggests that with change in a subpersonality comes 
immediate and automatic change in the whole personality. The sets of a 
reaction among other states and the "...network of interdependency becomes 
denser. " [Sliker:92:194-5] Thus there is a developing interdependency 
emerging not only between states entities, but cultural identities are 
developing across borders, with a sharing of beliefs and convergence of 
ideas between peoples redefining state relations. 
 
Social constructivism extends cooperation and interdependence arguments 
into the realm of ideas. It also picks up on the pertinence of norms and 
discourses as means by which change is engendered, and alludes to the role 
of leadership. It is invaluable as a tool to investigate the relevance of treaties 
to their constituents, by looking at community participation in the process. It 
is helpful as a way to enquire into the likely success of treaty makers in 
convincing the electorate of the efficacy of policy platforms being pursued. 
But it also raises new perspectives on the importance of individual human 
activity in global politics.  
 
To assess a treaty from a social constructivist viewpoint, as a component of 
an analytical model, insights into the conditions which led to a desire for 
change, the inspiration driving the treaty makers and the likelihood of a 
successful implementation, set the scene for the further investigation into the 
intent of the treaty maker.  Also under review is the aim of the treaty  and 
whether its purpose was essentially concrete and capable of physical 
manifestation, or if it had a more symbolic, although equally practical, 
application, based on changing world views. A deeper search will enquire 
into what influences the treaty makers contended with and whether the 
envisaged change was part of a systematised pursuit, the result of 
aspirational influences, ideological imperatives, or an attitudinal shift. The 
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treaty makers activity could be realised as an outcome of changing beliefs, 
evolving societal norms, or changing circumstances, and culminating in 
societal change as a result of collective intentionality.  
 
With the acceptance of social dynamism in international relations comes the 
necessity to enquire further into concepts which impact both externally and 
domestically. The varying manifestations of political beliefs and ideas  span 
both horizons and include norms, perceptions and discourses. These 
elements all share ideas as their base, and thus stem from either the 
collective cognition of a society, which has gained credence externally, 
through being adopted by external institutions as norms; by domestic 
constituencies as perceptions, or which enjoy majoritarian respect either 
across domestic constituencies; or within a hegemonic system where the 
core influences its satellites. Equally they can be outgrowths of the 
constructions based on individual prognostications that have gained 
influence, either within the domestic constituency, and have been exported; 
have been recognised in the external arena and have been imported into one 
or many states; or have simply been the one voice allowed legitimacy, 
within an autocratic state or a hegemonic system.  
 
The next section looks at the relationship between the three most prominent 
means of transmitting ideational influence, norms, perceptions and 
discourses, and their individual relationship to the treaty, as a way of better 
appreciating the arguments presented by social constructivists about how 
ideas are a dominant basis of interstate exchange, which thus evolves 
around psychopolitical activity.  
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Section Two   
 
External / Internal Perspectives 
 
Treaties can be construed as tools of foreign policy, which can be read as a 
policy with external application. Equally they can be seen as intended to 
affect domestic policy. This is an important qualification, as the efficacy and 
effectiveness of a treaty can be determined by which orientation it is 
construed to possess by the constituents of the signing states. Also the 
internal political dynamics of each state will impact on a treaty's acceptance 
or rejection. The relationship between leaders and followers must be 
considered. The strength of the political constituency and its ability to 
influence the political agenda is pertinent. The attitude to change within a 
constituency and the ability of the leadership to effect changes of attitude 
will act as defining pressures on a treaty. 
 
The following chapter examines those variant forms of ideational influence, 
with an examination of the relationship between officials and citizens in 
international relations, which reveals the value of dialogue for leaders. Of 
importance here is a probe of national identity, which will illustrate the 
overlap between domestic and external considerations and how that overlap 
influences attitudes, or demands attitudinal change. Finally the processes 
which must occur if attitudinal change is to be possible will be gleaned from 
the study of norm dynamics, perception formation enhancement and 
modification, the hierarchies of discourse and regimes of truth.   
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Chapter Five    
 
Bridging the External-Domestic Ideational Divide:  
The Relationship Between Treaties, Norms, Perceptions and Discourses. 
 
Treaties can be generated to effect perceptions in a particular manner, to 
impact on existing norms and to direct discourses. Applying a social 
constructivist comprehension of interstate exchange, treaties can be seen as a 
means to establishing identity. The social dynamism brought to bear with 
the realisation of national identity  stems from both external and internal 
determinants. Thus political beliefs and ideas can span both horizons and 
include norms, perceptions and discourses. A probe into the genesis of 
national identity will disclose how pertinent norms are, which in turn 
unveils the purpose of perception and the impact that discourses have on 
such a development. This will illustrate the connections to treaty 
development and implementation. 
 
National identity is a contentious concept, that can lie at the heart of political 
division within a domestic constituency. As such it is a concept to which the 
leaders of any state must pay constant and due regard. It is akin to national 
interest and invariably the appropriate articulation of the national identity is 
of major concern to state leaders intent on making an impression in the 
interstate arena. This dynamic can be the driving force behind treaty makers 
intent on constructing facades with which to impress potential customers, 
business partners, investors, military allies or foes. But equally this same 
dynamic can be incontrovertibly domestically oriented, with the intent of 
treaty makers to impress the domestic constituency in a bid to ensure 
domestic harmony, or plausible election outcomes.  
 
Saunders work on psychodynamics offers useful insights into the role of 
individuals in political activity. With his discussion of officials and citizens 
in international relations he points out how interstate exchange is not merely 
"a series of transactions between states", but "a political process of 
continuous interaction involving policymaking and policy influencing 
communities on both sides of a relationship"...(and that the)...focus on the 
politics of a relationship requires attention to human as well as state 
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dimensions of policymaking, interests, power, interaction and conflict." 
[Saunders:91:42] 
 
It is this humanness which he develops, suggesting that leaders are "not 
immune to the normal human frailties of speaking imprecisely from self-
centred positions and not showing interest or really hearing another's 
concerns." [Saunders:91:43] These limits of tolerance are brought to bear in 
dialogue and Saunders arguments provide a lucid insight into the 
predilections which guide treaty makers. In essence he contends that mature 
relationships increase that "ability to define problems together across 
cultural divides, in operational ways that enlarge opportunities for leaders 
to tackle them despite political differences."[Saunders:91:45]  
 
Thus if "nations and leaders are working in the context of a relationship to 
deal with a commonly defined problem, they will be more likely to develop 
courses of action that take into account each others political needs and 
constituencies." [Saunders:91:45]   In short Saunders contends that state 
negotiators bring paradigmatically limited ideas to the negotiating table and 
rarely are able to escape the confines of the norms promulgated within their 
home state, and intrinsic to their national identity. What this implies is that 
leaders must eventually reach positions of compromise that are determined 
by both external interaction and domestic predilection. The basis of 
agreement will rest with negotiated comprehensions of norms emanating 
from each state's constituency, and resulting in the formation of shared 
norms between the entreating states. where the norm is "...a negotiation of 
one character or another." [Saunders:91:49] 
 
Thus in order for a treaty to be accepted it must do one of two things.  It 
must be constructed in such a way that all parties to the agreement are able 
to leave the negotiating table content that there is a likelihood that domestic 
constituencies will be amenable to the changes that the treaty will bring, and 
this usually means a dilution of the agreement until a consensus is reached. 
Alternatively one of the parties to the agreement have sufficient sway to 
persuade the other parties to agree even though those parties must then face 
the difficult task of convincing domestic polities of the treaty's salience. In 
both cases norms will be under review and face challenges and thus norm 
dynamics are a crucial consideration. 
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Norm Dynamics 
 
In an examination of norm dynamics Finnemore and Sikkink are particularly 
interested in "the role norms play in political change - both in the ways in 
which norms, themselves, change and the ways in which they change other 
features of the political landscape." [Finnemore:98:2] They contend that  
"norms evolve in a patterned life cycle and that different behavioural logics 
dominate different segments of the life cycle." This evolution is driven by the 
dynamics of "strategic social construction", in which "actors strategize 
rationally to reconfigure preferences, identities, or social context."  
 
What is of concern here, however, is defining norms, understanding the 
relationship between domestic and international norms and gauging 
whether norms are agents of stability or change.  Finnemore and Sikkink 
recognise types such as "...regulative norms, which order and constrain and 
constitutive norms, which create new actors, interests, or categories of 
action."[Finnemore:98:2] There are also evaluative or prescriptive norms, 
which have a quality of "oughtness", and thus involve standards of 
appropriate or proper behaviour, which are gauged by "reference to the 
judgements of a community or society." Thus norms are "shared 
assessments" with varying strengths depending  on the amount of support 
they enjoy within the community. [Finnemore:98:5]  What is being explained 
here is how norms develop. The process of "norm creation" occurs in three 
stages, - Norm emergence; norm cascades, involving "broad norm 
acceptance"; and internalisation.  
 
The task of the 'norm entrepreneur' involves utilising these mechanisms of 
the norm 'life cycle', wherein norm emergence occurs when a norm 
entrepreneur convinces a critical mass of states, or norm leaders, to embrace 
a new norm and this "...can create a tipping point after which agreement 
becomes widespread." [Finnemore:98:6]  Vital to the installation of an 
emergent norm is behaviour aimed at replacing an extant norm, by 
generating disapproval or stigma, known as "norm breaking". Equally "norm 
conforming" behaviour must be encouraged as this either produces praise 
for the emergent norm, or provokes no reaction whatsoever.   
 
Norm entrepreneurs are critical for norm emergence as they construct 
"cognitive frames", which if successful, "resonate with broader public 
understandings and are adopted as new ways of talking about or 
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understanding issues." [Finnemore:98:9] Equally, in constructing new 
frames, the norm entrepreneur may encounter "firmly embedded alternative 
norms and frames that create alternative perceptions of both 
appropriateness and interest. " [Finnemore:98:9] Thus to challenge existing 
"logics of appropriateness" activists may need to be inappropriate. To do  so 
risks inciting cognitive dissonance within the community, but ofttimes the 
norm entrepreneur is motivated by an ideational commitment  to the ideals 
and values embodied in the norm. The risk of failure is countered by the 
possibility of success, and the imposition of an idea on the community has 
an effect which can continue long after the new idea has been dispelled by 
its opponents, intent on maintaining the status quo. 
 
The second stage  of the norm 'life cycle' involves imitation, where norm 
leaders attempt to socialise other states to become norm followers, and the 
result can be that a norm cascades through the followers. Until the "tipping 
point" is reached little change occurs, but after that point new norms are 
adopted more rapidly by states, often with little domestic pressure. A form 
of "contagion" occurs as transnational norm influences override domestic 
political concerns. Socialisation is seen as a dominant mechanism of the 
norm cascade. It occurs through emulation, as a form of followership; as 
praise for conformist behaviour, or as ridicule, if a state attempts to deviate 
from the prescribed norm. It is employed by networks of norm 
entrepreneurs to pressure "targeted actors to adopt new policies and laws 
and to ratify treaties..." [Finnemore:98:13] And thus conformity, too, is an 
underlining precondition of norm emergence and norm creation.  
 
In the same manner as with regimes and institutions, the motivations for 
state acceptance of external norms can be conformity, where a state 
demonstrates that it belongs to the group, and esteem, which is bestowed 
upon those states conforming and enhances perceptions of those states. It 
has been suggested that "state leaders conform to norms in order to avoid 
the disapproval aroused by norm violation and thus to enhance national 
esteem." [Finnemore:98:15] But if a state continues to object to accept an 
externally generated norm it is contended that norm entrepreneurs may 
"...provoke cognitive dissonance among norm violators", which leads those 
actors to reduce the dissonance "...by changing either their attitudes or their 
behaviour, " in a bid to conform. [Finnemore:98:14]  
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The third stage of norm creation involves the internalisation of the norm, as 
it acquires "...a taken-for-granted quality" and is no longer "...a matter of 
broad public debate." [Finnemore:98:8] and makes "conformance with the 
norm almost automatic."[Finnemore:98:15] Another mechanism contributing 
to internalisation of norms is "iterated behaviour and habit, "which arises 
when frequent interactions among state representatives creates 
"predictability, stability and habits of trust." And in turn  internalised trust 
can lead to evolutionary normative change as "...procedural changes that 
create new political processes can lead to gradual and inadvertent 
normative, ideational and political convergence." [Finnemore:98:16] 
  
But internalisation can be undone if and when there is domestic uprising 
against an entrenched norm, as the result of an emergent norm offering a 
more contemporary and timely outcome. Equally an emergent norm can be 
firmly rejected by the domestic constituency because it provokes cognitive 
dissonance within the polity which then shifts to a conservative and 
recalcitrant opposition to change. Disapproval of an external norm can stem 
from the domestic constituency, when that norm is perceived to undermine 
domestic sovereignty.   
 
Thus how global or regional norms impact domestically by setting standards 
of behaviour for states is another consideration that warrants recognition. 
But so too is the realisation that domestic norms can become externalised, 
particularly through the efforts of "norm entrepreneurs". Equally these 
actors may adapt external norms for application domestically, and this is 
most often the case where multilateral agreements have been reached and 
must be passed on to domestic constituencies.  Thus the dynamism of 
leaders is a significant factor in political change.  
 
This material on norms can be read in two ways. As an insight into what 
treaty makers must do to achieve institutional change, either externally or 
domestically, and thus gain acceptance of the agreement they are promoting, 
or as a recipe for constructing a treaty with which to effect institutional 
change and minimise any resistance. In either case norm entrepreneurs "face 
firmly embedded alternative norms and frames that create alternative 
perceptions of both appropriateness and interest." [Finnemore:98:9]   
 
 
Perception Formation, Modification or Enhancement 
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This struggle with perceptions is a major preoccupation for all political 
leaders and treaty makers who must maintain a profile of proficiency in the 
global economic arena, to ensure healthy commerce; who must demonstrate 
an ability to provide military security in a harsh global military 
environment; who must increasingly persuade other states of their 
adherence to global ecological and human rights concerns; and who must 
impart these perceptions to a domestic constituency in a bid to retain the 
facades of legitimacy endowed through democratic elections. While these 
forms of perception management pertain particularly to liberal democracies, 
authoritarian states must also practice perception maintenance, and will 
pursue some of the tactics already outlined.  However, the focus may be on 
the state sustaining the perception, both externally and domestically, of its 
ability to exercise control domestically. In many instances stability is often a 
basic requirement. Treaties can be employed to codify such stability. Thus 
perceptions are a vital component of the investigation into the effect of 
treaties.  
 
A major underpinning of perception formation is intentions. An actor's 
intentions can be defined as the actions taken under given circumstances (or, 
if the circumstances are hypothetical, the actions that could be taken if the 
circumstances were to materialise). Usually intention is seen to refer to 
"what the actor plans to do or what goals he hopes to reach." But here the 
term designates "the collection of actions the state will or would take 
because that is what others are trying to predict." [Jervis:83:48] Thus a state's 
"utopian intentions", as predicted by other states, influence the perceptions 
those others have of that state, and this determines their policy toward that 
state.  In this way pre-existing beliefs can influence perceptions, as solutions 
are determined by cognitive processes prevalent at the time. [Jervis:83:215] 
Thus preconceived ideas and attitudes colour the understanding of new 
messages.   
 
Jervis's early work on perceptions and misperceptions [1983] raises the 
impact of immediate concerns ["evoked sets"] on perception and 
interpretation. [Jervis:83:203] Evoked sets are crucial communication devices 
and when leaders enter into cooperative dialogue it is often assumed that all 
participants share the same concerns and information. But the sender may 
transmit a message which the receiver posits within his own framework and 
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receive a message at odds with that sent. Thus complex and subtle messages 
can create confusion, ambiguity, misperceptions and eventually, conflict.  
 
In related work, Schutz and Luckmann [Ekecki:99:2] look at the impact of 
"stocks of knowledge" on cognitive frameworks, and the interpretation of 
perceptions.  Stocks of knowledge are described as the sedimentation of past 
experiences, and are important in interpreting new and irregular events. 
[Ekecki:99:3]  This element is used in interpretation by reference to "...a stock 
of symbols, such as words... and other cultural knowledge to make sense of 
the world..." [Collins:88:275 in Ekecki:99:3] This knowledge is socially based 
as it develops through accumulation, and primarily through language. 
Further this knowledge "...determines the social reality one detects and how 
one interprets events based on that detection." [Ekecki:99:3] The stock of 
knowledge  contains "...not only an individual's past experience but the 
experiences of others as well." [Ekecki:99:3]  But it also is a knowledge 
which, as a provision of language, can refer to "...provinces of meaning 
which are in principle inaccessible as immediate experience."[Schutz and 
Luckmann; 73:248,250 in Ekecki;99;4] Stocks of knowledge "help determine 
which occurrences become classified or not classified as taken-for-granted 
experiences",  [Schutz and Luckmann in Ekecki:99:3] and are key 
components of social perception, as they are of norms. Thus interpretation 
rests on past experiences or on categorisation,  
 
Categorisation explains collective human activity particularly with regard to 
attitude, and is an important explanation of why social change can be so 
difficult. Allport, a social psychologist  delving into cognitive processes, 
suggested that categorisation occurs when people form "large classes or 
clusters" in a bid to simplify daily events and assimilate them into clusters. 
This means that the surfeit of information received daily can be more easily 
processed, but it also means that categorisation "saturates all that it contains 
with the same ideational and emotional flavour" [Ekecki:99:2], and thus 
perceptions are pre-determined by the categorical style. This style can 
exempt some members of society and thus create a series of we/they 
demarcations.   
 
This divide provides opportunities for change. Categories can be more or 
less rational, depending on the strength and cognitive prowess of the 
dominant group. As Ekecki suggests "(e)ven when presented with 
contradictory evidence, a person may find it costs them more to reject or 
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modify the previous category than to maintain them..."[Ekecki:99:2] Thus the 
stock of knowledge, which constitutes categories, is akin to the evoked set. 
Both stem from shared language and influence the interpretation of 
perceptions. 
 
In both instances, these elements of perception can create uncertainty or lack 
of clarity  that can lead to misinterpretation and a revised perception of the 
other. It follows that if the evoked set, for instance, is firmly entrenched 
within the psyche of state leaders, who have engaged in considerable debate 
about an issue, then they are locked into a comprehension and interpretation 
which defies outside influence.  The actor is constrained by the framework 
that has developed over time and interprets new information within that 
construct. The actor then is predisposed to noticing certain things and 
neglecting others, so that information which deserved serious attention was 
ignored, as it fell outside the parameters of the recipients immediate concern 
[Jervis:83:204]. 
 
A perceptual predisposition works in a way that an actor, even though faced 
with discrepant information, will maintain an entrenched view. 
[Jervis:83:146]  But perceptual predispositions do not defy influence. While 
they are "...most influenced by those domestic practises that are so deeply 
ingrained throughout the society that people do not realise the possibility of 
alternatives", [Jervis:83:283] attitudinal shifts can be realised by the 
pragmatic and adept negotiator. The process of persuasion is vital here and 
a competent diplomat can entreat an attitudinal shift within the ranks of the 
oppositionary negotiants, and within the domestic constituency. An 
investigation into persuasion techniques in a later chapter will expand on 
this significant psychopolitical element.  
  
Attitude change most often arises after discrepant information has been 
received. While the tendency is to maintain images and beliefs, the 
information may not be ignorable and thus must be reconciled with the 
dominant perception. [Jervis:83:289] Initially the recipient will attempt to 
seek a balance and reduce dissonance, while minimising the change to their 
attitude structure.   If change is necessary as the discrepant information 
elicits such movement, the recipient will at first "...alter those beliefs that are 
least important, that are supported by the least information, and that are tied 
to the fewest other beliefs," thus preserving all of the original attitudes. But if 
these mechanisms prove inadequate, in light of the discrepant information, 
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processes involving minor or peripheral changes will be invoked.  If, then, 
contradictions still prevail, mechanisms that "...necessitate more far-reaching 
changes will be called into play".    [Jervis:83:291]   
 
While this is a method of coping with discrepant information, an outline of 
the other mechanisms of attitude preservation or change suggests an insight 
into the strategy a treaty-maker must employ to guarantee the successful 
adoption and implementation of an agreement. Initially a recipient may fail 
to see that the new information might contradict existing beliefs. This can 
occur through a reaction whereby the message is immediately and 
automatically dismissed, through the activation of defence mechanisms,  or  
through a psychological process of selective cognition, whereby the message 
simply is not understood, due to a recollection or dependence on entrenched 
frames of reference. [Jervis:83:291] 
 
Another possible element of attitude preservation to be overcome by the 
change agent is the recipient's rejection of the validity of the information, as 
the source is discredited, but this can be judged solely by the recipient as the 
message advocates a position too discrepant to be given due regard. Equally 
the skill and objectivity of the communicator can be called into question and 
the message be discredited. Or the message can be discredited by the 
recipient who, in defence of old beliefs, can admit puzzlement and thus 
charge that the information is incomprehensible. [Jervis:83:293] 
 
Another tactic against change is 'bolstering', whereby new information is 
sought to support the existent view that is being challenged by discrepant 
information, and thus a rearrangement of attitudes can be brought into 
effect, as a counter measure to change.  This bolstering may in turn entrench 
the extant attitude even more deeply. Thus the change agent must act to 
limit the impact of bolstering, or to avoid it entirely. But not all discrepant 
information can be readily dismissed using these processes.  
 
At times the change agent has presented information worthy of review and 
regard. Change can be minimised through differentiation, whereby the parts 
causing attitudinal conflict can be separated from the rest, so that those parts 
become exceptional and circumstantial. A final tactic used against change 
agents is transcendence, which works to absorb the new discrepant 
information into the older existing attitude, [Jervis:83:296] thus reconciling 
"undeniable fact and immovable premises." [Jervis:83:303] However, the 
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immovability of central beliefs raised here can affect less important beliefs. 
But then conjecture arises about which beliefs are central and which 
peripheral. Further, a peripheral belief can become centralised by change 
and set off a series of further changes, which may be influenced by the new 
idea if it is accepted.  In fact once a recipient realises this new idea 
contradicts many older ideas "...the same dynamics that protected the old 
concept will spread the implications of the new one by altering subsidiary 
beliefs." [Jervis:83:305] 
 
To complete this excursion into perception theory and how change agents, 
in this instance, treaty makers, can achieve success, an insight into how to 
transmit discrepant information will be informative, and demonstrate how 
misperception can arise. Jervis contends that "(g)reater change will result 
when discrepant information arrives in a large batch than when it is 
considered bit by bit", [Jervis:83:308] as the contradictions between the new 
information and the prevailing view will be clear. But if the discrepant 
information arrives gradually, the conflict between new and old can go 
unnoticed, be dismissed as unimportant or result in slight modifications. 
Thus an explanation may not be completely satisfactory and a questionable 
interpretation can be used to support an image that in turn can be used to 
justify other dubious explanations, with inherent dangers in judging other 
states' intentions, since interpretation of past events often quickly become 
enshrined. 
 
In the end, the viability of the interpretation of perceptions is determined by 
the recipients "stock of knowledge", akin to Jervis's "evoked set", and the 
circumstances under which the perception is being presented to its 
constituency. Thus the appreciation of the intent of a treaty depends on the 
worldview or the mind set of the critic. This view stems from social 
constructs, which include cultural underpinnings and, importantly,  
language. This latter element  brings to the fore the role of discourses in 
social construction. 
   
Discourses 
 
Discourses are a vital element of political activity. They can be entrenched 
comprehensions which span several generations of a constituency, or they 
can be outcomes of newly installed norms and thus tools of the change 
agent, the norm entrepreneur, and the treaty maker. Their essential effect in 
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the political arena, be it external or domestic, is on language. This can be the 
language of diplomacy, used in the realm of high politics, or of social 
exchange, where constituents share ideas and information. 
 
Fairclough's investigation into language as a "social practice determined by 
social structures" introduces the idea of  "socially constituted orders of 
discourse", which he sees as "sets of conventions associated with social 
institutions." [Fairclough:89:17] His explanation serves as a reminder that 
treaty makers need to consider dominant discourses in their attempts at 
attitudinal change. He suggests that an order of discourse contains several 
discourses, which are related to practice, where the individuals actions are 
constrained by social convention. Fairclough describes these constraints on 
discourse and practice as interdependent networks, or orders of discourse 
and social orders, respectively. He suggests that the social structure is 
comprised of different spheres of action, each with variant practices, which 
have their own discourses, and thus "an order of discourse is really a social 
order looked at from a specifically discoursal perspective..." 
[Fairclough:89:29]  
 
To illustrate these points let us consider how the notion of free trade has 
been a multilateral pursuit globally, and the discourse appears to enjoy the 
support of the global media. Domestically, state agencies offer a similar 
support, and particularly within international media, but are constrained 
with regard to their domestic constituencies, where there is a clash between 
the discourses of the globalist free trader, and the local protectionists 
pursuing the national interest. 
Drawing on Foucault, Fairclough explains orders of discourse as pertaining 
to social institutions and contained within the confines of those 
constructions, but also operating outside the institution and determining the 
activity and interaction which occurs between institutions, and in society as 
a whole. Thus he states that "how discourses are structured in a given order 
of discourse, and how structuring changes over time, are determined by 
changing relationships of power at the level of the social institution or of the 
society. Power at these levels includes the capacity to control orders of 
discourse..." [Fairclough:89:30]  
 
 These orders of discourse are "ideologically shaped by power relations in 
social institutions and in society as a whole."[Fairclough:89:17] Ideological 
discourse control is aimed at "... ensuring that orders of discourse are 
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ideologically harmonised..." [Fairclough:89:30] Ideological power is 
understood to be the ability to "...project one's practices as universal and 
'common sense'..." and it is exercised through coercion, with the "...ultimate 
sanctions of physical violence or death," [Fairclough:89:33]  as might be 
practised by the treaty maker engaged by an authoritarian regime to effect 
change; or as a "...key mechanism of rule by consent" [Fairclough:89:34] be it 
tacit or direct.  Where this leads to, according to Fairclough, is a "...high 
degree of ideological integration between institutional orders of discourse 
within the societal order of discourse." In effect key discourse types which 
legitimise existing social relations have colonised institutional orders of 
discourse. [Fairclough:89:36] Thus the task of the treaty maker intent on 
change is to persuasively open those apparatuses of social control to 
modification, and then to introduce a change which is amenable to 
widespread interpretation within each constituency to which it pertains. 
 
In an extension of this argument Fairclough draws the links between 
discourse, and common sense, when he asks how "common sense relates to 
the coherence of discourse and to the processes of discourse interpretation".  
[Fairclough:89:77]  To reach a coherent interpretation of a text, which could 
be a treaty, Fairclough suggests that a connection must be made between the 
text and the world it describes. The connections are made by the interpreter, 
and not by the text, and thus "the common sense assumptions and 
expectations of the interpreter..." and "what's in the text" must be conjoined 
to achieve coherence. [Fairclough:89:78] This activity describes the 
interaction between the text and the world view and is the premise for 
viewing the treaty beyond the text. It is a way of comprehending the 
actuality inherent in symbolism, of seeing the possible physical 
manifestations of ideas that are conveyed by the images and evoked by what 
the treaty represents, rather than by what it says.  
 
But Fairclough takes common sense further and elaborates on its connection 
to ideology. He suggests that it is the "...conception of ideology as an 
'implicit philosophy'  in the practical activities of social life, backgrounded 
and taken for granted, that connects it to common sense..." [Fairclough:89:84] 
Thus ideology is most effective when it is invisible, and this occurs when 
ideologies are brought to a discourse as "....background assumptions...' 
which influence interpretation of texts, assumptions that are common-
sensical. [Fairclough:89:84-5] In this manner ideologies reproduce 
themselves through discourses. Thus the treaty maker, when faced with an 
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entrenched but invisible ideology underpinning constituent political 
comprehensions, is faced with a momentous task of persuasion and 
discourse redefinition.  
 
This can be a momentous task because discourse types can be "ideologically 
diverse...ideologically particular and ideologically variable." Fairclough 
contends that "(w)hat is a stake is the establishment or maintenance of one 
type as the dominant one in a given social domain, and therefore the 
establishment or maintenance of certain ideological assumptions as 
commonsensical." [Fairclough:89:90]  In essence there is a contest for control 
over the way that political situations are described, and about what 
solutions are most likely to succeed. Dominant and dominated discourse 
types occupy the realm of political exchange. A dominated type may exist in 
opposition to a dominant discourse or be contained by it. The quest for the 
change agent is to win the battle to control the contours of the political world 
and the treaty maker beginning with a dominated type of discourse must be 
very persuasive.  
 
Again the discourse established around free trade can illustrate the point. 
The constituency is advised that due to circumstances changing  
externally, and thus beyond the control of the state, domestic reconstruction 
is necessary to again return to a position of viability. This will entail a period 
of uncertainty during the rebuilding process if the necessary modifications 
are to occur in an appropriate time span, implying that time is of the 
essence. A recalcitrant constituency, not able to recognise the urgency of the 
situation will react negatively, and fall back to a position of complacency 
and demand a maintenance of the status quo. To override this dissension the 
change agent must take action. which may not only meet with opposition 
but be determined undemocratic. The promoters may argue that change is 
necessary for the national interest, while opponents may use the same 
argument, but base it on historical precedent, or dominant and entrenched 
national values. 
 
One avenue with which to effect a change of focus for a treaty maker is for a 
discourse to become dominant through naturalisation, which Fairclough 
describes as a process whereby the discourse will come to be seen as natural 
and commonsensical. However what comes to be common sense is 
"...determined by who exercise power and domination in a society..." 
[Fairclough:89:92] Thus any attempts to change the dominant discourse, and 
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effect changes to social structures, and thus political structures, will be 
limited by the dynamics of political power and the concomitant powers of 
persuasion.  
 
The treaty maker must not only be aware of discourse dynamics but be a 
competent operator of that psychosocial machinery to create effective 
devices that will elicit desired changes. While this is vital in the external 
arena where negotiation between state leaders is the first step to realising an 
agreement, the implementation stage of the provisions of a treaty, which 
invariably has a domestic impact, has a crucial dependence on being 
accepted by the domestic constituency. If, however, the treaty is aimed 
primarily as a symbolic device that acceptance is less crucial, but still 
important as its intent will undoubtedly be to alter the dominant discourse. 
If this is the case domestic acceptance, through attitudinal change, must be 
achieved, to guarantee the life of the treaty beyond its initial signature and 
ratification. 
 
The Relationship between Norms, Perceptions, Discourses and Treaties. 
 
As has been clearly identified, norms are a major institutional mechanism, 
providing guidance for treaty makers by outlining what policies attract 
acceptability or by offering indications of the need for change. Perception 
management is a primary objective for state leaders where instigation or 
enhancement can be realised through treaty making activity. Discourses 
flow from norms, but can also underpin them, but the convolutions become 
more intricate with the comprehension that perceptions may actually create 
discourses, which in turn generate norms. Which element gains precedence 
is often determined by the change being attempted, by the complexion of the 
culture targeted for change, or by leadership skills utilised by the change 
agent.  
 
Hence each of these elements can have influence over the strategy employed 
by a treaty maker intent on change. The analysis of the relationship between 
a treaty and norms, perceptions or discourses must first identify which of 
the three ideational elements influenced the treaty maker. This will give an 
insight into the type of task faced by the change agent. A further concern 
regards the impact that the treaty may have had on these elements. Beyond 
that deductions about whether the treaty challenges societal norms, or has 
an ideological base, or fits within attitudinal expectations, will indicate the 
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extent of cultural change that may be necessary for the treaty to gain 
widespread constituent support, and if such support is necessary to achieve 
success? 
 
This chapter has unpacked the ideational elements of norms, perceptions 
and discourses, to show how seemingly externally generated suggestion for 
change will inevitably be influenced by particular domestic predilections, 
and hence the most substantial investigation of the genesis, role and purpose 
of treaties occurs at the domestic level. Thus the next section aims to 
construct a lens with a psychological and psychopolitical bias by examining 
theoretical accounts of cultural change, leadership, political communication, 
including persuasion, propaganda and indoctrination, and the 
psychopolitical barriers to change that may be encountered by treaty 
makers.  
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Section Three   
 
 
 
 
 Internal Comprehensions  
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Section Three   
 
Internal Comprehensions  
 
This section examines the psychopolitical underpinnings of domestic 
political activity and in particular the ways in which social change comes 
about or is brought about. It deals with the mindset of the domestic 
constituency, and the tasks faced by treaty makers, acting as change agents. 
The treaty maker, when dealing with the domestic constituency, must 
contend with psychological variables, where a state's foreign policy is 
affected by "the personality, the motives, the attitudes, the beliefs, the 
stereotypes, the emotions and perceptions of its key decision makers and 
their advisers, or in the terms of the psychological attributes of its people, or 
at least those sections of it which the decision makers take into account". 
[Pettman:75:202]  
 
In dealing with these variables the treaty maker may need to construct 
treaties as tools of manipulation, persuasion, perception formation, 
modification or enhancement, or be aware that to ensure the acceptance and 
success of a treaty regime that such processes are employed to ensure 
change. The role of propaganda, examined here as part of the discussion on 
persuasion, is considered an important element in this process. This may be 
a process that involves the attempted diffusion of reformist concepts, is 
dependent on the acceptance and legitimising actions of the domestic 
constituency, and can be a form of "social engineering".  
 
But treaty makers must also be aware of the processes that can influence the 
success of programs premised on change, where cognitive dissonance, once 
invoked, can work against change; or where the persuasive leader can 
successfully implement a process of cultural transformation. 
 
In a wide ranging discussion this section begins with Chapter 6 and 
concerns Cultural Change and Leadership, which is based on Bate's 1994 
explication of cultural change, taken from an organisational perspective. 
This seems pertinent to an investigation of societal change, as a society and 
an organisation can be seen to be similarly structured.  
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The explanation of psychopolitical challenges to change contained in 
Chapter 7 is premised on both Money-Kyrle's and Eysenck's works, from the 
1950s, on the relationship between psychology and politics. The chapter is 
filled out by more contemporary psychologists from the 1980s, such as 
Sarbin who looks at narrative as a useful means of analysis, and Gergen and 
Gergen, who delve into interpretation. It is completed with Volkan's work 
from the early 90's on psychodynamics and the impact of identification on 
social groups. 
 
Finally  Chapter 8 examines Political Communication, and looks at both the 
ways and the means employed by treaty makers as change agents.  It 
outlines various comprehensions of persuasion, propaganda and 
indoctrination, drawing mostly on the work of Pratkanis and Aronson from 
1991, before accessing Snook's 1977 contentions regarding propaganda as an 
educative technique. Having dispensed with the method of political 
communication, a brief but insightful foray into the techniques of political 
communication employed by change agents follows, and is based on related 
work by McNair from 1995, and on Advertising and Consumer Psychology 
from the early 80s, drawing on Petty and Cacioppo.  Zanna's view on 
cognitive manipulation and persuasive communication, from a 1993 text, 
finishes the Chapter and the Section.  
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Chapter Six   
 
Cultural Change, Leadership and Treaties 
 
Treaties can change cultures and inevitably this is the result of active 
leadership and successful implementation. The task for the treaty maker, as 
change agent, is to effect a realignment of cognitive frameworks. Such 
frameworks can be variously described as norms, perceptions, or discourses 
and it is these social constructs which are the targets of change. But the 
underlying dynamic in all instances is attitude. Attitude stems from evoked 
sets and stocks of knowledge, and as such is both an individual and 
collective dimension. But more than that it can be the sum of present 
individual experience, conjoined with the contemporary experiences of the 
collective, and complemented by the historical underpinnings of the 
pertinent culture, be it dominant or otherwise.  This chapter questions how  
attitudinal shifts come about, and who engenders those shifts. This 
discussion will outline the approaches to change, and identify the role of 
change agents by examining forms of leadership. 
 
In a bid to better appreciate the process of achieving attitudinal shifts in the 
community Bate's work on cultural change within organisations adapts well 
to the political community, which has structural similarities, and provides a 
succinct insight into organisation studies. Bate suggests two possible 
comprehensions of culture. The scientific rationalist view is that culture is a 
component of organisation and thus "cultural change is essentially cultural 
engineering". [Bate:94:10] The anthropological viewpoint is that culture is "a 
perspective", "a framework of attention in the eye of the beholder", a social 
construction, but more than that,"(s)ocieties are cultures." [Bate:94:12] Thus a 
culture has "...no external reality but merely social creations and 
constructions emerging from actors making sense out of ongoing streams of 
actions and interactions." [Allaire etal in Bate:94:14]  Thus, Bate contends 
that any change among and between individuals, among the pattern of 
connections and interpretations, is cultural change. And cultural change is 
"the 'deconstruction' of something that already exists, and the 
'reconstruction' of something new or different to take its place"[Bate:94:15] 
 
To effect cultural change, and often the introduction of a new treaty is likely 
to have that effect, several strategies can be employed. Strategies are seen as 
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"...the ways and means an organisation or society has developed in order to 
cope with the basic 'life problems' relating to its survival and growth" 
[Bate:94:33], and to provide directional orientations. The conforming 
strategy is the simplest model, whereby social constructions are adapted, 
improved on or perpetuated, while deforming strategies have the attendant 
opposite effect, by perverting or subverting existing frameworks. The 
reforming strategy is aimed at abandoning or removing existing social 
constructions, while the transforming strategy is aimed at "...moving across 
from one form of social construction to another..." [Bate:94:16] through form 
or frame-breaking. The many social forms or constructions which can be 
affected by such strategies include knowledge structures, systems if ideas, 
belief systems, collective assumptions and symbolic systems.[Bate:94:16] 
Hence norms, perceptions and discourses must be included under this 
rubric.  
 
What also must be appreciated is that change will rarely occur as the 
outcome of only one strategy, but is more likely to be the result of a 
combination of strategies. In the process of transforming a culture there are 
likely to be both conforming and deforming elements at work on the culture 
being modified, and some reform may also be necessary. This makes the 
task even more complex as the change agent must attempt to predict which 
strategies are likely to have the greater impact, and if necessary then 
alleviate that impact if it proves to work against the dominant strategy. For 
the treaty maker, working within the confines of a liberal democracy, where 
scrutiny of the process is possible, or even likely, the constraints can be 
limiting. Thus executive action, which excludes parliamentary scrutiny,   
may be forthcoming as a means of finalising agreement between state 
parties.  
 
In a bid to introduce change the treaty maker has the option of pursuing the 
conservative but assured path to cultural development which leads to a 
change in culture, or a less certain but more radical attempt at a change of 
culture through a process of cultural transformation. The former option, 
while likely to achieve some success, may be so minimal as to be little more 
than a gesture, while the latter approach may contain requisite adaptations, 
but be defeated before the process begins. How should the change agent 
proceed? The following discussion examines both approaches to cultural 
change, before outlining types  of leadership, in a bid to identify possible 
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combinations of leader and strategy that would be effective. With such 
knowledge it will be possible to gauge the likely success of a treaty regime.  
 
Cultural Development or  Cultural Transformation 
 
Cultural development is interpreted as "evolution towards greater order and 
continuity..." through "...variations on a cultural theme."[Bate:94:35] Its basis 
is a conforming strategy pursued by culture conservationists who "...wish to 
preserve and protect the cultural environment (The Order) that their 
predecessors or present-day 'elders' have created." [Bate:94:34]  These 
strategists are seen as "...imitators rather than innovators, copiers rather than 
creators, improvisers rather than inventors, refiners rather than reformers...", 
and actors who see change as an "adapting, correcting, conforming 
process...dedicated to making the culture last." [Bate:94:34]  Thus this is a 
strategy of 'cultural continuity'. A treaty maker pursuing this pathway is 
likely to be acting to maintain or reinforce the status quo, and to be entering 
into agreement for security purposes. However, while transiting this 
pathway may meet with success, its impact may be ceremonial, rather than 
functional.  
 
The culture conservationist can also be an evolutionist, intent on "...a course 
of development that will produce not so much a change as a 'growth of 
order'" [Bate:94:38] Their strategy is custodial, change is acceptable if it 
produces a mutation of the existing form where the surface shape can be 
altered, but "...the underlying form or matrix from which it is constituted 
must remain the same." [Bate:94:38] Re-creation, reproduction, repetition are 
the strategic processes at play, and change is a disturbance to be corrected. 
Such correction may be realised with the imposition of cultural order where 
control is "...exerted by operating on the ideological premises of action." 
[Perrow in Bate:94:39] This is explained through hegemony, defined as a 
"form of ideational control" or mind control, aimed at changing the way the 
constituency thinks rather than how it behaves.  Equally the intent can be 
the maintenance of a dominant discourse in light of discrepant information 
that challenges dominant paradigms, or threatens the salience of cultural 
norms, or is construed to impact negatively on perceptions propagated by 
ruling elites.  The process of control is realised through 
 
"(f)irstly ...the dissemination of the values and norms favoured by the elite 
group; secondly... the denial, refutation and ultimately censorship of beliefs, 
values and norms which threaten the position of the elite group; and thirdly... 
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the attempt to define and limit the parameters of permissible and normal 
discussion of beliefs, values and norms." [Kirkbridge:83:238 in Bate:94:40] 
 
Hence a strategy of cultural order depends on ideational control. If this 
breaks down or is in imminent danger of doing so the ruling group can fall 
back "...upon the coercive power of the political society or state machinery in 
order to reassert its domination." [Kirkbridge:83:239 in Bate:94:40] 
 
However, this intransigent attitude to change could result from "schematic 
myopia", where cultural change does not occur, because leadership suffers 
"... a cognitive or perceptual affliction that narrows the range of vision..." 
resulting in missed opportunities and unrealised ambitions. This collective  
and functional blindness is a paradox of a culture which has a directional 
orientation [Bate:94:87], whereby it only looks one way at a time. A similar 
problem relates to misreading situations and picking wrong strategic 
alternatives. This is an outcome of blindspots, or cultural dysfunctionalities, 
which "...place cognitive barriers on perception, self reflection, learning 
action and interaction." [Hennestad:91:55 in Bate:94:88]   
 
These blindspots are the result of culture being inherently time bound and "a 
past solution to a past problem." Due to time constraints a culture tends to 
develop in a circular fashion in the sense of being "...an immanent, enclosed 
and self-contained cognitive whole within which patterns of thinking and 
logic endlessly repeat themselves" [Watzlawick etal:74 in Bate:94:90] 
Participants "...become prisoners of their own culture, hermetically sealed 
into a bubble" where "thinking processes become increasingly culture-
bound." [Bate:94:91] Simmel suggests that the culture has its own demise 
built into it that locks it into "irreversible courses of action." [Simmel:22:17 in 
Bate:94:86] Thus a culture may value consistency in behaviour which can 
result in entrenched conservatism, that undermines growth and leads to 
implosive characteristics.  
A visionary treaty maker is likely to be disappointed with the constituency's 
response to a proposal for change engendered by a proposed agreement, 
when the political environment has such a conservative complexion. 
However, change may be vital for the sake of that constituency. In such an 
instance blindspots must be overlooked and the bubble burst by breaking 
down cognitive barriers, and transforming the culture. 
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Cultural Transformation is a process intended to change the cultural 
structure, with an accompanying "fundamental change of cultural identity." 
[Bate:94:81] The prime objective of a strategy of transformation is to reframe 
culture, break the 'vicious' circle of "...narrowing options and endless 
repetitions of constantly failing solutions...", to take up "...the requirements  
of the modern world" [Bate:94:83] and overcome "cultural obsolescence." 
This can be achieved through a process of 'cultural discontinuity', by 
disengaging from the "futile and counterproductive activity of repackaging 
and recycling useless recipes and formulas" and initiating "...a genuine 
process of renewal and replenishment, regeneration and innovation." 
[Bate:94:83] But while the transformative objective may have lucid and 
logical premises and a functional salience, it may be deemed unsaleable to a 
constituency perceived as hostile to such an agreement, due to its symbolic 
incongruity, particularly if the treaty partner is considered unacceptable. In 
short, cultural transformation is premised on proactive thinking and 
application, and as such must work to overcome the endemic conservatism 
underpinned by the elements outlined below. Such obstacles may seem 
insurmountable and in the end change depends on the breaking down of 
cultural impediments to change and an effective leadership/ followership 
symbiosis. 
 
Leadership 
 
Treaty making can be led by policy change, be the basis of policy change or 
be designed as a symbolic placebo. But treaty making goes beyond the 
abstract process of textualising interests, desires and needs. The treaty 
maker needs be aware of the barriers to implementation that must be faced 
domestically by a treaty which, if it engenders change, is to meet with 
success. The implication is that a treaty which does not call for change will 
likely be absorbed into the discourse, without any notice being taken of it. 
But for a transformational treaty implementation is imperative, and as 
objective prescription becomes subjective interpretation that leads to cultural 
change, effective leadership is just as vital. 
 
Based on the notion that cultural change occurs through either cultural 
development or cultural transformation, reference to Bate's insights into 
leadership will reveal the style seemingly most suitable to the strategy to be 
pursued to implement change.  Bate suggests that leaders act in either an 
aggressive, conciliative, corrosive, or indoctrinative manner, or in any 
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combination of these. [Bate:94:168] A brief insight into each category will 
assist in evaluating the leadership style of a successful treaty maker.  
 
The aggressive style is characterised by cultural 'vandalism', where the 
objective of the change agent, the leader, is to deliver a large shock to the 
system in a very short time.  Aggressives unmake one world in order  to 
make another. A process of "invalidation and delegitimisation of previous 
patterns and practices" occurs, where the "past is debunked" and "history is 
rewritten". [Bate:94:170] "Deauthenticating the authenticity of a previous 
way of life", dissolving cultural coherency, fragmenting reality,  and 
removing habit and common sense as reliable ways of coping are vital 
preludes to change, where a "...careful self-censored discourse..." is 
encouraged among the population. [Bate:94:171] The new cultural directions 
must be policed to ensure effective implementation. Thus a strong 
integrated culture must be established  with "...a single source of authority 
and a single focus of loyalty..." whereby a form of cultural hegemony exists 
"...through which ideational control can be exercised by the ruling group." 
[Bate:94:174] While the unmaking can be an elementary task, the second 
stage of creating an integrated culture works against this style of leadership, 
unless the major stake-holders in the polity gain through the change. 
 
The aggressive leader's behaviour is heroic. It is intent on survival and based 
on the notion that  "radical times demand radical remedies." There is a 
commitment to redemption, wherein the leader behaves messianically, 
intent on a "...legitimate struggle fought in the name of truth and goodness"; 
initiative, which must be seized "in order to ensure a high probability of 
success" through radical and revolutionary activity; and innovation, where 
the rebel "works against the existing social structure..." [Bate:94:17-8]  Bate 
contends that the aggressive leader is less a revolutionary, a political 
sobriquet, and more a rebel and a romantic "motivated by a self-centred 
desire to ... transform the world." Concern for cultural substance over 
political process may bring about the romantic's downfall, as "immersed in 
his vision he often fails to notice the gathering clouds of opposition until it is 
too late." [Bate:94:178-9]  An opposition that may form when the extant 
cultural framework is swept away, the culture becomes less unitary and 
more pluralistic, with a "...multitude of discordant voices, divided loyalties 
and rampant segmentalism." [Bate:94:175]  
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These voices enter into dialogue with regard to implementation. Involved in 
the process are the dominant faction, which supports the ruling ideas; the 
enhancing faction, whose members are "more fervently attached to the 
values of the dominant culture than the dominant group itself; the 
orthogonal faction, who support the dominant group but "have their own 
separate values; and the counterculture, who "...repudiate the ruling values 
completely." [Bate:94:175] Hence it can be postulated that if the change 
agent, the treaty maker, is seeking the installation of a program coincidental 
with ruling ideas then support can be garnered, however, if that leader steps 
outside those parameters and is perceived as acting in the interests of the 
counterculture then failure may be the only outcome. But on the positive 
side, such leaders are committed to cultural innovation and play the "anti-
role to the establishment truths" [Bate:94:179] by challenging dominant 
paradigms. For them success may not be as important as the symbolic action 
of the challenge. The legacy of the aggressive leader may be to alter the 
content of cultural discourse, through norm modification [Bate:94:198-9], as 
pursued by the norm entrepreneur. 
 
The conciliative leader is more an incrementalist  and a new culture is 
slowly grafted on to the old. The approach is characterised by a form of 
discourse that is flexible, accommodating and egalitarian.  It appeals to 
common sense, and is achieved through persistence and hard work.  
There is no need for a "dialectical confrontation" in negotiation as the 
processes of convergence, conformity and order are preferable in order to 
achieve change than those of divergence, deviance and rebellion. "Mutuality 
is the key principle" [Bate:94:182] The conciliative approach is aimed at 
avoiding friction and this is possible through logical incrementalism, with 
low profile partial solutions unfolding as part of a strategic vision.  The use 
of language that deemphasises the extent of the envisaged change and 
presents the package in conventional terms will raise less resistance. The 
opposition must be targeted and be invited to participate and be involved in 
the development of options and to engage in the dialogue about change. But 
in its basic form the gradualist paradigm proposes that "systems can accept 
any change given time and patience."[Bate:94:183]  
 
The success of the conciliative approach rests on the leader's perceived lack 
of power; an ability to avoid conflict through collusion; through maintaining 
cooperative relations and a sense of order to achieve a level of cultural 
continuity;  by using elements of the old order to construct the new; by 
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utilising existing competences; and by ensuring that the new construct 
makes its forerunner appear obsolete. [Bate:94:183-5] This is a process which 
depends on evolution and is contained by convention. Bate contends that it 
may succeed in bringing about developmental change rather than 
transformational change. [Bate:94:185] This leader may be the conservative 
intent on change, to demonstrate insightfulness, and to illustrate 
pragmatism, but is shrewd enough to know that minimalism will meet with 
the most success. This seemingly benign approach to change can alter how 
the culture performs, its process. But it is malign too in the sense that the 
change program goes on unnoticed by those involved. It is its 
incrementalism which poses the greatest threat as mediocrity may become 
the norm. 
 
The corrosive approach to leadership is essentially a political process, the 
purpose of which is to "effect a major change in the locus and distribution of 
power and authority." Corrosives "...tend to be covert and devious, skilfully 
manipulating relationships in order to achieve their ends." [Bate:94:186] The 
rationales for the corrosive approach suggest that "...the pursuit of informal, 
non-legitimate and corrosive processes is indispensable to the process of 
cultural change and development." [Bate:94:187] They work by erosion, 
"progressively undermining the power base of rival groups" until those 
groups become either submissive or irrelevant. This is the approach where 
deals are struck behind closed doors, where favours are bought and sold, 
where networking is the "basic unit of cultural production and 
modification." [Bate:94:189]  
 
Corrosives see that to bring about cultural change the balance between 
directions and performance must be disturbed, where directions include 
"...indications, signposts, codes of meaning, guidelines, instructions, 
orientations and definitions" while performance means "...both actions and 
institutions, the conventionally appropriate responses to cultural directions." 
[Bate:94:188] For the treaty maker, the political guidance to which they are 
subjected can stem from such a leader, committed to effecting change 
through realising external agreement, but with the simple aim of bolstering 
domestic power and control. 
 
Networks are essential to this process as channels of meaning into which 
ideas are introduced and subsequently defined, developed, validated or 
corrected. Thus cultural change is a "...function of network complexity", 
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where networks empower individuals who then change cultures; are 
permissive and allow an "...almost infinite capacity for deviant thought and, 
behaviour; are non-hierarchical, self-reliant and self-helping; arenas for 
learning, information processing, and meaning negotiation; flexible and 
highly tolerant of ambiguity, uncertainty and internal dissension." Networks 
have no respect for the boundaries and contents of existing cultural 
paradigms..." [Bate:94:190] A major criticism of networks, however, is that 
they can be order-directed rather than change-directed, and thus an innate 
conservatism can undermine their possibly transformational function.  
 
The corrosive leader may use the networks that grow out of global and 
interstate institutions to garner greater domestic support. Facadism is an 
element of this form of leadership, which by its nature alters how the 
exercise of power is practised, but does not lend itself to collective well-
being as its primary focus is on political power. Its practice leads to cultural 
development, as its prescribed nature does not allow it the flexibility to 
transform. Thus as a form of leadership it takes a treaty, interprets it in a 
manner beneficial to its power-base, and attempts to implement the 
agreement with a similar end in mind, and that is essentially the 
maintenance of power. 
 
The indoctrinative leader sees cultural change as a learning process, that is 
planned and programmed. This process can be seen as a means of 
controlling people, a socialisation program aimed at teaching core values, a 
form of indoctrination, or cultural conditioning. This cognitive imperialism 
favours the dominance of one world view. [Bate:94:192-6] The rationale for 
this approach is that it devotes itself to changing the "underlying frame of 
meanings and values", the philosophical form of culture. [Bate:94:198] In 
short the change affects the guiding principles, or meta-directions, which 
give "...identity, wholeness and organisation to directions and performance" 
and provide "doctrinal and logical material from which particular normative 
directions are shaped." [Bate:94:198] Such a regime may be implemented by 
a leadership intent on introducing widespread reform into a society, 
particularly with regard to global agreements, which require the 
participation of state polities to achieve success. 
 
Bate suggests that the benefit of such a leadership approach is that  changing 
meta-directions, or the philosophical basis of the organisation, acts to alter 
the directions and performance of that institution. The underlying frame of 
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meaning and values is changed and thus the "...whole definition of reality 
changes..." [Bate:94:198] The cultural system will tend to follow on naturally 
and develop behind the change in meta-direction. However a major criticism 
of this approach is that it has "...no theory of learning associated with it, only 
a theory of teaching..." [Bate:94:199] and thus while it may offer a 
"discursive' kind of consciousness, a theoretical knowledge of culture, it 
does not give... a 'practical' consciousness of culture, a form of knowledge 
that can be used in everyday life." [Bate:94:200]  
 
Thus, in a practical sense, a treaty maker intent on engendering change by 
using this process would need to launch educative programs well in 
advance of reaching an agreement externally, for it to be readily accepted 
domestically. But Louis suggests that the "cultural learning must be active; it 
has to be sought by the individual..." [Louis in Bate:94:201] To create that 
desire the individual must be interested in the proposed change, and this 
suggests a treaty program which allows a longer period of time for 
implementation than the likely term of office experienced by most parties in 
liberal democracies. This suggests that as a leadership model the 
indoctrinative approach had authoritarian application.  It could eventually 
guarantee cultural change in a democracy, if it enjoyed multipartisan 
support, but to be so acceptable implies a conciliative form of change. 
 
A final comment from Bate pertains to the conception of leadership. To be 
successful, change agents as leaders must assist in "...guiding, influencing or 
directing the passage of the idea or spirit through the life-course of the 
cultural production process."  [Bate:94:237]  They must be the "activators of 
human energy and momentum, the animators of the spirit, the stirrers and 
protesters who lead the call to arms." [Bate:94:246] They are in "...constant 
rebellion against what they see as a stagnant and dehumanising world." 
They are the '"transforming leaders, the inspirers, those who through their 
own power as personalities and through the exciting energising force of 
their vision, inspire others to passion, commitment, energy and excitement 
about a shared purpose." [Bate:94:246]  
 
 To do so, however, requires a multidimensional application of leadership to 
ensure that all facets of the culture undergo a similar change. The inter-
relationships between the multiple dimensions will dictate the direction and 
outcome of the change process, and thus leadership will be a collective and 
not an individual activity. This is because culture is a social not an 
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individual phenomenon: socially created, socially maintained and socially 
transformed.  Thus "...leaders and followers mutually co-produce overall 
system leadership." [Bate:94:242]  In this way cultural change is assured if 
the required transformation fits within dominant cognitive frameworks. 
 
When assessing a treaty from the perspectives presented in this chapter the 
purpose of the treaty and the intent of the treaty maker must be ascertained, 
before delving into what changes are required if the introduction and 
implementation of the treaty are to meet with success. If attitudinal shifts are 
necessary, are they possible, what type of leadership is required to effect 
such a shift and what approach must that leader take to guarantee the 
legitimacy of the treaty and the change it engenders? 
 
Whether the approach to cultural change depends on the style of leadership 
or the form of the change depends on the prevailing circumstance, in that 
variant approaches may be required which will realise variant outcomes. A 
treaty which requires changes that will have a minimal cultural impact 
domestically is likely to attract little or no attention, or even if illuminated by 
the political process, be accepted and phased into the dominant political 
discourse. However, a treaty which may be vital for the state's long term 
interest, which will attract widespread dissension within the domestic 
constituency because of construed attacks on the status quo, may need to be 
imposed on the polity, through bipartisan or multipartisan means and the 
interaction of several leaders, committed to a global or multilateral objective, 
as contained in the agreement, who can use diverse leadership skills to 
ensure societal acceptance of requisite change. Such programs can be met 
with hostility and impenetrable psychopolitical obstructionism. The basis of 
this resistance stems from entrenched attitudes, beliefs, opinions and 
ideologies. These elements undergo scrutiny in the following discussion, 
which examines the psychopolitical challenges to change. 
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Chapter Seven    
  
Psychopolitical Challenges to Change. 
 
A treaty may appear to satisfy all the obvious requirements of a domestic 
constituency and seem ready for implementation, but still meet with 
psychopolitical challenges to change. The basis of such challenges may relate 
to entrenched cognitive frameworks. Thus a change agent with a radical 
program of reform, inherited from a newly ratified treaty regime, may be 
concerned only with the means of implementation, and this could be 
manipulated to alleviate concern of critics. However, a reform which 
requires significant attitudinal change to achieve implementation could be 
met with hostility and intransigence.  Major impediments to change can be 
entrenched beliefs, opinions, attitudes and ideologies. This chapter examines 
each of these elements to gauge their resistance to modification, and the 
likely intransigence they imbue in the constituency, in a bid to identify the 
most proficient strategies to be employed by treaty makers to ensure 
success.  The relationship between the elements will be established by 
delving further into the mechanisms of each, separately.  
 
The articulation of the various forms that challenges to change take allows 
for a further insight into the reactions of a political community to a leader's 
initiatives. Those various challenges are based on beliefs, opinions, attitudes 
and ideology, but are also premised on the grander themes contained in 
cultural narratives, that encompass myth and legend, and the ritualised 
notions of difference which develop between disparate groups in a 
constituency, and that stem from the preferred norms, perceptions and 
discourses on which each group bases it political and cultural predilections. 
 
This chapter draws on several authors from the psychology discipline to 
develop an understanding of the relationship between psychology and 
politics. The early works of Money-Kyrle [1951] and Eysenck [1954-1968] 
introduce the possibility of  interaction between the two comprehensions. 
This is continued with insights gained from Sarbin [1986], a narrative 
psychologist, who develops a link between discourse and narrative; Gergen 
and Gergen [1986], who examine interpretation and narrative; and Volkan's 
work on the psychodynamics of international relationships [1991], which 
examines how people acquire 'national' identity.     
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In his 1951 publication, Psychoanalysis and Politics, Money-Kyrle applies 
psychology to politics in a bid to "discover the nature and extent of whatever 
unconscious processes may influence...political desires, feelings and 
beliefs..."[Money-Kyrle:51:23] Thus his text is an essential and introductory  
document in this investigation into psychopolitics, as he lays the 
groundwork for  later thinking on social psychology. Money-Kyrle examines 
the cause of political dispute with regard to beliefs, desires and opinions. He 
states that the primary aim of the psychological analysis of politics is "to 
discover the nature and extent of whatever unconscious processes may 
influence political desires, feelings and beliefs" [Money-Kyrle:77:23]  
 
Beliefs are explained as "imageless expectations", which are based on 
"...dispositions to be surprised at any combination of sensory experience 
which is incompatible with the expected combination." [Money-Kyrle:77:32] 
The expectations are based on perception, and are an outcome of experience. 
They are arrived at through a process of cognitive development where 
learning "...consists in substituting true beliefs both for ignorance and for 
false ones." [Money-Kyrle:77:39] This action depends on realising a belief as 
a conscious awareness, as opposed to an unconscious understanding and 
acceptance of reality that impacts as an emotional response. 
 
The development of conscious awareness is the outcome of the interaction 
between the totality of the logically possible experience, the imaginative 
universe; the totality of the physically possible experience, the real universe; 
the totality of the objects of any one person's beliefs or expectations, the 
belief system; and the totality of an individual's actual experience, the 
biography. {Money-Kyrle:77:39] This interactive process increases the 
validity and widens the area of  the belief system, by imposing tests on 
experience. Reality tests analyse the corresponding relationship between a 
belief and reality, while regimes of consistency are based on the comparison 
of beliefs, which if in conflict, result in the eventual elimination of "one or 
other of the opposing expectations." [Money-Kyrle:77:40] When these tests 
are combined it follows that a belief system based on a more accurate and 
complete world view should pertain. However, disputes about accuracy 
come about as a result of an impediment to learning, which Freud called the 
Pleasure Principle, whereby the actor will resist images which impact on 
beliefs in such a way as to require the actor to "retain pleasurable and to 
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exclude or repress painful images."  [Money-Kyrle:77:42] In short, to stay in 
the comfort zone.  
 
This psychological delving into political activity is central to this thesis, 
because it seeks to address the deeper challenges that change agents must 
face. One significant and vital concern is with the individual within society 
who must be persuaded to accept change. As the foregoing discussion on 
beliefs suggests this requires a movement away from the unconscious, to the 
realisation of an integrated person, "...whose mind has nothing hidden from 
itself, and who is rational in the sense that the belief-systems governing his 
behaviour are true within the range of his experience because they have 
been consciously tested..." [Money-Kyrle:77:44] Thus the treaty maker must 
ensure that if the perception of the envisaged change forces the constituent 
to respond, then that response must be positive, in that there will be no 
retreat to the comfort zone, but rather an appreciation of the validity and 
worth of the proposed change, and ultimately its acceptance.  
In essence the constituency must believe that the change is either non-
threatening, necessary or in their interest. But that belief must be expressed 
freely amongst members of the constituency for it to gain legitimacy. 
Political expression is often contained within opinion, not only about the 
change but about the intent of the change, how that change can be realised 
and how its impact will manifest. 
  
The following insight into political disputes is concerned with differences of 
opinion about means and ends. It is contended that disputes about means 
are soluble, while those concerned with which end to pursue appear to be 
insoluble. The reasoning behind these declarations, according to Money-
Kyrle, is that an opinion about what means are likely to secure a given end 
"...expresses a belief... (which)... must be either true of false", although 
Money-Kyrle prefers "...probable and improbable". [Money-Kyrle:77:26] 
However, he contends that an opinion about the choice of ends "expresses a 
desire, ...an aspiration..." which can be neither proved nor disproved. Thus 
"...all ultimate political opinions expressing desires must be equally 
indefensible and unassailable." [Money-Kyrle:77:25]  
 
But desires and beliefs are symbiotic, in that while the means, which express 
a belief, may create an end, those means are also a creation of the end 
aspired to. Equally an end is only arrived at through the rational application 
of a process deemed legitimate, and pursued by  its aspirants. Legitimacy is 
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based on a system of beliefs which underpin the aspiration. Thus a criterion 
of rationality can be applied to desires and aspirations. In this way the 
"...rational can be defended", while "...the irrational can be assailed..." 
[Money-Kyrle:77:26] But the interpretation of what is rational or irrational 
often stems from prejudice. Thus opposition to change can be premised on 
prejudice, whereby a rationally valid aspiration would be deemed irrational. 
This opinion is "...influenced by unconscious motives and beliefs" and would 
be different if those motives "...were to become conscious." [Money-
Kyrle:77:27] Hence the task for the treaty maker as change agent is to elicit a 
conscious recognition and rejection of prejudicial barriers and thus allow the 
consideration of alternatives view, the development of new ideas and fresh 
opinions, and shifts in attitude. The task is to ensure that the changes likely 
to come about through the implementation of a treaty regime will meet with 
little prejudice.  
 
Such prejudice, though, can have many faces, and be focussed solely on the 
envisaged change, or be related to a rejection of the form in which the treaty 
is delivered, and thus there is limited receptivity of the message, or simply a 
rejection based on the constituency's more personalised non-acceptance of 
the change agent charged with attempting to introduce change. A major 
impediment to the removal of that prejudice, however, stems from 
entrenched opinion, rigid attitude and ideological fervour. The following 
discussion attempts to identify the relationship between these significant 
elements of communal solidarity, sometimes entrenched as collective 
conservatism.   
 
Eysenck, a renowned British psychologist of the 1970s, in his text of 1968, 
The Psychology of Politics, offers an explication of the organisation of social 
attitudes which, according to empirical psychologists, are "arranged in some 
kind of hierarchical system" [Eysenck:68:110]  He traces the evolution of 
specific opinions to habitual opinions, which combine to form attitudes, and 
can then congregate as ideology  [Eysenk:68:111-3], but it would be equally 
valid to see how an ideology fosters attitudes, which manifest as habitual 
opinions, and underpin specific opinions. An investigation into this 
hierarchy will explain this evolution/ devolution hypothesis.  
 
Specific opinions appear to have been discounted as of any pertinence. They 
are "...not related in any way to other opinions,...are not characteristic of a 
person who makes them,... are not reproducible in the sense that if the same 
 94
or a similar question were asked again under similar circumstances, the 
answer might be different." [Eysenck:68:111] Habitual opinions, however, 
are reproducible and form a relatively constant part of an individual's make-
up. They are expressed "...in the same or a similar manner on different 
occasions,...are not subject to sudden arbitrary changes...(and)... are reliable 
in the sense of being stable. [Eysenck:68:112] Thus opinion polls about a 
treaty's likely acceptance in a community can be misleading if the question 
posed elicits a specific opinion of the respondent, as that response may be 
reactionary and less considered than necessary to gain a valid insight. 
However, habitual opinions seem even more impervious to change. Would 
the treaty maker be best served by eliciting a specific opinion, with the hope 
that that specificity is widespread and thus likely to become a habitual 
response? 
 
Attitudes occur when individuals hold "...a particular opinion with regard to 
a particular issue with a certain degree of stability." But they also hold 
concurrently "... a number of other opinions on the same issue which in 
combination define...an...attitude towards that issue." [Eysenck:68:112] 
Opinions do not occur in isolation and they are closely related to other 
opinions on the same issue. But these attitudes are not independent. 
Attitudes themselves are correlated and "...give rise to ...super-attitudes and 
ideologies." [Eysenck:68:113] The premise of this articulation is correlation, 
understood as having mutual or reciprocal relations, where intercorrelated 
opinion begets attitude and, thus, intercorrelated attitude begets ideology. 
Thus, for a discourse to gain ascendancy it must traverse the path from 
single opinions, through the attitudinal phase, to the stratum of ideology.  
  
In a bid to explain the relationship between attitudes, the verbal expression 
of mental states, and opinions, the actual behaviour as shown in physical 
actions, Eysenk looks at the functions of words and actions.  [Eysenk:68:237] 
He concludes that "...neither words nor actions are invariably accurate 
reflections of underlying attitudes." [Eysenk:68:238] Words may be distorted 
reflections of attitude because the speaker is constrained by the expectations 
of the listener. Equally actions may be misleading as behaviour connotes a 
particular attitude, where in fact the real attitudinal bias of the actor is 
suppressed during the duration of the activity. Equally attitudinal indices, 
such as a show of words, may be equally misleading, where attitude is 
assumed for political effect. Thus overt verbal disapproval ...(can be)... found 
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together with covert approval and actual participation", and a knowledge of  
attitude is not sufficient when "...dealing with behaviour..." [Eysenk:68:239] 
 
These convolutions raise the possibility of duplicitous political action, where 
attitudes are assumed by change agents for political gain, but are bereft of 
underlying adherence by the constituency. Constituent members are 
encouraged to adopt a specific opinion, through the persuasive means of the 
change agent, or as a way of maintaining pertinence within a particular 
social grouping within the political collective. But the opinion, although less 
than entrenched, may achieve commonality, simply because the members 
are reticent about challenging its legitimacy. In this way responses can be 
elicited by change agents, but the saliency of the change realised would be 
suspect, and thus its impact either negligible or destructive, as the 
duplicitous nature of its acceptance and implementation works against the 
constituency.  
 
The treaty maker must be alert to the possibility of the distortion or 
hijacking of a policy of change, which could undermine or prevent further 
attempts at essential modification of constituent's interest. Again 
interpretation of intent is vital here, and the gatekeepers of society will act to 
propose or oppose depending on their constituent support bases. But treaty 
makers must equally be aware of how to imbibe attitudinal flexibility if they 
are to achieve change. 
 
One approach to attitude which can reveal underpinnings of behaviour is 
through the study of stereotypy. Stereotypes can embody a valid 
"generalisation", but often are "infallibly wrong..." [Eysenk:68:241] 
Perceptions can be "... determined by previously acquired attitudes of a 
stereo-type's character, " [Eysenk:68:240] Ethnocentric attitudes can be based 
on "...generalised and stereotyped views of out-groups, not on factual 
knowledge about members of these groups." [Eysenk:68:241] Stereotyped 
thinking can be more influential than factual thinking. And attitudes can be 
akin to stereotypes. For like stereotypes, "...attitudes prejudge the issue by 
determining our set, our way of reacting to new facts and new experiences; 
like stereotypes, attitudes give us an organised frame of reference which 
determines what we perceive and how we perceive it; like stereotypes, 
attitudes are mental habits which, if aroused, determine our actions." 
[Eysenk:68:242]  
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Thus "...the concept of attitude corresponds...to the concept of habit..." 
[Eysenk:68:246] where attitudes and habits are both learned; are both 
dispositions to act; are hypothetical constructs. But, as opinions are 
expressed as actions, so too are habits, described as well worn modes of 
action, whereas attitudes continue to appear as "the hypothetical underlying 
state of the organism which gives rise to this action." [Eysenk:68:246] Thus 
Eysenck asserts that attitudes determine actions and words. [Eysenk:68:247] 
They also "...determine the way in which we perceive things; the way in 
which we learn and remember things; and the manner of our reasoning." 
[Eysenk:68:247] And, as a qualifier, he points out how "...what we learn and 
what we remember depends in part at least on our pre-existing attitudes 
towards the material with which we are presented". [Eysenk:68:247] 
 
In a summary of the effect of attitudes the point is made by Eysenck that 
social and political actions are mediated through attitudes, which like habits 
are learned modifications of the central nervous system. Attitudes show a 
considerable degree of organisation or structure, and can be acquired 
through a learning process, or by conditioning. [Eysenck:68:265] It is the 
constructivist nature of attitudes with their ideational underpinnings, as 
implied by Eysenck, which suggests that the clash of ideologies can be a 
major impediment to a treaty maker realising success. 
 
Whether ideology is the basis of attitudes and opinions, or achieves 
widespread acceptance because of those elements, may be circumstantial, in 
that in any instance an ideological explication may redefine constituent 
cognitive frameworks, or may be adopted by that constituency as a succinct 
explication of its proponent's comprehensions. In either case the proponents 
and opponents will vie for the prominence of their preferred ideological 
approach. For, in essence, the ideology is a composite of desires, feelings, 
beliefs, opinions and attitudes. It contains and constrains the context within 
which comprehension may occur. It articulates process and delineates 
outcomes. It objectifies agency and gives the interpretation of structure 
subjectivity. In short, ideology can give a political narrative both structure 
and aspiration. Again there is a relationship between the ideology and the 
narrative generated by that ideological underpinning. And thus the treaty 
maker must also attempt to create an extension to the extant narrative, the 
dominant discourse, that is pertinent to the site of  the envisaged change.  
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Sarbin, a narrative psychologist of the 1980s, was intent on "...demonstrating 
the utility of looking upon human action as narrative". [Sheehy:97:501] He 
saw narrative as determining the conventions of discourse, and considered 
the reporting on and analysis of life histories more useful than the analytical 
methods of conventional psychology which reviewed experiments "...done 
on nameless, faceless subjects, the results of which were expressed as 
probabilities." [Sarbin:86:x] The connection between narrative and discourse 
suggests that this approach brings the psychological and political closer 
together and is thus a useful tool for this thesis. 
 
According to Sarbin examining a narrative extends analysis beyond the text, 
with its focus on structure, to a contextual analysis, where meaning can be 
derived from the context in which the story was related. Hence a narrative, 
which enjoys widespread usage, functions in a like manner to the discourse 
by determining cognitive frameworks, and the analysis of a particular 
narrative can reveal the obstacles to cultural change, or how that narrative 
can be used to achieve change. The narrative, if entrenched, creates a context 
in which the interpretation of the changes envisaged is defined by and under 
the influence of "collateral episodes, and by the efforts of multiple agents 
who engage in actions to satisfy their needs and meet their obligations". 
[Sarbin:86:6]  
 
Thus humans "think, perceive, imagine, and make moral choices according 
to narrative structures" [Sarbin:86:8], and when presented with information 
which is not immediately recognisable, the individual organises that data 
"into an imaginative formulation that meets one or more tests of coherence". 
[Sarbin:86:12] Thus the "self as author can imagine the future and 
reconstruct the past" [Sarbin:86:18] In effect, to achieve success the treaty 
maker needs to build a story around the change envisaged by an intended 
agreement so that it becomes an element of an extant discourse. This 
construct can hinge on imagined futures, if they are limited to the level of 
vision that the change agent perceives the constituency to be able to attain.  
 
This is a recipe for explaining the processes of acceptance and rejection of 
paradigmatic challenges. Equally, this recipe also contains a guide to 
instituting paradigmatic change successfully. Gergen and Gergen [1986] 
expand the insight into the function of narrative suggesting that the reader 
determines what the text is saying rather than the text determining "..the 
reader's reaction..." and hence the construction of a comprehension will be 
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"...governed largely by the convention of proper interpretation". 
[Gergen:86:24]  They argue that interpretation is guided by entrenched 
preconceptions, and that the reader's "...expectations, skills and affective 
dispositions are major determinants of the text's meaning."  [Gergen:86:24]  
This suggests that any attempts at change that take the form of an agreement 
will come under particular and individual scrutiny within the constituency. 
It also raises the possibility that that individual scrutiny is influenced by 
societal constraints that must be modified by the treaty maker intent on 
change, while if the intent is a reinforcement of the status quo a simple 
presentation of text in the commonly accepted form will see an easily 
realised success.    
 
While Gergen and Gergen focussed on interpretation they were also 
concerned about narrative construction. Their insight offers a further 
understanding of how a constituency can be persuaded to adopt a new form 
of narrative, as it details how a narrative needs an end point and it is the end 
point of the narrative which defines its content. [Gergen:86:38] But what is 
considered the necessary endpoint for any narrative is subjected to exercises 
of power. The authors suggest that while public opinion can suggest "...what 
people believe to be goals; it cannot furnish insights as to whether these 
goals are worthy or not." [Gergen:86:37] This harkens back to Money-Kyrle's 
discussion of the divergence of opinion around means and ends, and how 
the ends are always the point of unresolved contention. It must be 
concluded that for the treaty maker intent on change a clear enunciation of 
end goals is vital to persuade acceptance of change within the polity.  
Narrative formation is a crucial concern for change agents as it is the means 
whereby the constituency perpetuates political comprehensions, and can be 
the basis of any legitimacy bestowed on policy arrangements. This insight is 
also valuable as it implies a relationships between opinion, attitude and 
ideology, as base elements of the narrative, and indicates how important an 
awareness of narrative is to the change agent. 
 
Further and more complex impediments to change can be found in 
Volkan's insights into psychodynamics. His work outlines the impact of 
identification, whereby  "...the sense of self is intertwined with the identity of 
the group." [Volkan:91:36] Individuals assimilate within themselves the 
functional image of the collective, and the members of the group come to 
resemble one another. And while the individual's "psychological, defensive, 
and adaptive mechanisms..." may enlarge, and be used as different ways of 
 99
protecting and regulating the sense of self, this rarely overrides "...the deep-
rooted notions of belongingness..." [Volkan:91:36] imbued during childhood. 
Thus institutions and social organisations grow around these entrenched 
notions. Through identification individuals can make sense of and control 
the world around them, and share in "differentiating those unlike the group 
and inimical to it." [Volkan:91:36] If this differentiation occurs within a 
domestic constituency the treaty maker must attempt to form an agreement 
which satisfies not only the members of the dominant societal group, but in 
a bid to give an agreement longevity, members of opposing groups, or 
minority groupings which can be persuaded to offer support. The 
convolution of negotiation in such an event lends to the notion that a simple 
imposition of change from above, which requires minimal discussion and 
elicits little or no dissent, would be considered pragmatic and lucid. 
 
However, Volkan suggests that the principle of maintaining sameness, as 
pursued by socially cohesive groups, is often based on a common cause 
about which enmity exists. A group when faced with an extreme alternative 
will react with strength, but "when differences are minor, the principles of 
sameness and distancing are at risk and must be maintained at all costs." 
[Volkan:91:38] Rituals of differentiation may be manifest as adversarial 
symbiosis, where groups are locked into a vicious cycle which distances 
them "while at the same time connecting ...(them)...in unending and 
obsessive competition." [Volkan:91:38] Thus the simple imposition may be 
rejected because it undermines differentiation. Hence the change agent 
needs to present change in a manner which is perceived to maintain the 
distance between social groups, eliminate the ritualistic competition about 
the issue, and satisfy the requirements of the entire constituency.  
 
This calls for leadership which unites disparate social groups on an issue 
while allowing those groups to continue to believe that they are maintaining 
competition, difference and distancing.  But leadership of those disparate 
social groups can be a major impediment to realising change. There is a need 
to bring the groups together so the leaders are involved in the formation of 
policy that leads to change, and in its implementation. Volkan recommends 
an assimilator, " who is psychologically indispensable in helping his 
followers assimilate changes that are brought about by a transforming 
leader." [Volkan:91:42] Thus each group needs to be encouraged by the 
treaty maker, acting as a transformative leader, to appoint assimilative 
leaders, to encourage the acceptance of change. Such a scenario must be seen 
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as virtually impossible aspiration unless the changes envisaged within an 
agreement are so broad that they include all players. 
 
From the discussion we can discern psychopolitical challenges to change 
with which a treaty maker must contend to achieve a successful acceptance 
and implementation of new policy. Not only must entrenched attitudes and 
ideological underpinnings being accounted for, but the more refined 
components of narrative structure must be factored into how the change is 
communicated to the constituency. The treaty must be written in a manner 
which leads to proper interpretation, thus avoiding politically manipulative 
exploitation of an agreement to advance an opponents interests at the 
expense of a change possibly advantageous to the constituency. The message 
must be presented in a manner conducive to communal receptivity, rather 
than a retreat to cognitive dissonance, which can be premised on 
differentiation, or the constituency's lack of identification with the proposed 
change likely if a treaty undergoes implementation. 
 
To overcome such widespread disparateness the treaty maker must  contrive 
a text which shares universal acceptance within the greater constituency, 
albeit with some processes of persuasion being applied by the norm 
entrepreneur at both the leadership level and within the constituency. 
Equally the task of persuasion must have an impact on the context within 
which change must occur, and this may include a reconstruction of  the 
political arena, though rewritings of history, or the redefinition of the 
constituency's role in developing the future. The discussion in the following 
chapter will deal with persuasion techniques, the psychology of influence 
and the practices which lead to attitudinal change, before making a brief but 
potentially elucidating visit to data on possible communication techniques.  
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Chapter Eight 
 
Political Communication : Ways and Means   
 
The effect of a treaty must be communicated to the political constituency in a 
manner that overcomes all psychopolitical challenges to its ability to 
engender change. Thus a treaty's likelihood of effecting change depends on 
how its impact is communicated, politically. Political communication is 
comprised of both ways and means.  While the form of leadership is a 
determinant of possible outcomes, it is also an indicator of the likely 
philosophical method that will be used to change the political attitude. The 
means with which to achieve attitudinal change must also be considered, by 
identifying the physical manifestations of the tools of social and political 
communication. Thus this chapter is presented in two parts, the methods 
and the machinery. The several works referred to in both contain outlines of 
the conceptual underpinnings of political communication. Due to the 
density of data and the limited space in which to present it the reader is 
encouraged to make the links between the theory and the possible practices 
that treaty makers must employ to be successful.  
 
The Methods
 
Prominent in the writing on techniques of political communication are 
persuasion, as a form of positive encouragement, and the more negative 
methods of propaganda and indoctrination. Each of these methodological 
forms will be examined to indicate possible approaches that may be adopted 
by treaty makers. In an attempt to further gauge the possible success of a 
treaty regime and to comprehend the likely obstacles that would be 
encountered by the change agent this work is elucidating. The main authors 
used here were Pratkanis and Aronson, in their 1991 text, Age of 
Propaganda, which examines the psychology of persuasion; MacDonald, 
O'Donnell and Jowett, and Burnett, in Smith III's media studies text 
Propaganda, published in 1989, and Snook's 1972 educational treatise, 
Concepts of Indoctrination, which is a series of philosophical essays. Each 
publication was selected from a survey of materials pertinent to the 
discussion. 
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Persuasion, Propaganda and Indoctrination 
 
The notion of indoctrination is raised in education theory as a form of 
persuasion, sometimes defined as propaganda. In a far reaching discussion 
which again arrives at cognitive dissonance as the turning point in attempts 
at cultural change, Pratkanis and Aronson mount a philosophical and 
psychological explanation of how persuasion works. They are curious about 
the nature of persuasion and how it influences behaviour. [1991:2] Their 
work makes reference to earlier notions of persuasion, which took the form 
of "...an argument, a debate, a discussion or ... a well argued speech 
presenting the case for or against a given proposition..." [Pratkanis:91:9] and 
was practiced by Sophists.  In opposition to this comprehension, Plato 
contended that the arguing of "...both sides of any argument merely clouded 
the understanding of what he saw as truth." [Pratkanis:91:11] The authors  
outlined the reconciliation of these views, as propounded by Aristotle, in the 
Rhetoric.. 
   
Aristotle argued against the Sophist notion that persuasion was needed to 
discover important facts, whereby a student would eventually be convinced 
of a fact through the argumentative process, that was essentially subjective 
and the outcome was negotiable. Plato's concern however was that elite's 
could manipulate masses through argumentative trickery. Aristotle 
suggested that knowledge could only be gained by logic and reason, but he 
was concerned with ensuring viable outcomes. He cautioned that "...not 
everyone was capable of reasoning clearly about every issue." Thus..."(f)or 
these denser souls, the art of persuasion was needed to communicate the 
truth to them in such a manner as they might come to a right conclusion." 
[Pratkanis:91:11] The modern leader who makes the mistake of excluding 
members of a constituency perceived as dense runs the likely risk of losing 
the position of leadership. Thus persuasion must have a universal focus in 
that the whole constituency must be encouraged to assent to envisaged 
change. 
 
Persuasive communication has been defined by O'Donnell as a process "that 
attempts to get the receiver to accept or adopt a new response in a voluntary 
fashion." [O'Donnell in SmithIII:89:59] Successful persuasion can result in 
response shaping, where new behaviour is rewarded; response reinforcing, 
where persuadees are stimulated to greater involvement; and response 
changing, which involves behavioural change or the adoption of new 
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behaviour. [O'Donnell:89:61] It has also been defined as an appeal that 
persuades "not through the give-and-take of argument and debate but 
through the manipulation of symbols and of ...basic human emotions." 
[Pratkanis:91:5-6] Treaty makers intent on altering the content of an 
agreement may be wary of the symbolic approach and its dependence on 
emotional appeal, due to its unpredictability. Equally, the treaty maker 
pursuing perception modification may consider such an approach the most 
likely to succeed.  
 
Persuasion, an element of marketing, has been labelled as propaganda, 
when it works as a mass persuasion technique. [Pratkanis:91:9] Propaganda 
was originally defined as "the dissemination of biased ideas and opinions, 
often through the use of lies and deception," but the meaning has evolved to 
mean "mass suggestion or influence through the manipulation of symbols 
and the psychology of the individual. [Pratkanis:91:9] This is a process 
where a point of view is communicated with the intent of having the 
recipient of the appeal "...'voluntarily' accept this position as if it were his or 
her own." [Pratkanis:91:9]  
 
The language of the contemporary social psychologist intent on 
understanding persuasion includes terms like persuasion techniques, and 
the labelling of election campaigns as persuasion rituals, or negatively, 
influence attacks. [Pratkanis:91:6] The connotations are that modern 
persuasion techniques are manipulative and goal oriented. A better 
understanding of these processes is enhanced by insights into 
psychoanalysis, learning theory and cognitive approaches.  
 
The psychoanalytic theory of persuasion is based on finding the hidden 
meaning of things, and designing a campaign of persuasion, based on 
symbolism, that appeals to the deepest motivations of its recipients. This is a 
form of subliminal influence. [Pratkanis:91:21] While a hard to prove theory, 
as the location of its impact is in the unconscious, its element of 
subliminality may be an effective tool of persuasion, particularly with 
regard to the attitudinal or cultural change intended by the treaty maker.  
 
The learning theory approach contends that "...a persuasive message is 
persuasive when it is learned and accepted by the recipient; propaganda 
must be seen, understood, learned, remembered and acted upon. 
[Pratkanis:91:22] This will occur if the message rewards recipients by 
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attracting their attention; presenting a clear, appropriate and persuasive 
argument that can be learned; and provide an incentive to act on the learned 
knowledge and beliefs. According to Pratkanis research suggests that "...a 
communication can be persuasive even if it misses a few of the learning 
theory stages" [Pratkanis:91:23], but it must follow that a change maker 
intent on success should take each aspect into account. 
 
With cognitive approaches Pratkanis and Aronson contend that "...the target 
of persuasion is not a passive receptor of influence, dutifully obeying the 
principles of learning theory, but an active participant in the persuasion 
process." [Pratkansi:91:23]  This is because persuasion depends on how a 
message is interpreted and responded to by the recipient. Reception is 
affected by the recipients predominant cognitive framework at that time. 
Thus a successful persuasive tactic "...is one that directs and channels 
thoughts so that the target thinks in a manner agreeable to the 
communicator's point of view." [Pratkanis:91:24]   
 
What determines which cognitive framework is predominant at the time of 
reception is the mystery the change agent must probe to be successful. The 
authors suggest that the successful persuasion tactic "...disrupts any negative 
thoughts and promotes positive thoughts about the proposed course of 
action." [Pratkanis:91:24] Two overarching principles which influence the 
way messages are received are how "humans seek to conserve... cognitive 
energy by taking mental shortcuts" and "...attempt to rationalise...thoughts 
and behaviour so that they appear reasonable..."[Pratkanis:91:24] Hence a 
successful change agent will satisfy both these demands of their recipients. 
 
However, the process that is utilised by the change agent is more extensive 
than that suggested by the previous comments. The tactics that can be 
employed require explication. As a foretaste pre-persuasion can be used to 
establish how an issue is defined, after which a communicator "can influence 
cognitive responses and obtain consent..." without appearing to be 
attempting persuasion. [Pratkanis:91:24] Persuasion can occur when 
recipients are in a mindless state or when they are thoughtful and, according 
to Petty and Cacioppo, two possible routes to persuasion, the peripheral and 
the central, are possible. Taking the peripheral route the recipient devotes 
little attention and effort to processing a communication, while taking the 
central route involves "...a careful and thoughtful consideration of the true 
merits of the information presented." [Pratkanis:91:28]   
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The route the recipient takes is determined by the personal relevance of the 
issue to which the communication pertains. But thoughtful persuasion is 
difficult and time consuming, whereas propaganda uses the peripheral route 
to persuasion and is "designed to take advantage of the limited processing 
capabilities of the cognitive miser." [Pratkanis:91:31] This design would 
include  a simplistic persuasion device that makes it likely that recipients 
will adopt the peripheral route having been presented within a simplified 
version of a complex problem. Thus the change agent has two options. To 
present a succinct and simplistic version which is so innocuous it goes 
unnoticed and is simply incorporated into the collective stock of knowledge 
with little or no recognition, or to attempt to communicate a message which 
requires thoughtful consideration and considerable cognitive commitment. 
The former, the almost invisible message, which may be accepted tacitly or 
wholeheartedly, seems to suggest little change, unless the communicators 
are especially competent, whereas the more complex task appears to 
promise a depth of improvement if accepted, but that likelihood is low as 
cognitive dissonance always looms. These insights can be used to construe 
the possible structure of the program of persuasion a government need 
utilise.  
 
Cognitive dissonance occurs whenever two inconsistent cognitions (ideas, 
beliefs, opinions) are held simultaneously. This state of inconsistency will be 
resolved rapidly by changing one or both cognitions so that "they will fit 
together better" [Pratkanis:91:34]  To protect self-esteem individuals will go 
to "great lengths of distortion, denial and self-persuasion in order to justify 
...past behaviour". [Pratkanis:91:34] The greater the commitment to a course 
of action the more resistance there will be "to information that threatens that 
course." [Pratkanis:91:35] "People will ignore danger in order to avoid 
dissonance. But the reduction of dissonance is used to advantage by 
propagandists in the "rationalisation trap".  How this works is  the 
"propagandist intentionally arouses feelings of dissonance..." and then offers 
one solution, one way of reducing this dissonance - by complying with 
whatever request the propagandist has in mind." [Pratkanis:91:35]  
Propaganda, however, according to MacDonald, writing on propaganda and 
order in modern society, has a greater role in society than merely 
persuading communities to a particular way of thinking.  It can be used by 
"...social-political-economic-cultural-intellectual elites..." to 'inform' 
efficiently and authoritatively, to seek a "predetermined reaction in...(a)... 
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mass audience".  and to play "...a critical role in the preservation of 
order."[MacDonald in SmithIII:89:24] It does this as it   
 
"reiterates mutually respected values, skews events and phenomena to 
harmonise with the national viewpoint, and reaffirms the correctness of 
national policies and goals. Even when contentious major political parties 
seek the support of the electorate, it amounts to competition among varying 
sociopolitical interpretations, each communicated assuringly through party 
propaganda. The citizen here is left to decide which partisan 'truth' to accept". 
[MacDonald:89:25] 
 
A form of social engineering can be identified here where "propagandistic 
rituals that shape the individual and forge a common citizenship" can also 
form the framework of the mind-set of the modern state. [MacDonald:89:25] 
Thus national perspectives can be the outgrowth of propagandistic leaders, 
who must convince the masses of the salience of modern social constructs. 
The social, political and economic organisation of modern society depends 
on propaganda to persuade compliance. It acts as a social adhesive, it stirs 
emotions to direct public opinion, [MacDonald:89:28] it educates and it 
controls. For, while "degrees of dissent may be permitted...true radicals are 
always in a minority. Their critiques are either suppressed by authorities or 
they are nationally disdained as threatening curiosities or unpatriotic 
subversions." [MacDonald:89:30] Thus propaganda has made sustained 
order possible in mass society as it has offered "the method by which to 
reorganise, consolidate and govern. And via its ability to condition, it has 
forged in each political arrangement a stabilising consensus." 
[MacDonald:89:34] The fate may be sealed for a treaty maker seeking to 
introduce change that threatens that consensus, whereas the pragmatist will 
need arguments that extend the consensus, while effecting change. 
 
Often, however, propaganda has achieved this consensus due to its ability to 
serve as a discourse, where it may be spoken or written, in the service of 
ideology, defined by Burnett as "the study of ways in which meaning serves 
to sustain or alter relations of domination." [Burnett in SmithIII:89:127] 
Ideology is further defined by Ellul as "any set of ideas accepted ... without 
attention to their origins or values. [Burnett:89:130] O'Donnell suggests that 
institutional propaganda has as its purpose promoting "an ideology to an 
audience which the propagandist sees as having similar objectives." 
[O'Donnell in Smith III:89:53] The appearance of a similarity of objectives 
gives the message viability, but it may also be the result of resonance, a 
technique "whereby the receivers of the message do not perceive the themes 
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of the messages to be imposed upon them from an outside authority ... 
(but)... perceive the arguments of the message as having come from within 
themselves", thus "...voicing the beliefs and feelings that already exist in the 
audience." [O'Donnell:89:52] 
 
Ellul identified several categories of propaganda including the political, 
whereby a government, a party, an administration or a pressure group used 
techniques of influence with a view "to changing the behaviour of the 
public", and these were the propaganda of agitation, which describes the 
"...efforts of those working against the government or the established order"; 
the sociological, seen as a "progressive adaptation to a certain order of 
things, a certain concept of human relations, which unconsciously moulds 
individuals and makes them conform to society"; and the propaganda of 
integration, which "aims at making the individual participate in his society 
in every way. It is a long term propaganda, a self-producing propaganda 
that seeks to obtain stable behaviour, to adapt the individual to his everyday 
life, to reshape his thoughts and behaviour in terms of the permanent social 
setting."[Burnett:89:130-1] 
   
Each style of propaganda must be seen to operate in different political 
circumstances. The first style must be seen as revolutionary, and likely to 
succeed in a newly emerging political environment. The second is an 
incremental approach most favoured in liberal democracies, while the 
integrative approach could be most effective in an autocracy, or as a 
symbolic approach within a liberal democracy, where change occurs as an 
outcome of inevitability, as circumstance demands resolutions beyond the 
control of the political hierarchy. 
 
Burnett extends the argument towards the motivational impact of ideology 
on the propagandist by examining the way in which "ideology operates in 
the social sphere". [Burnett:89:131] He identifies legitimation, dissimulation 
and reification as the three central processes at work here. These are 
important signifiers with which to examine the response of a constituency to 
treaty makers' attempted advances, which may have ideological 
underpinnings. In essence "...relations of domination may be sustained by 
being represented as legitimate...". To achieve this ideology is used to justify 
extant approaches and to delegitimise any threat to the existing order. 
Dissimulation occurs when sectional or individual interests are represented 
as more universal interests. This is a cloaking of the true aims or goals of a 
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policy so that the interests of the authors are concealed. Reification occurs, 
according to Giddens, when "...the interests of dominant groups are bound 
up with the preservation of the status quo. Forms of signification which 
'naturalise' the existing state of affairs, inhibiting recognition of the mutable, 
historical character of human society thus act to sustain such interests." 
[Burnett:89:135] 
 
The process that leads to signification can be seen as propaganda, defined as 
"the systematic propagation of a given doctrine...", or as education, 
understood as "the act of imparting knowledge or skill." [Pratkanis:91:216] 
This is a crucial link as it introduces the possible likelihood of formal 
education being used by the state as a mechanism of social control. Thus 
change agents opposed to official doctrine may find an intransigent foe in 
the education system, if the system is mobilised against change. This can 
occur because formal education can be seen to "systematically endorse the 
system, legitimise it, and by implication, suggest it is the natural and normal 
way." [Pratkanis:91:216] Equally the link implies a possible utilisation of the 
education system to inculcate propagandistic messages, particularly those 
with an ideological base. Hence what is labelled as propaganda and what is 
labelled as education depend on one's own propaganda purposes." 
[Pratkanis:91:217] 
 
Propaganda can also be likened to 'conditioning' and 'indoctrination', both of 
which have been considered as educative techniques. The philosophical 
underpinnings of indoctrination reveal a relationship between these forms 
of persuasion and education. However, while education is seen to impart 
"skills, attitudes or ways of behaving" Snook contends that indoctrination, 
like propaganda, has a motive based on "the handing on of beliefs". 
[Snook:77:2] Views on the content of indoctrination vary, from the notion 
that "...any beliefs can be indoctrinated...", or that "...indoctrination can be 
used only of doubtful or false beliefs...", to the notion that "doctrinal beliefs 
are subject to indoctrination." [Snook:77:2] But the intent of the educators is 
also a factor in the determination of whether a message is a form of 
indoctrination. One argument supports the idea that the communicator's 
intended outcome can be used as a determinant, or that the mere 
presentation of contentious beliefs constitutes indoctrination, regardless of 
the intent. Thus a government setting up training programs which support 
an envisaged change as contained within a treaty regime may stand accused 
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as propagandists or equally be seen as educators. Such labelling will be 
determined by and contested in the political circumstances. 
 
Wilson points out that there is a distinct difference between conditioning, 
which is related to teaching behaviour, and indoctrination, which is aimed at 
teaching beliefs. [Snook:77:3] Green qualifies this by suggesting that "the 
only beliefs...which must be rejected are those which prevent us from being 
open to reasons and evidence on all subsequent matters." [Snook:77:4] 
Kilpatrick sees reconditioning as a form of indoctrination where doctrines, 
construed as "an inter-connected set of beliefs..." [White in Snook:77:7] are 
implanted and are to be held uncritically.  [Snook:77:4] It is here that the 
teachers intentions are crucial. Snook contends that intention encompasses 
both "..what is actively desired...", suggesting agenda-realisation, and 
"...what is foreseen..." [Snook:77:7], which must imply an inculcation 
premised on either the maintenance of the status quo, or a more radical 
furtherance of social comprehensions. The connection between intention and 
responsibility is raised by Snook, and it follows that the onus to ensure that 
the message is not a form of indoctrination lies with the educator. But 
realistically educational programs are controlled by powerful elites whose 
intent is invariably political, and thus responsibility becomes a negotiable 
commodity, with little relevance to or regard for the recipients of the 
message. Equally the form the communication takes is open to the same 
disregard, and thus indoctrination, in the form of propaganda, can be 
readily realised and effectively create attitudinal change. 
 
However, communication itself has varying definitions, from the simple 
face'to'face form, between communicator and receiver, through mediated 
communication, where the message is encoded by a third agent before it 
reaches the recipient, to transactional processes "in which participants create 
and share information with one another in order to reach mutual 
understanding." [O'Donnell:89:49-50] Mediated communication seems the 
most common form utilised by dominant political elites, through mediums 
like television, where face-to-face communication occurs, while 
oppositionary forces proffering alternative ideas to mainstream discourse 
tend to be employing on-line facilities frequently and effectively.  
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Assessing the Ways of Political Communication. 
 
In a bid to better appreciate the psychopolitical means employed by the 
treaty maker to achieve change conceptual insights from this chapter 
contribute to the development of the analytical model to be applied to 
treaties by seeking to identify possible modes of influence. The probe begins 
with the more benign persuasion, propaganda is considered a possible 
strategy, as is indoctrination. Questions are raised about if these possible 
forms of psychosocial manipulation are aimed at attitudinal modification, or 
if a less intensive program is being employed by change agents intent on 
perception modification. Finally are the treaty makers acting in leadership 
roles and pursuing either cultural development or cultural transformation? 
       
It can be seen that political communication is linked intrinsically to notions 
of cultural change and leadership, and that various psychopolitical 
mechanisms can be utilised to create shifts in attitude, beliefs, world views 
and cognitive frameworks. Thus an insight into the ways communication  
mechanisms can be utilised by change agents is necessary to give pertinence 
to the preceding philosophical underpinnings of political communication.  
 
The Machinery
 
In order to implement treaties the political leadership must gain the support 
of its constituency. This, thus, requires acquiescence on the polity's behalf to 
accept the intentions of a treaty. A treaty's success can be closely tied to this 
acquiescence in a democratic environment. The value of any change which 
may be implied by the introduction of new legislation as a result of signing 
and ratifying a treaty must be imparted to the political constituency. The 
success of the treaty is thus dependent as much on the 'gatekeepers' abilities 
to convince and persuade that constituency, as it is on the pertinence of the 
treaty and the changes implied therein. The means of political 
communication must thus be assessed, as it is another of the tools with 
which to gauge the role of a treaty, to deduce the purpose of that treaty and 
to assess its likely effect. This section has been labelled machinery  because it 
outlines and assesses the mechanisms that can be employed by political 
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communicators. However, while it is important to outline these elements 
they will not be a feature of the overall analysis. 1  
 
This section of the chapter draws on McNair's 1995 text An Introduction to 
Political Communication; Petty and Cacioppo's work on routes to 
persuasion, in the Percy and Woodside text on Advertising and Consumer 
Psychology ,published in 1983; and Zanna's discussion regarding message 
receptivity, presented in Mitchell's 1993 text, Advertising Exposure, Memory 
and Choice. These texts were utilised as a way of accessing materials which 
related psychological processes and advertising effects. Thus they are drawn 
from the variant forms of advertising and consumer psychology, but can 
also be linked to communications studies. 
 
The basis of McNair's insights into political communication is Denton and 
Woodward's contention that political communication is characterised by 
"the intentions of its senders to influence the political environment", and that 
what makes communication political is not the source of the message but 
"...its content and purpose". However, they see political communication as 
"...public discussion about the allocation of public resources... official 
authority... and official sanctions". McNair suggests that while this definition 
includes "verbal and written political rhetoric",  it excludes "symbolic 
communication acts", which offer insight into the political process as a 
whole. [McNair:95:3]  
 
If McNair's claim is applied to treaties he seems to suggest that they can be 
proffered to a community as utilities with a practical application or as agents 
of symbolic change. The possible effects of the former need simply be 
quantified, whereas symbolism is a qualitative variable. If the changes being 
offered by implementing treaties are comprehensible, an empirical measure, 
the likelihood of their acceptance by their constituency is high. However 
symbolic changes must be comprehendible, a position not only hard to 
gauge, by recipient and analyst alike, but also difficult to achieve.  
 
                                                 
1 The machinery of political communication concerns advertising and the communications 
devices found in broadcasting and publication. The theory contained in this explanation of 
the means of political communication gives further context to the task of the treaty  maker 
in achieving change. However, the theoretical comprehensions will not be tested in this 
thesis, due to limits of space and time, but also because media analysis is a lengthy and 
precise task, requiring a visit to media archives. The box developed for enquiry would be a 
useful starting point for students of public relations or media studies. 
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If the premise that governments will engage in political communication in 
order to persuade the constituency of proposed changes is accepted, then 
this argument is valid. But it is also an important consideration of treaty 
makers to ensure that the value of treaties they enunciate can be 
communicated to the public. Huckfeldt and Sprague [1995], in a discussion 
on social communication, question how people obtain political information, 
and this is pertinent here as it relates to persuasion techniques. In essence 
the authors suggest that the constituency can either obtain information 
directly from the external political environment and then "...process that 
information as independent decision makers guided by their own decision 
rules... (or)... they make decisions on the basis of shared deliberations, 
shared information and shared social experience." [Huckfeldt:95:45] The 
authors are concerned about whether the competent and rational individual 
is at the centre of attitudinal change, or if the common social environment 
determines preferences and opinions. [Huckfeldt:95:46]  
 
In further work on persuasion, a vital component of political communication 
and a vital tool of the treaty maker in the process of cultural change, the 
psychology of advertising offers profound insights into strategies for 
success. Petty and Cacioppo [Percy and Woodside:83] discuss the differing 
routes to persuasion as a means to achieving attitudinal change. The central 
route views attitude change as "...resulting from a diligent consideration of 
information that is central to what people feel are the true merits of the 
advocacy." [Petty etal in Percy:83:3] Whereas the peripheral route leads to 
attitudinal change "because the attitude object has been associated with 
either positive or negative cues or the person uses a simple decision rule to 
evaluate communication." This approach does not require "...any extensive 
issue-relevant thinking." Thus there is an automaticity involved, which 
means "that attitudes do not always change in a thoughtful manner."  
[Petty:83:4] 
 
Petty and Cacioppo attempt to explain the two routes to persuasion with the 
Elaboration Likelihood Model of Attitude Change. [Petty:83:5] In essence, 
they are gauging the likelihood of a message recipient to elaborate through 
issue relevant thinking. They argue that as a recipient receives an overload 
of information daily some messages will be elaborated upon, unwanted ones 
will be filtered out, while others will simply be accepted. If a treaty maker is 
to achieve success then the constituency must be persuaded to adopt the 
message which outlines changes. The message needs to be both worthy of 
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elaboration and liable to simple acceptance. The advocate need to realise 
that the cognitive responses to a message can be favourable or unfavourable 
thoughts. Again the message must be constructed so as to "point to desirable 
consequences..." [Petty:83:7] for the recipient.  
 
However the authors do conclude that the central route is preferable if the 
generated attitude change is to be "more salient in memory..." as people hold 
these attitudes with more confidence. [Petty:83:16] This suggests that the 
task of the treaty maker is more complex if the objective is to introduce 
significant and substantial change, but if the task requires acceptance of 
change, but little commitment to that change from the constituency, then the 
peripheral route has utility. The authors link the impact of message 
repetition with this approach to attitudinal change, suggesting that 
"...persuasion first increases then wears out as the number of repetitions 
increases." [Petty etal in Alwitt etal:85:96]  Thus subjects were most 
favourable to message that were "...supported by strong arguments and 
presented a moderate number of times." [Petty:85:97-8] This work on routes 
to persuasion gives further insight into the task before treaty makers if a 
treaty is to gain acceptance within a political constituency. It also serves as a 
tool for retrospective analysis of the promotion of treaties.  
 
With his examination of attitudinal change Zanna [Zanna in Mitchell:93] 
completes the work in this section on political communication . His concern 
was with the process of message receptivity, and the 'problem' of open and 
closed mindedness in persuasive communication. He pondered the 
conditions under which a message recipient would be "...open-minded and 
motivated by concerns for validity...", and when the recipient would be 
"...closed-minded, and motivated to defend his or her attitude."  
[Zanna:93:143] He concluded that message recipients respond according to 
whether the communication is perceived to advocate "a position within their 
latitude of rejection... (or) ...within their latitude of acceptance." 
[Zanna:93:148]  Zanna's work is an intricate insight into cognitive 
manipulation and offers insights into how the public can be encouraged to 
be receptive to change, and by implication, how that same community can 
be persuaded to reject change. As a means to adjudge the salience of a treaty 
prior to introducing it to the community, this is a valid prescriptional tool. It 
also offers clues to the statesmen forced to introduce treaties into a domestic 
environment as a result of external pressure, and how that presentation 
must be modified to gain acceptance. Again this is a crucial concern for the 
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democratically elected politician, or the benevolent dictator. The arguments  
presented here outline the processes of persuasion and the methods by 
which political effects can be ascertained. They are a vital measure to be 
applied to treaties to gauge their efficacy. 
 
Assessing the Means of  Political Communication 
 
To contribute insights, from this section on the forms of political 
communication, to the development of an analytical model the following 
questions must be put, with regard to a treaty regime, when testing the 
likelihood of attitudinal change. The answers can indicate the strategy of the 
change agents, and offer clues as to why a treaty may have been accepted or 
rejected by the constituency. Firstly the form of the communication must be 
ascertained. Was the treaty maker attempting to achieve change by 
transmitting messages about the content and purpose of a proposed 
agreement, with the hope of attracting the support of recipients through the 
central route of persuasion, or by symbolic means, and thus by attracting the 
attention of the cognitive misers, through the peripheral route of 
persuasion? But does the constituency receive the information individually, 
and directly from the change agents, or are its adjudications based on 
common deliberations? Again the central and peripheral routes to 
persuasion come into play. Equally, does the message conveyed by the 
change agent elicit favourable or unfavourable thoughts, and thus contribute 
to its acceptance or rejection by the constituency? Finally, was the message 
conveyed on a basis that attracted attention or was it rejected for excess 
repetition which challenged the tolerances of the members of the 
constituency.  
 
However, examining the dynamics of political preference is a difficult 
observational task. Huckfeldt etal suggest an inability "to observe directly 
the process of social interaction with political content."  In fact there is a 
requirement to take independent samples at "multiple points in time, or by 
repeated observations of the same sample." This suggests that this particular 
insight requires preparation prior to an event occurring, as the data 
generated around an issue can be quickly lost, or can become contaminated " 
due to reinterviewing and sample attrition." [Huckfeldt:95:46] As a result 
this test will be excluded from the polyphonic model which will be compiled 
in the following section. 
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Overall, this chapter has examined the manner in which political 
communication can be utilised, by suggesting the variant forms of 
persuasion, before delving into the means with which to pursue the 
communication objective. A treaty maker fully cognisant of the means of 
message delivery and the diffusion of innovation, would simply need to 
choose a form of encouragement suitable to the policy context to achieve 
likely success. The difficulty with the analysis of political communication is 
its interpretive nature. There is a fine line between indoctrination and 
education; so how does one discern the intent of the propounder of 
information? Equally, to fully appreciate which machinery was employed by 
the change agent not only requires extensive quantitative analysis of media 
activity with regard to a treaty, but also a qualitative analysis of how the 
information was transmitted and received. The following section brings 
together the quantitative and qualitative test developed in this thesis in a bid 
to create a model with which to gauge the likely efficacy of a treaty regime. 
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Section Four 
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Section Four 
 
Developing the Polyphonic Analytical Model 
 
In this section the polyphonic analytical model is developed which examines 
the origin, role, and purpose of treaties, from a polyphonous and 
multiperspectival theoretical view, before testing the efficacy of the Treaties 
identified in this project. The model has two complexions, one of which 
presents general assessments, while the other presents particularist insights, 
gleaned with the application of the model. Waltz's justification for creating 
an analytical tool that is "...a necessarily slender explanatory construct" 
[Waltz:90:32] which looks at particularisms rather than generalisms, justifies 
this process. But, equally, the quest for "Big Picture" analysis can be satisfied. 
 
This theoretical explication reveals how treaties may not only be pertinent in 
the external political arena, but that their impact may equally affect the 
domestic regime. Further the growing significance of the individual in 
global political activity means the treatises expounded within the discipline 
of psychology, and in particular, psychopolitical and sociopolitical insights, 
are also needed to extend the comprehension of the utility of treaties.  
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Chapter Nine   
 
The Polyphonic Analytical Model 
 
The primary objective of this exercise is to create a model with which to 
gauge a treaty's efficacy and to test the hypothesis that psychopolitical 
underpinnings must be taken into account if change is to occur. Throughout 
the preceding chapters of this thesis, from Chapter 2 to Chapter 8, groups of 
questions aimed at testing the efficacy of a treaty as a tool of foreign policy, 
where its intent is change, have been drawn out from selected readings of 
theoretical precepts, from International Law, International Relations, 
Organisation and Communication Studies and, Psychology.  
 
This wide source of investigative elements has been developed in four 
stages. Firstly, to comprehend the general origin, role and purpose of 
treaties, as a way of contextualising a treaty regime. A second dimension is 
introduced into the equation by suggesting that a treaty maker is influenced 
by external factors that must be given due consideration during the creation 
of a treaty and throughout its implementation. But equally the domestic 
impact of a treaty must also be addressed to ensure constituent acceptance. 
However, this is a complex task as the treaty maker must extend the reach of 
the treaty beyond the text and take into account psycho-social and psycho-
cultural challenges to change which they must overcome before a treaty 
gains acceptance. Possible avenues are identified to be followed by treaty 
makers as change agents in pursuit of that success. This is the third and most 
significant concern for the change agent and leads to the investigation into 
psychopolitics. These three stages are synthesised in this chapter as the 
polyphonic analytical model. A fourth element is the more particular 
component of this project which examines the efficacy of selected treaties as 
tools of foreign policy.  
 
Each of these four stages is dealt with in case studies, to indicate the possible 
application of the model, with a view towards legitimising the synthesis 
developed in this thesis and to suggest its value as a means to further 
research. The investigation deals with four major dimensions, that are 
discussed in correlative sections.  
 
The first three are related to theoretical insights, and are thus generalised, 
while the question of efficacy is included as a diagnostic adjudication in the 
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concluding chapter. It needs to be appreciated that the efficacy of a treaty, its 
power to produce an effect, depends on the context in which the treaty is 
located, and on the intent of the treaty makers. However that context can be 
influenced by determinants beyond the control of the treaty maker. Equally 
the challenges to change posed by the domestic constituency are often 
outside the realm of influence enjoyed by change agents and extra effort 
must be expended to gain efficacy. This suggests that efficacy is being tested 
in each instance of this analytical process, with the probes into possible 
psychopolitical impacts on treaty programs, that are realised as each chapter 
ponders the role of norms, perceptions or discourses as elements of change. 
 
 Essential Dimensions of the Assessment  
 
Questions regarding the essential dimensions of this assessment  
 
A How do the theoretical perspectives of international  
 relations explain the origins, role and purpose of a treaty?  
B What influences must treaty makers contend with? 
C What challenges to change, as presented by psychopolitical 
 understandings, are to be overcome and what actions must be 
 taken to achieve successful acceptance of a treaty ?  
D Was the attempt at effecting change a success? 
 
Bearing these concerns in mind an explanation of the mechanics of the  
development of the groups of questions pertinent to each strand of the 
investigation is necessary for a better understanding of how to apply those 
questions. The model is constructed as a series of probes categorised as A, B, 
C, or D,  based on the questions presented as the Essential Dimensions of 
the Assessment.  
 
Those primary questions are broken down into secondary enquiries of a 
broad nature, and presented as General Lists, which indicate possible 
avenues to investigation. For example, the inquiry into the origin of a treaty 
suggests a probe into international law, or an examination of how systemic 
pressures can instigate treaty making activity. Thus, the secondary group of 
general questions identifies constituent elements, defined by theoretical 
comprehensions, that may be regarded as relevant to each general concern. 
 
Those constituent elements, in turn, lead to a tertiary group of questions in 
Boxes, drawn up using descriptive headings, as designated by the 
theoretical materials chosen for the development of the model. Each 
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theoretical category is delved into to ascertain particular insights called for, 
and to then generalise those particularisms.  
 
Thus, this is a two way process, where particular insights gleaned within 
each perspectival Chapter and based on the probes called Essential 
Dimensions, were presented as General Lists of questions, which then came 
under more in-depth scrutiny as series of questions about particular aspects 
of each theoretical contribution. The responses to these questions when 
applied to a treaty or package of treaties, can then be articulated in a more 
general manner in the case studies, and summarised as essential 
comprehensions in conclusion.  
 
Essential Dimension A 
 
How do the theoretical perspectives of international relations 
explain the origins, role and purpose of a treaty?  
 
The first group of questions, presented in the following list, seeks to ascertain 
the context in which the treaty maker is attempting reform, if that is the case, 
or is simply tinkering with political symbolism in a bid to engender 
perceptions of activity, while maintaining the status quo, a political ploy 
aimed at enhancing regard. The list is self explanatory but the responses may 
be contestable, and suggestive, rather than concrete.  
 
Origin, Role and Purpose of a Treaty 
  
• Origin   Where and why was the treaty developed? 
• Role [function]  What role can the treaty serve? 
• Purpose [aim]  What is the purpose of the treaty ? 
     
 
The theoretical insights gained from International Law, NeoRealism, 
Hegemonic Stability Theory, Regime Theory, NeoLiberal Institutionalism, 
and Social Constructivism are used in this opening section, to place the 
treaty within an external context. Each of these theoretical perspectives was 
chosen because they have psychopolitical or psychosocial elements in 
common, in the form of norms, perspectives or discourses.  
The questions posed within each perspective are intended to disclose the 
role of a treaty in international and national politics, by identifying and 
outlining possible functions of an interstate agreement. The questions are 
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manifestations of insights developed through the explication of theoretical 
perspectives drawn from the selected International Relations theories which 
identify psychopolitical elements as vital components of theoretical 
comprehension. This occurs because the hypothesis being pursued contends 
that those psychopolitical elements influence constituent acceptance of a 
treaty and thus must be satisfied before a treaty can realise widespread 
support. 
 
 From the following List, extracted from Section 1 of the thesis, it is possible 
to ascertain expectations of possible functions of a treaty within the 
international arena.      
 
 
General List A  
   
Possible Construction And Interpretation Of Treaties Using  
Selected International Relations Theoretical Perspectives.  
                   
International Law  
The impact of a treaty on International Law or with reference to  
peremptory  norms.  
NeoRealism    
The influence of systemic constraints on a treaty or of a treaty on 
systemic constraints.  
Hegemonic Stability Theory  
The role of hegemons in engendering change. 
Regime Theory   
Regime formation and the impact of treaties on transactionalism.  
NeoLiberal Institutionalism  
The form of institutional change engendered by a treaty, types of gains 
and distributional effects.  
Social Constructivism  
The context of the treaty environment and intent of the treaty. 
 
 
Each component discussion suggests elements of influence which determine 
how a treaty may impact on those components, and an insight into the 
dynamics of treaty making. 
 International Law and Treaties 
 
As the purpose of the thesis is to develop the hypothesis with regard to the 
psychopolitical validity of a treaty a model must be sought which allows the 
evolution of such an insight. From an international law perspective the 
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overall quest appears to be to gauge the impact of a treaty on International 
Law or with reference to peremptory norms. A consideration of a treaty's 
justiciability, enforcability, and breachability, explores the basis of legalistic 
legitimacy. An insight into the domestic impact of a treaty can show how 
state actions can be determined by external influence. But the focus on 
norms is seen to be of greater relevance in this project which is examining 
the influence and demands of psychopolitical elements and how they affect 
domestic lawmakers, the judiciary and the political constituency. Thus, 
domestic impact is analysed as having a psychosocial underpinning, in that 
constituent activity can be aroused in response to a treaty. This may occur as 
the treaty is construed to have aspirational elements aimed at change and is 
thus considered to be an assault on peremptory norms, which underpin 
international law or as a clash with common domestic law. Moreover, there 
is a need to consider whether a treaty is in line with a peremptory norm, but 
as a result countermands domestic legislation, and is thus likely to attract 
external support, but be liable to domestic rejection. 
 
 
Box A1 
The Legal and Psychosocial Impact of a Treaty 
 
 Impact as Agent of New International Law?
  Legal basis of treaty 
  Justiciability? 
  Enforcability? 
  Breachability? 
 Influence on or of Peremptory Norms
  Domestic Impact? 
  Aspirational elements? 
 
 
 
NeoRealism, the System and Treaties. 
 
The essence of neorealist comprehension is related to the system of states 
and how influence is brought to bear upon states by the system, or 
alternatively how states can utilise the system to create pressure on states. 
This table is applied to gauge the influence of such systemic constraints and 
to explain the nature of the system and thereby identify the possible origin, 
role or purpose of a treaty. Equally it illuminates possible effects of treaty 
making activity and can indicate any change that may have come about. 
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Box A2 
 NeoRealism, the System and Treaties 
 
Was the treaty devised to satisfy systemic pressure? 
Was the treaty intended to create systemic pressure?  
What form did that pressure take? 
How did the process impact upon systemic constructs? 
 
 
 Hegemonic Stability Theory , Influence and Treaties 
 
Hegemonic power is a constant in the international system and reference 
needs be made to the possibility of a hegemon exerting influence over states 
by demanding , overtly or covertly, that treaty makers engage in consensus 
building to find agreement. Such pressure can also be an outcome of a state  
pursuing influence with a hegemon, by acting of its own volition, in seeking 
an agreement either with that hegemonic state, or with other states to garner 
the hegemon's attention and respect. Thus the origin of a treaty can be 
revealed by this inquiry into influence? 
  
 
Box A3 
The Hegemon and Influence 
Did a hegemon have influence over the formation of the treaty? 
Was the treaty developed to enhance universal interests? 
 
 
Regime Theory and Treaties - Implementation  
 
This table looks at the impact of a treaty and its implementation on how 
states interact and the possible impetus for regime formation as a result of 
that interaction. It is also possible that a regime based on an extant treaty 
may generate further agreement which could be formalised as a treaty. 
Further to this can a treaty be seen to bring joint gains to states negotiating 
agreement? Equally are there other benefits to be gained beyond the 
material, in the form of actions strengthening symbolic ties or enhancing 
perceptions of cooperation and interdependence? In the following table the 
impact of regimes on treaties is tested, with an inquiry into the relationship 
between regimes and treaties. 
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Box A4 
Regimes, Transactionalism and Treaties. 
    
Is regime formation influenced by the treaty? 
Does the treaty have a positive impact on the Pareto frontier? 
Does the treaty aid transactionalism? 
Is Interdependence enhanced or hampered by the treaty? 
 
 
NeoLiberal Institutionalism and Treaties. 
 
In a similar manner the precepts of NeoLiberal Institutionalism are subjected 
to analysis, but equally Regime theory can be included in this table, as it 
relates to interdependence and interstate interaction, but also because it has 
an element of transactionalism, where the strictures of the state have less 
influence and the personality of leaders begins to impact on global 
structures and to encourage regime formation. Bearing this in mind it 
becomes necessary to ascertain what impact a treaty has on the structure of 
the system and what possible effects the change which accompanies the 
treaty may have. In short, the task is to identify the form of institutional 
change engendered by a treaty, and the types of gains and distributional 
effects. 
 
 
Box A5 
Institutions and Treaties 
 
 Is a new institution fomented by the envisaged change?  
What types of gains may be realised by treaty instigators? 
What distributional effects can be estimated and realised? 
 
 
What institutional change implies is that norm modification occurs. As 
norms are a guideline to behaviour, behavioural modifications must be seen 
to impact on norms. This understanding serves as a timely reminder of the 
similar position arrived at in International law, where norms were 
considered of major significance in the ongoing development of global 
cooperation. Again here is a further test of the viability of treaties. Can they 
be seen individually as contributing to the evolution and development of 
emergent norms in their areas of pertinence?  
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Thus an essential component of the analytical models arrived at in these 
chapters must review how norms, perceptions or discourses have evolved or 
been modified as a result of treaty making. Rather than apply this gauge to 
each theoretical perspective an overall assessment avoids repetitive 
responses to the following enquiry.  
  
 
Box A6 
Psychopolitical Impact of Treaties 
    
 Is there a noticeable modification of 
  norms? 
  perceptions? 
  discourses? 
 
 
Social Constructivism, Context, Intent and Treaties.
The concluding insight contained in each of Boxes A1 to A6 is a lead-in to 
the societally grounded views of social constructivism, which are centred on 
the import of ideas as agents of change. Box A7, articulating social 
constructivist probes is vital for the extension of the argument about 
psychopolitical influence either on treaty makers, or as a result of their 
confabulations. It contains complex enquiries into the intellectual and 
psychosocial support structures that treaty makers must employ to realise 
their agendas. 
 
 
Box A7 
Social Constructivism, Context, Intent and Treaties,. 
 
Was the treaty making environment conducive to success? 
Was the intent of the treaty symbolic? 
Did the treaty have pragmatic or aspirational underpinnings?  
Would interests be affected by proposed change? 
 
   
Social constructivism also offers insights into influences on treaty makers 
and is discussed further in the next section, Essential Dimension B. 
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Essential Dimension B 
 
What influences must treaty makers contend with? 
 
Comparable components constitute Box B1 below, which expands on the 
influence of norms, perceptions and discourses as raised in companion Box 
A7.  The reason for splitting the application of social constructivism is the 
notion that ideational motives can be at work in both the external and 
domestic environments. This occurs through the manipulation of norms, 
perceptions and discourses, which are the bridging arrangements between 
the outer and inner political realms. Thus a fuller comprehension of the 
influence of ideas is gained by testing the treaty in both environments. 
 
 This is realised through insights gained into the forms of external and 
domestic influence with which the treaty maker must contend. These 
elements of influence include norms, perceptions and discourses, which 
preside in both the international and domestic arenas and have been 
identified at work in the external environment in the preceding boxes. Thus 
the following section looks at the bridge between these two realms. 
 
 General List B , constructed from notions contained in Section 2 of the 
thesis, attempts to ascertain the extent to which treaty makers were 
influenced by norms, perceptions or discourses, or if in fact the treaty maker 
was attempting to influence those societal constructs. 
 
 
General List B 
  
External And Domestic Influences On The Treaty Maker. 
  
Social Constructivism  
What external / domestic influences must the treaty maker contend 
with? 
Norms, Perceptions, Discourses   
Which of these influences were pertinent?     
 
Which of these elements of psychopolitical comprehension did the 
treaty makers engage? 
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Social Constructivism, Influence and Treaties. 
 
With the various ways in which ideas can manifest within the collective Box 
B1 enquires into the likely form that ideational influence takes with regard 
to the introduction and implementation of a treaty. Such identification gives 
the treaty maker a comprehension which assists with the instigation of 
change. It is possible that most or all of the influences may contribute to the 
eventual strategy employed by the change agent. 
 
 
Box B1 
 Social Constructivism, Influence and Treaties. 
 
 Were the treaty makers influenced by  
 precedent? 
   collective intentionality? 
   societal norms? 
  perceptions? 
  discourses? 
   beliefs? 
 
 
 
 Norms, Perceptions, Discourses and Treaties 
 
When considering norms, perceptions and discourses as forms of influence 
which element gains precedence is often determined by the change being 
attempted, by the complexion of the culture targeted for change, or by 
leadership skills utilised by the change agent. These three elements have 
been selected as prominent political forms of ideational control. The 
following questions in Box B2 concern which of these influences were 
pertinent, and which of these elements of psychopolitical comprehension 
were engaged by the treaty maker. The underlying purpose of the 
application of the enquiries in Box B2 is to identify the validity for the 
argument that psychopolitical elements underpin any attempts at 
constructing treaties, and that change is a difficult process to implement if 
the requirements demanded by psychosocial forces are not manifest. 
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Box B2 
Norms, Perceptions, Discourses and Treaties.  
 
Which of these 3 elements influence the treaty maker? 
Does the treaty have an impact on these elements? 
Does the treaty challenge societal norms? 
Does the treaty fit within attitudinal expectations? 
Does the treaty have an ideological base? 
What extent of cultural change is necessary for the treaty to gain 
widespread constituent support? 
Is widespread constituent support for the treaty necessary  for 
success? 
Does the treaty enhance extant perceptions? 
Does the treaty modify the dominant discourse? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 129
Essential Dimension C 
 
What challenges to change, as presented by psychopolitical 
understandings, are to be overcome and what actions must be 
taken to achieve successful acceptance of a treaty ?  
 
Psychopolitical Components and Treaties. 
 
The prime question in this grouping is what processes must treaty makers 
utilise to achieve acceptance and what barriers must be overcome for the 
successful realisation of change? This investigation is instigated by the 
possibility that a treaty may appear to have an intended role, which does not 
coincide with the outcomes realised by the implementation of that treaty. 
This may be intentional, but equally happenstance may intervene in the 
process and modify the applicability of the treaty at any instant.  
 
Thus a third group of tests is arrived at, with the extraction of viable and 
pertinent psychosocial insights gleaned from Section 3 of the thesis, which 
treaty makers can, may or should, subject political constituencies to, if a 
treaty is to be successfully integrated or incorporated into the consciousness 
of the polity and thus enjoy widespread constituent support or at least a 
crucial subscription of an influential political elite. The following List 
outlines the general inquiry within each perspective from which those 
insights are drawn. 
 
 
General List C  
 
Challenges to Change Facing the Treaty Maker 
 
Cultural Change   
What types of change are possible?  
Leadership   
What form of leadership is necessary? 
Psychopolitical challenges  
What is the likelihood of attitudinal barriers being lowered,  
or of cognitive dissonance being engendered? 
Persuasion, Propaganda, Indoctrination 
Which mode of encouragement must be employed to achieve  
success? 
Political Communication 
Which forms of communication will facilitate the requisite changes 
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Cultural Change, Leadership and Treaties.  
 
In the context of cultural change the purpose of a treaty and the intent of the 
treaty maker must be ascertained, before delving into what changes are 
required if the introduction and implementation of the treaty are to meet 
with success. it is also important to gauge the extent of cultural change 
necessary for the treaty to gain widespread constituent support, if that 
support is necessary for success. Such constituent support may require 
attitudinal shifts and this can depend on the style of leadership adopted by 
the change agent, and the approach taken. This is vital to guarantee the 
legitimacy of both the treaty and the change it engenders. 
 
 
Box C 1 
Forms of Cultural Change and Leadership  
When Introducing a Treaty 
 
Can the treaty initiate cultural exchange domestically? 
Was that the treaty makers intent? 
Does the treaty require cultural change for acceptance? 
What psychological alterations are required within society  
to effect cultural change? 
What type of leader will achieve success? 
What approach must that leader take?  
 
 
To continue this overview the insights stemming from the psychopolitical 
challenges that treaty -makers might encounter, when faced with a 
recalcitrant constituency, must be understood. 
 
Psychopolitical Challenges to Change 
    
From the discussion we can discern major challenges to change with which a 
treaty maker might engage to achieve a successful acceptance and 
implementation of new policy. Not only should entrenched attitudes and 
ideological underpinnings be accounted for, but the more refined 
components of narrative structure must be factored into how the change is 
communicated to the constituency. The treaty needs to be written in a 
manner which leads to proper interpretation, thus avoiding politically 
manipulative exploitation of an agreement to advance an opponents 
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interests at the expense of a change possibly advantageous to the 
constituency. The message is best presented in a manner conducive to 
community receptivity, to avoid a retreat to cognitive dissonance, which can 
be premised on differentiation, or the constituency's lack of identification 
with the proposed change likely if a treaty undergoes implementation. Thus 
the following queries, in Box C2, when applied to a treaty, can identify those 
challenges to change to be contended with by the treaty maker. 
 
 
 
Box C 2  
 Psychopolitical Challenges to Change 
 
 Were these challenges encountered and met? 
  attitudinal constructs 
  ideological obstructions 
  narrative structures 
  proper interpretation 
  identification 
  rituals of differentiation 
  message receptivity 
  cognitive dissonance 
 
 
By examining the possible challenges to change, with Box C 2, the likely  
psychological barriers faced by treaty makers can be identified. To overcome 
theses barriers appropriate styles and forms of communication must be 
employed by a change agent intent on success . These various approaches to 
political communication adopted by a treaty maker must be assessed as they 
offer an important view of likely failure or success.  
 
Political Communication
 
Having ascertained the purpose of the treaty and the intent of the treaty 
maker Box C3 allows for an extensive probe into the style taken by the 
psychosocial and psychopolitical processes of influence. In a bid to better 
appreciate the means employed by the treaty maker to achieve change the 
following table posits those possible modes of influence. It begins with the 
more benign persuasion, while propaganda is considered a possible 
strategy, as is indoctrination. Are these processes possible forms of 
psychosocial manipulation aimed at attitudinal modification, or is a less 
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intensive program being employed by change agents intent on perception 
modification, where attitudes remain static while opinions become more 
flexible?  Or are the treaty makers acting in leadership roles and pursuing 
either cultural development or cultural transformation? 
 
 
 Box C 3 
 Identifying the mode of influence 
 
Was the form taken by the psychopolitical processes aimed 
at change and the acceptance of the treaty 
 persuasion, propaganda or indoctrination? 
 psycho-manipulation? 
 attitudinal modification? 
 perception mechanics? 
 leadership? 
  cultural development / transformation? 
 
 
But the style of political communication is strategic, and thus the tactics to 
be employed need to be identified to fully comprehend which process the 
treaty maker used to influence the constituency. The enquiries presented in 
Box C4 are to be used to identify whether the treaty under consideration 
conveyed a message premised on content and purpose, and thus a practical 
program with possible concrete manifestations, or if its intent was symbolic, 
aimed at engendering changes in attitude and belief. 
 
 
 Box C 4  
 Forms of Political Communication 
 
What form did the political communication take? 
   content and purpose 
   symbolism 
 
 How was the message conveyed to the domestic 
constituency? 
    direct information 
    shared deliberations 
    favourable thoughts 
    message repetition 
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 However, examining the dynamics of political preference is a difficult 
observational task, as suggested in Chapter 8. Thus this task falls outside the 
parameters of this project and will be excluded from the polyphonic model. 
 
In the final section the success of a treaty regime is gauged and analysis of the 
process pursued by the treaty makers is finalised.  
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Essential Dimension D 
 
Was the attempt at effecting change a success? 
 
This fourth grouping, the test to gauge the efficacy of a treaty, is essentially 
realised by subjecting the treaty to the three groups of tests outlined above. 
The final section, as suggested, will gauge the efficacy of the treaty, but will 
be a composite prose articulation drawing upon the information gleaned by 
the application of the series of questions presented in Boxes, and identified 
and outlined in this Chapter. In its own right, however, this section has a 
grouping of questions which need be applied at the completion of the 
application of the other three groupings of questions.  
 
 
Box D 
Efficacy of the Treaty 
 
Assessing the results of applying the polyphonic 
analytical model is the treaty likely to 
  
  only have an external impact? 
  be rejected externally? 
  be accepted by the domestic constituency? 
  be implemented domestically? 
  meet with constant resistance domestically? 
  be firmly rejected domestically? 
  have a symbolic effect? 
 
 
Following the application of the series of questions articulated in this a 
polyphonic analytical model a conclusion about the efficacy of a treaty under 
examination will be possible. The next two chapters utilise the model to 
explore elements of Keating's Treaty Package. This, in turn, will allow a 
reflection on the utility of the polyphonic analytical model in the concluding 
chapter. 
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Section Five 
 
    
    
 Assessing Keating's Treaty Package 
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Section Five 
 
Assessing Keating's Treaty Package 
 
While previous sections offered insights into the varying perspectives with 
which to look at treaties as tools of foreign policy, the function of this section 
is to present an assessment of treaties chosen for analysis, by applying those 
multiperspectival insights. The model enunciated in the previous section 
will be applied to treaties selected from the Keating Package, which will be 
evaluated to ascertain their usefulness as components of that government's 
attempts to engender change in Australian political culture. But, at the same 
time, the results of the analysis of the treaties will be used to identify the 
effectiveness of the polyphonic model developed to assess the treaties. In 
short, the model will test the treaties which in turn will test the model. 
 
The analysis begins by setting in place the complexion of the investigation 
and the form that the evolutionary examination of each of the treaties will 
take. This depends on the shape of the model being applied, which is itself 
evolutionary, in that the initial task was to outline the origin of the treaty. It 
was necessary to ascertain the motivating forces behind the genesis of a 
treaty. A second task was to identify the role each treaty was expected to 
perform, and to clearly enunciate the possible proper or customary role of 
each treaty. But there was a claim being made within the Australian 
Parliament that treaties were impacting negatively on domestic conventions. 
It was implied that treaties were being used in ways which exceeded their 
proper function. Thus the purpose of the treaties and of the treaty makers 
was placed under scrutiny. In this instance purpose, defined as intent, is 
taken to convey a different comprehension to treaties, than role. The 
questions that arose with purpose in mind included what other purposes 
treaties could be used for?, and what the intentions of the treaty makers 
were? The fourth and final comprehension was to gauge the efficacy of the 
treaties under consideration, in a bid to ascertain their likelihood of 
successful acceptance and implementation. Thus the case studies will delve 
into the origin, role, purpose and efficacy, where the latter, understood here 
as having the power to elicit change, is an extension of either role or 
purpose. In this sense efficacy can be read as an outcome, either quantifiable 
or qualifiable, or as a less concrete and less tangible implication or 
impression, with futurist and predictive overtones. 
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Essentially the investigation will be applied to individual areas of treaty 
activity pertinent to the Keating "Big Picture" Project. However while the 
primary focus of Keating's foray into Asia was premised on economic 
considerations, and in particular on APEC, an investigation into that area of 
development, by applying the polyphonic analytical tool, would proffer up 
little evidence with which to test the model. The APEC policy platform is 
simply an extension of decades old development of economic arrangements 
in the region, that stem from the Australia-Japan Trade Treaty of 1957, PECC 
and PBEC. 
 
It is the military security agreements on which the focus of the case studies 
will fall as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), is essentially targeted at the 
external environment, while the Australia-Indonesia Agreement on 
Maintaining Security, (AMS), was targeted at domestic audiences. Although 
the APEC analysis would provide an opportunity to apply the model to its 
full extent, as the economic reach of APEC is both external and domestic, the 
divergent applications to the ARF and AMS will reveal the salience of both 
aspects of the model. 
 
These three agreements must be placed in a context which illustrates their 
pertinence to each other, and also to Keating's Vision. Initially Keating was 
intent on economic reform. When Treasurer he pursued the economy, as 
stand-in Prime Minister after ousting Hawke he perceived economics still as 
the main game; post election, on assuming the Prime Ministership in his 
own right, he appeared to assume office pursuing the activities outlined in 
the duty roster of the PM&C Office. But this did not explain his foreign 
policy pursuit. It was necessary to take a look further back in Keating’s 
development to discover the basis for his interest in this area of policy; and 
tradition may well have constituted his raison d'etre;  for Curtin and 
Whitlam had both focussed on external engagement. 
 
Equally circumstance could have been the main reason. The mere fact that 
Keating had served as treasurer for several terms of Parliament before 
becoming Prime Minister gave him a natural inclination towards economic 
rationales. His involvement with the fledgling APEC, under Hawke's 
stewardship, would have aroused his interest in external affairs, as would 
his constant struggle with the effects of economic globalisation on Australia. 
Through that involvement in APEC Keating was privy to regional and 
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global discourses on economic futures and was also meeting regional 
leaders on a regular basis. Australia was intent on realising a stronger 
economic relationship with regional states and ASEAN was an obvious 
place to seek influence. Suharto was the strong man in ASEAN and Keating 
would have had no option but to seek him out, which he did and 
successfully. It was through Suharto's efforts of persuasion that the Bogor 
meeting of APEC came about in 1994, setting in train the Heads of 
Government meetings which were to become an annual feature of regional 
economic diplomacy.    
 
It was not a big step from Bogor to the acceptance by ASEAN of the Evans' 
proposal for a regional military cooperation grouping based on the 
European model, which would be realised in 1994, with the formation of the 
ARF. While this institution was welcomed by regional leaders it was not of 
great concern to domestic constituencies and failed to attract any noticeable 
praise. As a result of the work that Evans and Keating did in the region, and 
particularly with the influential Indonesian leadership of Suharto and 
Alatas, the foreign minister, it was not unfathomable that Keating and 
Suharto came to agreement on a mutual security pact between Australia and 
Indonesia. It was a surprise, however, and the reactions in Australia were 
mostly premised on the secrecy component of the negotiations and paid 
little regard to the actual effects that the Agreement might have on regional 
security.  
 
The bland acceptance of the APEC reforms and the imperceptible passage of 
the ARF into existence, were in stark contrast to the volatile attacks on 
Keating's and Evans's secret diplomacy, and an underlying distrust of the 
AMS that seemed based on entrenched fear of Indonesia, rather than any 
logical arguments that would support rejection of the document. The 
purpose of the following case studies is to test two treaties for efficacy as 
tools of foreign policy, and to ascertain if there was a need for either to be 
presented in a persuasive manner to gain the approval of the domestic 
constituency. 
 
These will be very brief and speculative applications of the polyphonic 
analytical model, to demonstrate that there is a viability in pursuing this 
avenue of investigation into the psychopolitical underpinnings of treaties, 
and the need for those underpinnings to be considered when constructing 
an agreement. 
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Chapter Ten   
 
ASEAN Regional Forum and Australia 
 
The ASEAN Regional Forum was created in a bid to enhance regional 
military cooperation following the post Cold War redefinition of strategic 
concerns. This chapter will discuss the development of the ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF) and Australia's involvement in that. The aim is to examine the 
source of the agreements reached to create the ARF, their role, purpose and 
efficacy, by utilising the polyphonic analytical model to examine how 
treaties are tools of foreign policy. What this analysis demonstrates is that 
the ARF was based on consensual agreement, rather than through formal 
treaty arrangements. But that those agreements were premised on extant 
treaties. Thus the initial task of identifying the origin, role and purpose of 
the agreements constituting the ARF is also focussed on those primary 
constitutive documents. In developing this case study reference will be 
made to a series of questions based on the  previous theoretical discussions 
and the polyphonic analytical model,  but the presentation will take the form 
of an analytical narrative. A final judgement will be made concerning each 
facet of the investigation into the function of the agreements, before a 
synthesising and concluding statement is made concerning the efficacy of 
the ARF, as revealed by the analysis of those constituent elements. 
 
Origin, Role and Purpose of the ARF 
 
The 1992 Singapore Declaration of the Fourth ASEAN Summit proclaimed 
the members states "...intent to intensify ASEAN's external dialogues in 
political and security matters as a means of building cooperative ties with 
states in the Asia Pacific region." [see Addendum B]  During the 1993 
ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference in Singapore foreign ministers from 
ASEAN and dialogue partners in that process "...agreed to separate, regular 
gatherings which would focus on regional security issues under the auspices 
of a newly constituted ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)." [Dupont:98:1]  
 
The inaugural ARF ministerial meeting, which was held on July 25, 1994, in 
Bangkok, Thailand, brought together foreign ministers from the European 
Union (EU) and Asia-Pacific countries. At the time ASEAN consisted of 
Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and 
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Thailand.  ASEAN's Dialogue Partners were: Australia, Canada, the 
European Union, Japan, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, and the United 
States.  ASEAN's Consultative Partners were China and Russia. ASEAN's 
Observers were Laos, Papua New Guinea, and Vietnam. The meeting 
established the ARF as the first region-wide multilateral forum for 
consultations at the government level on Asia-Pacific security issues. The 
1994 Chairman's Statement, issued by consensus following the meeting, 
described the ARF as a useful instrument for contributing to regional 
security by easing tensions, reducing suspicions, and cultivating 
consultation habits.  
 
Then Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans, referred to Australia's "...initiative at 
the 1990 ASEAN-PMC in Jakarta..." as an important impetus for the ARF. A 
priority for DFAT was to enhance the regional security environment by 
gaining acceptance of cooperative security approaches. [Ball&Kerr:96:73-4] 
ASEAN was considered a key regional player in organising security 
dialogue forums. Australia had presented a proposal for a Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Asia (CSCA) in 1990 [Soeya:94:87] In 1991, 
Japan's Foreign Minister at the time, Nakayama, proposed making use of the 
ASEAN-PMC as a forum for political dialogue "aimed at enhancing a sense 
of mutual reassurance." [Soeya:94:89] While visiting Japan, in January  1992, 
US President Bush was party to a US-Japan declaration, which included a 
reference to the ASEAN-PMC as a forum for political dialogue in the Asia-
Pacific. Two factors behind this development were, firstly, pressure from 
ASEAN-ISIS, a non-official organisation, to establish a security dialogue; 
and, secondly, that the ASEAN-PMC was the only sub-regional forum 
which had the potential to host a security dialogue. [Ball&Kerr:96:74] 
 
In fact the ASEAN-PMC process was seen as addressing the security 
concerns of the ASEAN region by acting as a medium through which 
dialogue amongst Association members could occur, with regard to 
cooperation in security matters, but also as a forum at which to address 
issues "relevant to the Asia Pacific region and community as a whole." 
[Jawhar:93:7] The resultant formation of the ASEAN Regional Forum, while 
initiated by ASEAN states, saw a commitment by Australia and then Foreign 
Minister, Evans, to organise seminars and help "...frame ARF procedures, 
protocols and agendas." [Cheeseman:96:261] 
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Contained in the Chairman’s Statement of the First ASEAN Regional Forum 
was the agreement to “endorse the purposes and principles of ASEAN’s 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-East Asia, as a code of conduct 
governing relations between states and a unique diplomatic instrument for 
regional confidence building, preventive diplomacy, and political and 
security cooperation.” [See Addendum B] The following year, at the 2nd 
ARF, the Meeting recognised that “the concept of comprehensive security 
includes not only military aspects but also political, economic, social and 
other issues.” Through these mechanisms, put in place by the ARF, 
cooperation has been engendered and enhanced by the socialisation of 
member states. By accepting membership the contractual commitment of 
states appears obvious, and although the contract is unenforceable members 
have an interest in cooperating through the gains guaranteed by interaction. 
Significantly the ARF is the only regional security framework "in which all 
the great powers are represented..." [Simon in Carpenter:96:42]  
 
The basis of the measures and guidelines adopted by member states of the 
ARF is a series of agreements realised over several years, as adjunctive 
evolutionary commitments. However, for the purpose of this exercise the 
preliminary document for analysis will be the Chairman's Statement from 
The First Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum  25 July 1994, Bangkok. 
 
This Document outlines how ASEAN Heads of State and Government 
proclaimed their intent to intensify ASEAN's external dialogues in political 
and security  matters, as a means of building cooperative ties with states in 
the Asia-Pacific region. It was also agreed to mount an extensive study 
regime looking at ideas related to   
 
 a) confidence and security building, nuclear non-proliferation, 
 peacekeeping cooperation, exchanges of non-classified military 
 information, maritime security issues, and preventive 
 diplomacy. 
 b) the comprehensive concept of security, including its economic 
 and social aspects, as it pertains to the Asia-Pacific region; 
 c) other relevant internationally recognized norms and principles 
 pertaining to international and regional political and security 
 cooperation for their possible contribution to regional political and 
 security cooperation; and to  
 d) promote the eventual participation of all ARF countries in the 
 UN Conventional Arms Register.  
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But more importantly the meeting agreed to 
 
"... endorse the purposes and principles of ASEAN's Treaty 
of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, as a code of 
conduct governing relations between states and a unique 
diplomatic instrument for regional confidence-building, 
preventive diplomacy, and political and security 
cooperation." [See Addendum B] 
 
This is a crucial insight into the workings of the ARF, as endorsement of the 
principles of the Treaty with which ASEAN was founded implies a 
commitment by all parties to agree to abide by the guidelines of that 
document. Thus the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, 
signed by ASEAN members in 1976, is the primary underpinning of the ARF 
and a significant focus for investigation. In essence this treaty commits its 
signatories to an "...abiding respect for justice and the rule or law ...", to "... 
peace, friendship and mutual cooperation on matters affecting Southeast 
Asia consistent with the spirit and principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations, the Ten Principles adopted by the Asian-African Conference in 
Bandung on 25 April 1955, the Declaration of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations signed in Bangkok on 8 August 1967, and the Declaration 
signed in Kuala Lumpur on 27 November 1971", and to the settlement of 
differences or disputes through "...rational, effective and sufficiently flexible 
procedures, avoiding negative attitudes which might endanger or hinder 
cooperation." [Addendum C] 
 
International Law and the ARF 
 
Thus, while it can be claimed that the ARF has no treaty basis or powers of 
compliance, as it appears to be founded on Statements issued from meetings 
of ASEAN-PMCs, such statements constitute commitments which allow for 
reference to previous agreements, as is evidenced by the endorsement of the 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (Amity Treaty). Hence 
the legal basis of the agreements must be related to the documents from 
which they stem, including the Amity Treaty. Such treaties and agreements 
have a degree of justiciable reality through long term existence and prior 
reference, and thus precedence must be a factor. Compliance is not 
dependent on enforcement, as States voluntarily make commitments to the 
process, and compliance can be forthcoming, as an evolutionary flourish 
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stemming from a realisation of the benefits that flow from compliance, and 
as an outcome of covert systemic pressure. Thus breaches would be dealt 
with within the ARF, although a deeper investigation into the conflict 
resolution mechanisms of the ARF reveals a dependence on the modes of 
peaceful settlement contained in Article 33(l) of the Charter of the United 
Nations. This offers a proviso that members  which are parties to a dispute 
should be encouraged to take initiatives to solve that dispute by friendly 
negotiations before resorting to the other procedures provided for in the 
Charter of the United Nations.  
 
Insofar as the ARF is committed to maintaining peace and security between 
States, it is not seen as likely to be able to intervene domestically. In fact 
concern amongst ASEAN members was expressed at the possible Japanese 
involvement in the process. The concern was based on entrenched historical 
fears, particularly with regard to security and "a possible Japanese military 
role..." [Soeya:94:90] But concerns about China's growing military power and 
naval adventurism also contributed to the perceived need to develop an 
institutional framework for security dialogue which would "incorporate 
China as a valued participant in regional security affairs." 
[Goldsworthy:97:26] Although China was not eligible to join ASEAN, its 
inclusion in the ARF, as a Consultative partner, may begin a socialisation 
process which contributes further to the PRC's pacification. Moreover, the 
ARF, through endorsement of the Amity Treaty, appears to be adopting a 
regional commitment to the signatories pledge of pursuing "the furtherance 
of world peace, stability and harmony..."[See Addendum C]  
 
This aspirational element of the Forum's objectives can have an overall 
influence on comprehensions of cooperation in the region, although such 
understandings are of a voluntary nature. But could well result in a 
lessening of fears of members of the ARF of either Japan's or China's military 
agendas. No doubt judicial interpretations and influence on peremptory 
norms, both internationally and domestically, within member and 
participant states, can be influenced by the developing notions of 
cooperation, as the cross fertilisation of ideas continues.  
  
Psychopolitical Impact 
 
The psychopolitical impact on judicial judgements can be brought about as a 
result of the exchange process, but also because legal training for higher 
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office often involves processes related to intergovernmental programs. 
Domestic legal norms come under scrutiny as a result, discourses are 
modified and the resultant changes alter perceptions of a state's activities, 
but equally state's will modify their legal attitudes in a bid to gain greater 
acceptance and influence at regional forums. 
 
Conventional Theoretical Comprehensions 
Systems, Hegemons, Regimes and Institutions 
 
The initiative for the ARF appears to have stemmed from discussion relating 
to Evans' call, in 1990, for the creation of a collective security body along the 
lines of the European CSCE, to be dubbed the CSCA, the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Asia. His commitment to a common security 
approach in the region was first presented in the Australian Senate in 1985. 
At the time Evans was serving as both Minister for Resources and Energy 
and Minister Assisting the Minister for Foreign Affairs. He called for the 
creation of " a stable and secure network of bilateral and multilateral alliance 
and treaty arrangements." [Scott:99:279] The United States, which enjoyed 
"clear military dominance and saw no need to engage in multilateral security 
arrangements" in the region, was opposed to the CSCA. [Scott:99:278] Evans 
amended his proposal, but was intent on finding support for a regional 
security dialogue. It was Nakayama's expressed interest, in 1991, and then 
the later declaration by Bush and Miyazawa in Tokyo, in 1992, which 
arguably led to the creation of the ARF.     
 
From the perspective of how systemic constraints led to this outcome it can 
be seen that Evans was both privy to foreign policy discussions in the early 
1980s, which were predominantly UN focussed, emanating from Hayden's 
office, and resource and energy discussions which undoubtedly pointed to 
the region to the north. It was in Australia's interest to pursue economic 
advantage in the region and one possible avenue was through the virtuous 
path of regional cooperation, particularly as any dissension in the region 
seemed to be related to resource politics. 
 
Evans applied pressure to the system and the system responded through 
both the regional hegemon, Japan, which eventually expressed interest and  
the global hegemon, the United States, which gave assent, after having 
encountered persuasive arguments from both its major allies in the Asia 
Pacific, Japan and Australia. In 1993, the Clinton Administration had made 
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clear "its willingness to participate," [Murdoch:23.7.93:5] with Clinton 
declaring during a trip to Japan and Korea that a "...continued US military 
presence in the region and new security dialogues were the guiding 
principle for his vision for the Asia-Pacific region." [Murdoch:23.7.93:14]  
 
The US was concerned to maintain its regional prominence and constraining 
the ambitions of the regional powers was now "its primary purpose," while 
Evans was pressing for an eventual "self-sustaining, and self regulating 
alternative security system..." [Scott:99:283] It seemed that assuaging the 
hegemon was crucial if the development of the AFR was to proceed. But 
equally the US needed to heed its major regional allies, as it realised that its 
traditional bilateralist security approach in the region had been surpassed by 
regional developments. [Scott:99:285] In fact, the six original ASEAN states 
saw the Forum as shaping a new order in the region by "fostering 
cooperative security", while Singapore's Prime Minister Goh could see how 
the Forum could sort out problems, both present and future, before they 
triggered armed conflict. [Murdoch:30.5.94:7] Regional countries were also 
becoming increasingly worried "about the risk of a nuclear arms race in 
Asia." [Murdoch:22.7.94:11] 
 
However, the US always had the upper hand, as its continued presence in 
the region was recognised as "...a vitally important stabilising factor." 
[Soeya:94:93] But there are difficulties associated with this dependence on 
the US for stability. There may be important economic incentives for 
reducing that dependence on the US. Or the value oriented issues pushed on 
the Asian states, and related to universal interests such as democratisation 
and human rights "...could create a major obstacle to Asian efforts to 
develop a comprehensive framework"  for regional cooperation. 
Alternatively, the imposition of hegemonic driven reform could hasten 
"...the process of dissolution of those rigid political and social systems" 
apparent in some authoritarian states in Asia. [Soeya:94:94]   
 
The realisation of the ARF as an offshoot of ASEAN-PMCs demonstrates 
how institutions develop within regimes. In this instance the early work on 
the Amity Treaty, and the Ten Principles adopted by the Asian-African 
Conference in Bandung, the Declaration of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations and the overarching guidance of the Charter of the United 
Nations, all set the stage for further extensions of that work. The agreements 
realised at the ARF enhance interdependence as cooperation is engendered 
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through consultation and consensus decision making. Transactionalism is 
fostered, as domestic issues feature unofficially, and states work to resolve 
disputes that threaten to overflow borders and undermine regional peace 
and security. Institutions, both physical, in the form of SOMs, (Senior 
Officer's Meetings) and through 'first track' (official) work programs, and 
"second track" (non-official) seminars and workshops on regional security 
issues, and conceptual, with the burgeoning appreciation of the benefits that 
flow from interstate interaction, and the practice of consensual regional 
politics, develop as components of an ongoing process of reform. 
 
Psychopolitical Impact 
 
While there seems little likelihood that the machinations of the ARF can 
have a significant impact on domestic constituencies, due to the external 
orientation of the objectives, which are related to regional concerns, the 
involvement of leadership cadres from each member state suggests that 
inflexible and dogmatic stances on policy issues will eventually succumb to 
modification, and pragmatic comprehensions will be realised as 
intransigence is abandoned in preference for imperative action. What is at 
work here is the psychomanipulation of leaders as an outcome of the 
socialisation process which they encounter when engaged in interstate 
regional exchange. 
 
Social Constructivism - Intentions and Influences 
 
The involvement of  states pursuing diverse liberal democratic, socialist or 
authoritarian domestic political application means that the environment in 
which the change makers are operating is less than conducive to success, 
and that any advances to be realised by the ARF will be bargained for 
extensively. This can mean that outcomes are diminutive and no more than 
lowest common denominator articulations, which can attract guarded 
support, rather than overt embrace. However, the nature of the socialisation 
process suggests that a middle ground between radical reform and 
conservative entrenchment will be reached, where the pragmatic leaderships 
of both liberal and conservative states can reach an agreement.  
 
The ARF attempts to create a mood within member constituents of 
cooperative dialogue with regard to maintaining security, an end to which 
all participants subscribe. The logic of membership suggests this as it seems 
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unlikely that a state intent on belligerence would bother to present a facade 
of cooperation. However, a belligerent could usefully apply to the 
consensuality of the forum in a bid to air arguments that would not be heard 
if the forum did not exist. In this sense influence can be brought to bear if the 
state intent on dissent can gain access to the agenda making process. Again 
negotiation becomes important here. The persuasive change agent can make 
it difficult for the Forum to function effectively, or can impress upon 
members the pertinence of due process, and achieve outcomes through 
constitutional processes. 
 
While the ARF has been called a "...talking shop" [Dupont:98:abstract], it is 
symbolic of aspirations that have long been held by ASEAN, as evidenced 
by the Amity Treaty. The endorsement by all participants of the Amity 
Treaty, as a component of the ARF, is further evidence that that attachment 
is still viable. Yet, while the ARF is symbolic of a hope for regional peace it is 
also a pragmatic application aimed at dispute resolution, and a more 
transparent practice of regional political, economic and militarily strategic 
activity. 
 
The pursuit of, what Evans called, Good International Citizenship as a 
national aspiration can be realised through the ARF and thus participation 
in the Forum can be in the national interest. National identity may undergo 
some modification as the result of such a stance but this is not likely to 
undermine sovereign status, nor lessen perceived power. It may connote 
acceptance of western ideological commitment, particularly with regard to 
justice, but as the ARF is ostensibly not concerned with domestic political 
arenas this can be discounted. In such instances, though, authoritarian states 
may experience challenges to domestic control if they appear conciliatory. 
 
While treaty makers as change agents must often contend with the domestic 
constituency, the process which resulted in the formation of the ARF seems 
singularly focussed at the inter-governmental level, where concerns with 
electoral or other domestic outcomes are less influential than are attempts at 
implementing reforms aimed at enhancing interstate activity, and 
particularly if those reforms are aimed at alleviating tensions between states, 
or at ensuring that tensions are unlikely. External influences may have a 
greater impact on how policy is arrived at within the ARF, as pressures can 
be brought to bear on less cooperative states to shift their programs into 
reform mode.  
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In building the ARF, the change agents borrowed from previous ASEAN 
agreements, and thus utilised precedent, while collective intentionality was 
manifested once the forum engaged in dialogue. To some extent an 
acceptance of the societal norms of the regional players, gathered around 
ASEAN, meant that the collective commitment was extant prior to the 
exchange. To what extent belief was significant here is arguable, as 
pragmatic political cooperation may have been the one comprehension 
shared by all participants, and thus a belief in its efficacy may have been the 
underpinning which made the negotiations possible. 
 
Psychopolitical Impact 
 
Any domestic attitudinal impact of the ARF would be related to the political 
elite, as the foreign minister was the representative of the state. The political 
associates, academic advisers, senior bureaucrats and journalists 
accompanying the foreign minister to ARF meetings would be privy to the 
necessary toing-and-froing demanded by the practice of diplomacy, and 
inevitably attitudinal shifts would be required to achieve outcomes, as the 
ARF is a consensus based decision making forum. But pragmatism rarely 
undermines the dogmatic nor ideological underpinnings of the participants, 
and thus attitudinal facades would be presented for the sake of the outcome 
and to preserve the institution. This suggests that norms were safe, 
perceptions maintained and the discourse fluid but consistent, although 
constrained by the founding documents of the ARF and by the dominant 
powers present at the discussion table.   
 
 Norms, Perceptions, Discourses and the Treaty 
 
A challenge to the notion of maintaining the status quo exists though, with 
an understanding that there are substantial issues to be discussed between 
all participants at the ARF, and that these issues will be raised. There is a 
perception of the ARF serving as a talkfest, but it is exactly that function, 
where multiperspectival discourses underpin the various debates 
encountered by the members, which gives the Forum its salience. Norms 
will be challenged, particularly with regard to the means of conflict 
resolution, where the ARF can be used to avoid conflictual situations, or at 
least to "...move quickly to try to settle disputes." [Murdoch:30.5.94:7] Extant 
norms will play a role here as the defining characteristics of the Treaty of 
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Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia do provide guidelines for 
behaviour. It is also suggested that officials will see the forum "...as having 
close links with the United Nations" [Murdoch:30.5.94:7] and this 
comprehension will further enhance the burgeoning cooperative nature of 
regional exchange. Undoubtedly state representatives will attempt to change 
the underlying interpretations of guidelines and the norm entrepreneurs 
will be active, enhancing existing measures aimed at cooperation, or 
defending extant measures aimed at protecting sovereignty. 
 
 In a similar manner perception mechanics are a crucial component of the 
exchanges engaged in within international institutions. States perceived as 
belligerent will be persuaded by the society of states, constituted by the 
membership grouping of the ARF, of the benefits of adherence to societal 
norms. But negotiation is also about gaining advantage and states will strive 
to present themselves in a positive light, while pursuing their less than 
altruistic national interest. Again the limiting factors to self-interested 
activities for the ARF participants are the Amity Treaty and the UN 
guidelines on conflict resolution.  
 
The recognition of those founding documents must influence the 
participants in the ARF and have an impact on attitude. That is an outcome 
of the socialisation process, which all participants encounter by being 
involved in institutional, and thus constitutional, exchange. While 
attitudinal shifts within the rarefied atmosphere of regional exchange at the 
institutional level is likely, it is questionable that the business of the ARF will 
have any domestic impact, within any constituent state. Security issues are 
the affair of the externally oriented departments of foreign affairs and 
defence, and traditionally beyond the concern of any but the most diligent 
domestic constituents.   
 
The ARF met with a similar fate if the reportage in Australian newspapers 
around the time of the inauguration of the forum is indicative of domestic 
interest. In fact while the ARF was primarily focussed externally it was 
introduced at a time when a series of governments pursuing regional 
enmeshment had been in office for just over a decade. Attitudes had been 
moulded during that time, and this message was likely to be received 
positively by a constituency well used to the discourse. Interestingly claims 
to having an instigatory role in the formation of the ARF, as well evidenced 
by reportage on Evans involvement in that process, have a psychopolitical 
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base, as there is a greater likelihood of domestic acceptance of an externally 
focussed and generated agreement if the domestic constituency is assured 
that its representatives had influence in its realisation, and that their activity 
was in the national interest. The onus lies with the leadership to ensure that 
such assurance is forthcoming. 
 
Cultural Change and Leadership 
 
Members of ministerial entourages appear to be the only participants in ARF 
activity, hence those actors are the only ones likely to need to contend with 
cultural change. Those actors are consistently subjected to nuanced 
exchanges based on cultural predilections, which not only challenges their 
own cognitive frameworks, but through a socialising process modify their 
frames of reference. This can trickle down into society but is unlikely too, 
due to the entourage being assembled around the foreign minister, who is 
often invisible to the domestic constituency.  
 
Also the nature of the ARF activity is aimed at the external arena. 
Widespread constituent support in not necessary for the institution to 
achieve successes. This is essentially because the ARF is aimed at 
cooperative security, which is in the interest of liberal democracies, where 
the domestic constituency is ideologically committed to peace and security. 
Authoritarian states, on the other hand, participating at ARF meetings have 
no need to refer to their domestic constituencies, because of the nature of 
their domestic political structures. This latter situation could be challenged, 
however, if adequate reportage of the outcomes of ARF deliberations were 
to filter through to that population. This is not only a possibility, but a 
consideration which those states must have countenanced before deciding to 
participate in the Forum, and thus it must be accepted that the risk of 
domestic change is possible and even probable. However, in both instances, 
with liberal democratic constituencies amenable to the discourse, and 
populations of authoritarian states either not privy to them or accepting of 
any positive advancement as an outcome of such talks, there is little or no 
need for persuasion to be utilised. 
 
Again this can be challenged, if and when the judgement and 
prognostications of the ARF work against the interests of a state and its 
population. At those times, however, it would be most likely that the 
disgruntled states would seriously consider abandoning the talks, but again 
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once the state is locked into negotiation the maintenance of positive 
perceptions may be deemed vital, and there may be a reluctance to move to 
a position of "rogue" state. At that point the domestic constituency may need 
to be convinced that the collective judgement of the ARF was in the interests 
of that domestic population. Again if the primary motivating force of all 
ARF participants is peace and security then this likelihood may only be 
encountered by  belligerent states, which have little need to consult the 
domestic constituency, let alone convince the need for change. 
 
Thus with regard to the ARF there seems little need to delve into the means 
of achieving attitudinal change within the domestic constituency. But by 
accepting the notion that regional enmeshment was a well established 
discourse within the Australian polity, the acceptance that attitudinal 
change had occurred in the past must be recognised. In fact, as a result of the 
Guam Doctrine of 1969, whereby the United States, through President 
Nixon, effectively shifted the onus for regional security in the Asia Pacific 
onto regional states, Australian governments had been pursuing a form of 
self-reliance in security, on a bipartisan basis. Having said that, the onus was 
still on the leadership of the Keating Government, and particularly Evans as 
Foreign Minister, and to a lesser extent, Keating as Prime Minister, to assure 
the public their interests were being taken care of with Australia's 
involvement in the ARF.   
 
The leadership task was not a momentous one, but it required a conciliatory 
approach and a tactful explication to an Australia constituency long 
suspicious of Asia. Keating's forays into the region in pursuit of APEC, 
which had been preceded by representatives of the Whitlam, Fraser and 
Hawke ministries, had softened domestic attitudes to pragmatic 
arrangements with regional states. Things economic or strategic were 
considered legitimate, although cultural exchange was still a troubled area, 
and this may have stemmed from domestic comprehensions of historic 
Australia- Asia migratory patterns. 
 
It was said that Evans achieved "...a remarkable standing in the region" for 
his work on the ARF. Thailand's then foreign minister, Prasong Soonsirir, 
following the inauguration of the forum, stated that "(i)f credit for a single 
individual's contribution to the ARF could be given, the honour would have 
to go to my good friend, Senator Gareth Evans..." [Sheridan:30.7.94.] In 
domestic reportage little comment was made on the ARF, or on Evans 
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involvement in its realisation. This either suggests that the publishers 
considered the Forum of little relevance domestically, or that the reports 
were diverted to more specialist publications. 
 
Further Psychopolitical Components and Treaties 
 
Bearing these thoughts in mind  a brief assessment of the  relevance of the 
further groupings of questions developed as the polyphonic analytical 
model will support the conclusion that the ARF is of limited interest to the 
domestic constituency, while it continues to be of limited significance. 
 
In this sense the change agents are unlikely to have to deal  with a 
recalcitrant constituency, and will not need to contend with possible 
psychopolitical challenges. Attitudinal barriers will not be encountered,  
ideological obstructions are not encountered as the change engendered by 
the implementation of ARF processes is unlikely to impact domestically, 
although if, as a result of an ARF adjudication1 , Australia became involved 
in a regional imbroglio this situation could change rapidly, as dominant 
narrative structures were challenged by a call to arms in defence of a 
regional entity not considered worthy of support by the domestic 
constituency, particularly if rituals of differentiation were triggered by such 
a request.  Failure on the part of the constituency to identify with the issue 
or the actors involved in that issue could lead to further rejection, and 
cognitive dissonance could become a reality, with the resultant possibility 
that the ARF could be abandoned by an electorate which had not considered 
it relevant before it challenged the dominant attitudinal constructs. To avoid 
such a situation the adept leader would ensure a proper interpretation of the 
demands expected to be met by the constituency as a result of the ARF 
adjudication. 
 
To guarantee that that interpretation was received by the constituency at 
large a form of political communication best suited to the urgency of the 
situation would need to be employed. It would be vital for the leadership to 
assure the constituency that any activities occurring externally in which 
Australia was involved were in the national interest and unlikely to have 
any domestic impact.  The point about tactics being used to ensure a strategy 
of political communication is successful is brought into full force in an 
instance such as this, where the form of persuasion must generate timely 
                                                 
1 An hypothetical possibility with low probability if the record of the ARF is any indication. 
 153
outcomes.  If the demand is for symbolic interaction the pressure is on 
cerebral elements of the constituency, that may be realised as favourable 
thoughts.  Whereas if there are demands for a physical application, the 
appeal must satisfy deeper requirements. The leader may need to take a 
more frank approach conveying a message directly, through message 
repetition, or by engaging the constituency in shared deliberations. The 
effects of how the leaders perform when communicating politically will 
determine the outcome of their appeal, but also give saliency to the 
institution, in this instance the ARF, and the task it is expected to perform. 
 
Thus the role of the leader is crucial in convincing the constituency of the 
saliency of any change that can be brought about by externally generated 
pressure. While regional security persists the ARF offers little challenge to 
the domestic constituency, but once it offers a threat to stability it may come 
under intense review. 
 
The Efficacy of the ARF Founding Documents  
 
When evaluating the effectiveness of the documents which created the ARF 
we need to look to the ARF itself. To look at the impact of the treaty beyond 
the text. The ARF must be seen as a symbolic construction of significant 
importance to the region, and to all the actors involved. The fact that it is 
attended by all major global powers, including the US , Japan, Russia, 
Germany and the UK as European participants and China, gives it great 
credibility as a potential broker of security cooperation. However to 
continue to be of relevance it must be flexible enough to respond to the 
changing demands of a global community in transformation.  
 
The risk is that the ARF will become a creature of habit, and simply a facade 
of interdependence where the annual attendance at meetings by foreign 
ministers, where obeisance and deference to overdiscussed possibilities will 
become the way of business. This is possible if the cognitive framework, 
built through the experiences of participants at meetings, where a 
comfortable position is realised and there is a reluctance to depart from that 
comfort zone, leads to ennui and a conservative maintenance of the status 
quo. On the other hand, the ARF could become a practical broker of regional 
cooperation, well able to resolve differences through negotiation. Its 
weakness may well be its dependence on the UN Charter as a last point of 
conflict resolution, thus creating a tendency to allow negotiations to go 
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through the gamut of ARF processes unsuccessfully, knowing that as a last 
resort the UN can intervene. This may mean the ARF never realises it 
potential as a regional tool of foreign policy.  
 
In the end, the ASEAN Regional Forum is defined by the treaties on which it 
is built. It is thus a constitutionalist construction, privy to interpretation, and 
psychopolitical manipulation, and to be effective, it must be defined in a 
manner which satisfies the needs of the actors with which it is enmeshed, 
while ensuring that the interpretation of its outcomes guarantees its success. 
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Chapter Eleven 
 
The Australia-Indonesia Agreement on Maintaining Security 
In 1995, then Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating, prior to signing the  
Australia-Indonesia Agreement on Maintaining Security, said it was "a 
major strategic development for Australia and for the region... providing for 
Australia's future and creating greater certainty about that future." 
[Stewart:15.12.95:1] President Suharto of Indonesia was quoted as saying 
that "both countries want to contribute to peace and security in the region, 
helping achieve economic development and prosperity." [Walters:15.12.95:4]   
 
This chapter will examine the origin, role, purpose and efficacy, of  the 
Agreement on Maintaining Security (AMS), which is essentially a formal 
treaty, and hence a summary of the signatories objectives is well articulated 
and readily accessible. As with the preceding investigation of the ASEAN 
Regional Forum, the polyphonic analytical model will be utilised to examine 
the AMS as a tool of foreign policy, and hence reference will be made to a 
series of questions based on the previous theoretical discussions  but the 
presentation will take the form of a narrative. A final judgement will be 
made concerning each facet of the investigation before a definitive and 
conclusive statement is made concerning the hypothesis that to achieve 
success as tools of foreign policy treaties must be constructed and construed 
so as to satisfy the psychopolitical necessities of all key actors, external and 
domestic.  
 
Origin, Role and Purpose of the AMS. 
   
In 1988, during his first year as Australia's foreign minister, Gareth Evans 
met with Ali Alatas, the Indonesian foreign minister, and agreed to work at 
improving the relationship between the neighbouring powers. They 
reinstituted annual talks between senior officials, established an Australia-
Indonesia Institute and in 1989 signed the Timor Gap Zone of Cooperation 
Treaty, which was "...an agreement to jointly exploit oil and gas under the 
Timor Sea." [Scott:99:252] By 1990 Canberra and Jakarta were working on a 
Joint Declaration of Principles, but this was dropped in 1991 after the Dili 
Massacre in East Timor. However, the 1993 Strategic Review elevated 
defence cooperation with Indonesia to primacy in Australia's strategic 
outlook and Keating raised the idea of a full security treaty with Suharto at 
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the Australia Today promotions in Jakarta, in 1994. [Sheridan:15.12.95:1]  
Keating and Suharto has worked closely on the APEC presentation at Bogor 
in 1994, and Evans recalled that Keating's relationship with Suharto was 
"...both imaginative and deferential simultaneously." [Scott:99:254]  
 
Keating's arguments, in support of the Agreement, which he put to Suharto 
in Jakarta, in 1994, were that Australia and Indonesia had no territorial 
designs on each other;  that neither of the communities of each country 
clearly understood this;  that with the end of the Cold War common interests 
in defence and security were becoming clearer; and that multilateral 
initiatives like APEC and the ARF needed to be supported bilaterally. 
[Lowry:96:9] At the Osaka summit of APEC, in November 1995, Keating met 
with Suharto and it was confirmed that a proposed security treaty between 
Australia and Indonesia "...would be ready to sign before Christmas." 
[Gordon:96:317]  
 
On the 18th December 1995 Evans and Alatas signed the AMS, in the 
presence of Keating and Suharto. Devised as a means of bilateral 
cooperation to maintain mutual security, at the time of its signing the AMS 
was variously described, in Australia, as "...a treaty designed at the level of 
grand strategy...the stuff of history..."[Sheridan:16.12.95:21]; and '...a 
declaration of trust that would signal even closer defence ties and more 
economic cooperation..." [Keating in Gordon:19.12.95:1] ; while then 
Opposition leader Howard called the signing "...a sensible move. Indonesia 
is Australia's closest northern neighbour and the Coalition supports the 
continued development of the relationship in a way which reflects its 
importance to both countries." [Stewart:15.12.95:1]  East Timorese resistance 
leader Ramos-Horta was more critical, stating that "(w)hen you have a 
dictatorship and a democratic country with very different legal systems -one 
almost non-existent in Indonesia because the army is a law unto themselves 
-to sign such a treaty is like a treaty between God and the devil." 
[Stewart:15.12.95:1] 
 
According to Bhakti, an Indonesian commentator, by signing the AMS, 
Indonesia became indirectly connected with a pattern of treaties that 
Australia has established with its neighbours and other external powers. 
These agreements included the 1971 FPDA, a pact between Australia, New 
Zealand, Malaysia, Singapore and the UK; the 1987 Joint Declaration of 
Principles between Australia and Papua New Guinea; and the 1951 ANZUS 
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Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States. This meant 
"...that Indonesia...(had)... not only indirectly become part of Western 
alliances, but also...( had)... a part in Australia's new forward defence 
strategy." [Anwar:98:510] 
 
Sheridan commented on how the AMS was the first reciprocal security 
treaty Australia had ever signed with an Asian nation, the first mutual 
security treaty Indonesia had signed with anyone, and the first security 
treaty Australia had signed with a state whose troops had been in direct 
physical contact with Australian troops, during the 1960s. 
[Sheridan:16.12.95:21] He called the treaty a "powerful symbolic moment in 
Australian history ...(with)... the Keating Government telling the Australian 
people, and others, the truth about where our long term national interests 
lie." [Sheridan:15.12.95:5] Shadow Foreign Minister Downer thought the 
AMS an excellent initiative, in principle, and one "symbolically important 
because it underlines the value of the bilateral relationship...(and 
provided)...a framework to develop the security dialogue." [Hartcher:96:26] 
While there was bipartisan support in the Australian Parliament, the 
concern with the secrecy under which the Agreement was negotiated and 
the East Timor problem would offer impediments to the AMS gaining the 
support of the Australian constituency. How those impediments impacted 
on the domestic constituency are revealed in the following insights gleaned 
from an application of the polyphonic analytical model. 
 
 International Law and the AMS 
 
The Agreement had three main clauses relating firstly, to regular 
consultations between Ministers about common security; secondly, to the 
provision for specific consultations in the case of adverse challenges to either 
party or their security interests; and finally to the promotion of 
"...cooperative activities in the security field." But the Agreement was 
"intentionally vague on what action might follow consultation on security 
challenges..." and was significant "...as much in its implications as in its 
operative clauses." For Viviani, it implied the completion of the web of 
Australian security treaties in the region, and it entrenched the relationship 
between the two states. [Viviani:97:155]  However, it did not appear to have 
relevance in the field of  International Law. 
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The AMS noted that "nothing in this Agreement affects in any way the 
existing international commitments of either party", suggesting that this 
treaty would not have precedence over previous commitments. But it also 
reaffirmed that international disputes would be settled by peaceful means 
"in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international 
law."[Addendum A]  As with the ARF, the AMS was premised on UN 
resolution procedures. Thus the Legal basis of the treaty was not in doubt. It 
was a justiciable document, and its provision for consultation on security 
breaches and to consider measures which might be taken to resolve a 
conflict, allowed for an enforcability of such measures through the UN. As 
for breachability, although there was no clause built into the agreement with 
which to identify a breach, with a reading of the preamble it was not 
difficult to construe the possibility that a perception of a loss of respect for 
sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity could offer 
possible avenues for either party to retract their assent to the agreement. 
 
The likelihood of the AMS having any impact on domestic law seemed 
negligible, except in the instance of either state calling on the other to 
provide troops, as this would require special legislation to either finance 
such an operation or if either government was reluctant to make such a 
commitment, could provide a legislative escape route. The aspirational 
elements of the Agreement, such as promoting a dialogue on cooperative 
security, seemed less to do with affecting international law, and more with a 
focus on symbolic impacts.  Keating wanted a simple and straightforward 
agreement, as it was "the commitment that mattered." [Keating:00:140] The 
fact that the agreement was couched in "intentionally vague" terms, suggests 
that it was written with reaching assent in mind, and thus its provisions 
needed to be very general. Howard was concerned with the term "adverse 
challenges" and saw that the term external challenges would have been 
more pertinent, and a safer option. He reportedly expressed concern that 
this wording "left open the risk of Australia being placed under pressure to 
become involved in Indonesia's internal matters." [Stewart:15.12.95:1] 
Shadow Foreign Minister Downer saw the wording as leading to a situation 
where "...one party interprets the treaty to mean internal rather than merely 
external challenges." [Greenlees:15.12.95:4] His argument may have been 
premised on the possibility that Australian could be asked to intervene, on 
behalf of Indonesia, in domestic conflicts within Indonesia. Equally, it also 
implied that Australia could be asked to ignore untoward activities in East 
Timor, and other troublespots in Indonesia.  
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Psychopolitical Impact 
 
From an international law viewpoint both Australia and Indonesia had been 
summoned by the International Court of Justice due to a rift with Portugal 
over sovereign rights in the Timor Gap. [ICJ:95:] Hence for Portugal, the 
AMS was probably less than a surprise. The real surprise may have been felt 
most significantly within Australia, but the agreement did not appear to 
envisage any radical changes to international law.  
 
Conventional Theoretical Comprehensions 
Systems, Hegemons, Regimes and Institutions 
 
In essence the AMS was a key component of a security web that Australia 
had been building in the region. The Labor Government, under Hawke, had 
made a commitment to regional cooperation, with Evans committed to 
working 'with' the region rather than 'against' it. This may have also been 
the result of the move towards greater self reliance in defence that Australia 
was obliged to engage in as a result of the Guam Doctrine of 1969, with 
which US President Nixon had effectively passed the responsibility for 
regional military security to regional states. Admittedly it had taken some 
time for Australia to begin to cope with the demands of that responsibility, 
and one avenue was through regional military cooperation.  
 
While there appeared to be little pressure on Australia and Indonesia 
reaching such an agreement it was actually seen as a way of reducing 
Australia's "previous strategic dependence on the United States, although 
it...(did)...not invalidate nor compromise Australia's extant security 
obligations." [DuPont:96:53] Thus the AMS was a way of reducing pressure 
by sharing it on a wider front. This could be tied into the Guam Doctrine 
once again, and interpreted as hegemonic influence, if not overt pressure. 
Another possible motive was an anticipation of changes in the political 
climate resulting from the effects of economic globalisation. In fact, China 
had claimed sovereignty over an area of the South China Sea, which 
included a gas field off Indonesia's Natuna Island that Jakarta was 
developing with "US and Japanese energy companies". 
[Richardson:19,12,95:2]  
 
Analysts had reportedly said that the AMS "...reflected a growing 
determination by countries in South-East Asia and the South West Pacific to 
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maintain stability in the region and lays the basis for a strategic 
counterweight to any attempt by China or any other outside power to 
interfere in regional affairs." [Richardson:19.12.95:2] However, it may be 
related also to the Labor penchant for regionalism, as opposed to 
Conservative governments apparent historical maintenance and 
entrenchment of the US alliance. The standoff between Indonesia and 
Australia over East Timor had been long standing and the AMS gave hope 
that quiet diplomacy could be brought to bear to influence a change in 
Indonesia's attitude to that troubled province. In this sense the treaty was an 
outcome of systemic pressure, that had emanated from the US, and its 
reduced commitment as a security guarantor in the region, but which had 
been exacerbated by the end of the Cold War.  
 
In the context of wider strategic commitments in the region, and with the 
development of the ARF, the AMS enhanced the universal interest in peace 
and security in the region. For many Australians "Indonesia has long been 
regarded ...as the source of the most likely threat to Australian security." 
[DuPont:96:53] Thus the AMS had the potential to alleviate the tensions 
between Australia and Indonesia, by eliminating uncertainty. The existence 
of several institutional settings relating to Australian Indonesian security 
concerns, both military and economic, meant that the AMS was a further 
component of that institutionalised cooperation, which included both APEC 
and the ASEAN Regional Forum. In context, the AMS was one of a group of 
bilateral arrangements, realised in the region to Australia's north, which 
included the Malaysia-Australia Joint Defence Program, (1992), the Joint 
Australia-Singapore Coordinating Group (1992), the Australian-Indonesia 
Defence Policy Committee (1994) and the Australian Indonesian Defence 
Coordinating Committee (1994) [Horner:97:86], The Joint Declaration on the 
Australia-Japan Partnership of May 1995, which "...committed the two 
countries to advancing their security dialogue..." [Rix:97:148] and The 
Australia-Singapore Joint Declaration 1996.  
 
In this regard the above mentioned bilateral arrangements have contributed 
to the development of institutions and institutional exchange, with the 
promise of greater transparency in defence relations, and the possibility of 
reduced or negligible tensions. However, the longstanding concern of 
Australians about Indonesia's involvement in East Timor continued to be a 
"...thorn in the side of...successive Australian governments." [Kent:97:172] In 
this sense, Keating saw that "the treaty enhanced Australia's capacity to 
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make a positive contribution on issues like East Timor", while Alatas said 
that "Indonesian-Australian relations are not only based on the question of 
East Timor and neither should we allow it to be." [Gordon:19.12.95:2] Alatas' 
comment could well be read as a refutation of Keating's affirmation, or allow 
for the wider comprehension that stemmed from stability for economic 
pursuits. 
 
Social Constructivism - Intentions and Influences 
 
Realised in an environment of elite cordiality based on the relationship 
between Keating and Suharto, which undoubtedly stemmed from their 
cooperation on bringing together Heads of Government at APEC meetings, 
and possibly as a result of Whitlam's earlier friendship with Suharto, the 
AMS appears to have been  reached with mutual interest. The Agreement's 
symbolic importance was that it sent a direct and unambiguous signal to the 
region that Australia  accepted that its well being as a nation would 
"ultimately depend on its own ability to build constructive relations with its 
neighbours." [DuPont:96:52] It was a pragmatic agreement based on an 
understanding that regional cooperation would strengthen both parties 
place in the world, but it also made it less likely that Indonesia would 
present a security threat to Australia. [DuPont:96:53]  Nothing in the 
agreement threatened national identity from an Australian perspective, but 
the tacit affirmation that East Timor was de jure part of Indonesia, accepted 
by Australian governments, but not Australian public opinion, would fuel 
the notion that Keating had chosen to continue to disregard the totalitarian 
nature of the Suharto regime, and  this could be seen as 'kowtowing' to a 
dictator to ensure Australian security, but at the expense of the East 
Timorese. 
Domestically, in Australia, the Agreement was met with surprise, which 
came from the secrecy with which it had been negotiated, but also because it 
breached the rules of western liberalism, in that it could be perceived that 
Australia had "...sacrificed its commitment to liberal values, democracy and 
human rights on the altar of realpolitik." [DuPont:96:55] In fact, proponents 
of western liberal values, the 'anti-Indonesia lobby', were influential in 
raising suspicions about both Keating's and Suharto's motives, which could 
have seen the AMS foundering "...on the shoals of public opinion." 
[DuPont:96:60] This may have been avoided if future Australian 
governments worked to encourage the domestic constituency to view 
Indonesia in a more positive light. In the final analysis it would have to be 
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realised that Keating and Suharto were acting out of the belief that their 
actions may be of some mutual interest to Australia and Indonesia. The 
precedent of the Timor Gap Treaty was an indicator of how the relationship 
could proceed amicably, but there were significant hurdles to overcome 
within Australia. Not the least of which was the perception, amongst the 
Australian constituency that Indonesia was a country, in many respects, 
"...alien to the Australian consciousness." [Brown:99:103] 
 
 Norms, Perceptions, Discourses and the AMS 
 
If norms play a part in this process, particularly domestically, it may be in 
the sense that Australian values have gradually been eroding with regard to  
human rights. Pragmatism, especially of an economic nature, had seen a 
previously entrenched stance on fair play undermined, in pursuit of other 
objectives. The commercialised vision of the national interest overrode the 
care and concern for fellow human beings, and human rights became the 
poor cousin of economic progress. Ironically, disregard for human rights can 
work against economic well-being, when dealings with sophisticated states 
are undermined by negative perceptions. Portugals' soured relations with 
Australia over East Timor could well have influenced other European states. 
 
Domestically, the Australian peoples' concern with living standards and  self 
interested regard, could result in tacit consent for the government's 
programs of economic and security reforms. Such was the discourse of the 
mid nineties in Australia, where securing a place in the region was 
considered of paramount importance for the future well being of the 
Australian people. A hard game where self interest was weighed up against 
altruistic commitment and the former appeared victorious.  Suharto's 
comment on the AMS about economic development and prosperity 
reinforces a possible mutual comprehension of the role of the AMS. Thus the 
attitudes of the Australian people and the Indonesian ruling elite were not at 
odds on economics, but the Australian constituency could afford to consider 
moral obligations, a luxury the Indonesian leadership believed it could not 
afford if stability was to be maintained. [Woolcott:16.12.95:4] This was the 
point of dissension between the two political camps in Australia, the pro 
Jakarta lobby and the pro East Timor lobby. 
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Cultural Change and Leadership 
 
For the Australian public to fully accept the outcomes of the AMS it would 
need to "quickly come to terms with seeing Indonesia as a permanent ally." 
[Viviani:97:156] This would mean overlooking the past indiscretions of the 
Indonesian military. This was particularly the case in East Timor, where 
mass murders like the Dili massacre of 1991, and the accumulated killings 
by the Indonesian military of an estimated 100,000 of the East Timorese 
population over a 25 year period, were well evidenced. This was further 
exacerbated by the 'never to be forgiven' slaying of  five Australian 
journalists at Balibo, by Indonesian forces during the 1975 invasion. [Kent 
:97:172] The resultant attitudes of Australians towards Indonesia seemed 
insurmountable odds to overcome.  
 
Widespread constituent support was vital for Keating's agreement to be 
wholeheartedly accepted by the Australian constituency. Significant 
attitudinal shifts were required to the extent that Australians needed to 
realise that Indonesia has broad defensive interests similar to Australia.  
Significant changes were necessary within Australian culture if such a 
magnanimous acceptance was to be forthcoming. Coupled with this was the 
fact that officially the Indonesian population was almost completely Muslim. 
The East Timorese population, on the other hand, were to a great extent 
Catholic. The division between cultures, both within Indonesia and with 
Australia, presented a major obstacle, based on perceptions, inflexible 
attitudes, and deeply held beliefs in the deviousness of the other.   
This could well have been Keating's objective, to break down the walls built 
on unsubstantiated assumptions. He needed to approach the Australian 
constituency in a persuasive and inclusive manner and to encourage their 
support in building bridges between two vital cultures, especially given the 
moderate nature of Islam, as practised in Indonesia.  Instead he conducted 
the negotiation of the Agreement in secret. The Australian Democrat's 
foreign affairs spokeswoman, Senator Bourne, criticised the moves to 
formalise and promote security cooperation with Indonesia, claiming the 
government had presented the treaty as a fait accompli without any debate 
in Parliament or consultation with other parties.  And that the Opposition 
was told "...after the Americans and just before the public announcement." 
[Greenlees:15.12.95:4] 
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Australian reportage of Keating's involvement in the realisation of the treaty 
was described as "...a foreign policy coup that enhances his leadership 
credentials...(and)...a demonstration of Keating's willingness to spend 
domestic capital in order to gain it..." [Gordon:16.12.95:21]; and "a major 
strategic and diplomatic coup...which could see either nation defending the 
other against attack." [Stewart:15.12.95:1]  Both these comments exemplify 
Keating's ability to function as a statesman in the regional arena, but say 
little about his ability to convince a domestic constituency that it was in their 
interest to alter their attitude to a neighbouring state and to welcome the 
new arrangement which makes them allies, and possibly friends. 
 
The criticism that was forthcoming was harsh, with Sister O'Connor, whose 
Order of St Joseph had offered sanctuary to East Timorese, saying Australia 
didn't have "...any backbone when it comes to dealing with Indonesia. It is a 
matter of kowtowing to them."[Ellicott:15.12.95:4] Former deputy secretary 
of defence Alan Wrigley asked, "why do we have to invest - and risk so 
much - in strengthening bonds with a military system overwhelmingly 
dedicated to checking the emergence of the free expression and diversity of 
opinion which we ourselves value above all else?" [Wrigley:15.12.95:5] These 
were major criticisms of leadership where Keating acted as the aggressive 
leader intent on shocking Australians into action, rather than the conciliative 
leader who could inspire acceptance of change. Thus he met with significant 
psychopolitical challenges from a recalcitrant constituency, which may have 
contributed to his eventual loss at the polls, at the hands of a conservative 
leader who reassured the electorate that their attitudes on change were 
correct. 
 
Psychopolitical Challenges for Change 
 
Although the Howard Opposition had called the treaty a 'sensible move' on 
the Friday before the signing, Howard  had also suggested that it was time 
for Suharto to visit Australia, stating that it was  "...a great pity he hasn't felt 
able to visit this country in 20 years. I think any relationship must be of a 
strong sense of mutual self and it would in my view bring further balance to 
the relationship if he were able to visit this country." Howard then went on 
to criticise the ambiguity of the phrase "adverse challenges", in the treaty, 
which Evans read as "external'. When asked if Australia would commit 
troops to defend Indonesia if they were requested Howard said "...the 
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government of the day would have to assess any request for troops on its 
merits." [Ceresa:16.12.95:4] 
 
Counter arguments to the Agreement presented in Australia stemmed from 
three sources. Firstly, from those who believed that bilateralism would 
undermine regional cooperation and could antagonise China. [Lowry:96:14]  
In fact, while it was feared that the AMS could raise suspicions in Beijing 
that Australia was building an anti-Chinese coalition "aimed at denying 
China its rightful influence in the region", China seemed to accept that the 
Agreement did not target a particular state. However, in 1994,  Keating had 
commented on "...a natural symmetry of interests between Australia, 
Vietnam and Indonesia in resisting any attempt by China to establish 
hegemony in Southeast Asia, or to become part of the Chinese orbit." 
[DuPont:96:55] Secondly, from those who objected to Australia signing such 
an agreement with an authoritarian regime governing Indonesia, and finally, 
from those who objected to the lack of parliamentary scrutiny of the treaty 
making process. [Lowry:96:14] 
 
Not only did Keating meet with attitudinal obstructions, but he came up 
against several other impediments to success. Ideological obstructions, in the 
form of opposition to undermining the allegiance that Australia showed to 
its western allies, were made obvious in comments made by Duncan 
Campbell, a former diplomat and deputy secretary of DFAT, questioning 
whether Australia had ""...sought any clarification of the status of US 
commitment under ANZUS..." [Campbell:16.12.95:4] in light of the new 
arrangements with Indonesia.   
 
Narrative structures, on which the "bad news" about Indonesia was 
premised, were indicated by Campbell, who said that pressure tactics from 
lobbies on human rights and independence had "...not protected or 
promoted a single human rights cause or dented Indonesian consumer 
resistance to morals made in Australia",  implying that the AMS would meet 
with dissent as long as that pressure was maintained in Australia, and that 
the government must provide leadership to ensure recognition of "values in 
the region other than...(their)...own." [Campbell:15.12.95:5]   
 
The lack of identification with the neighbours of a different cultural heritage 
was implied in a report in Kompas, an Indonesian daily newspaper, which 
suggested that prior to the Agreement "...relations between the two 
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countries was coloured by suspicion and other points of disagreement..." 
[Walters:18.12.95:2], while National Party leader, Tim Fischer, commenting 
on the "rushed signing" of the Agreement, suggested it should have been 
tabled in Parliament and allowed to lie for a month, because "some people 
could become suspicious of what they saw as secret deliberations between 
the Australian Government and governments in Asia." [Taylor::18.12.95:1] 
This was a cautious but overt criticism of the Keating Government's regional 
enmeshment program, and an indication of the conservative attitude of 
members of the Australian constituency. 
 
The lack of message receptivity, where Keating seemed to fail as a 
communicator, is best summed up by political journalist Michael Gordon, 
who said that, in the end, Australians "...stopped listening to Keating...", but 
Keating blamed the media for making the communications task so difficult, 
contending that the "...media was sick to death of the Labor Government..." 
[Gordon:96:348] Keating called the criticism that he concentrated on the big 
picture at the expense of the people's interests nonsense, arguing that while 
there was a perception that his government was out of touch, "...perceptions 
in the modern world depend largely on the channels of communication, and 
if they are closed off it is extremely  hard to change perceptions." 
[Gordon:96:349]   
 
Finally, cognitive dissonance, was engendered by the parliamentarians and 
other critics, who identified faults with the treaty almost at its launch. Once 
the constituency was encouraged to go on the defensive, as it was revealed 
that their dominant attitudes were being subverted, Keating's program was 
under threat . 
 
Persuasion, Propaganda, Indoctrination 
  
While, on a state to state level, the AMS may have appeared to "be a major 
step in the diplomacy of reassurance", the lack of debate within Australia 
and thus the lack of support from the Australian domestic constituency, 
"...undermines its capacity to build the trust that the government has 
declared on Australia's behalf." [Smith:96:161] Keating had suggested that 
the AMS was about a declaration of trust between himself and Suharto 
"...which then goes beyond the official family into our communities", but 
Lowry warned that the Australian society's views of the Indonesian 
government "are unlikely to be changed by government-to-government 
 167
agreements,  which have the taint of political expediency and do not address 
the underlying causes of Australian perceptions." However, the counter 
argument posits that government-to-government relations are vital before 
those tensions can be addressed, and that "higher level concerns relating to 
long-term national security demand that societal concerns be subordinated 
to more important 'national interests'." [Lowry:96:30] This was well 
illustrated by Keating's remarks with regard to  finalising the AMS without 
prior public discussion, when he reportedly suggested that "if there had 
been a more public process, there probably wouldn't have been a treaty." 
[Smith.H:97:17-18] In fact it emerged that the negotiations for the treaty had 
been directed from the Prime Minister's office, to the exclusion of other 
departments, including Foreign Affairs. [Trood:97:48] 
 
It was obvious that Keating did not employ any persuasion techniques, he 
was not committed to an indoctrination process, nor did he utilise 
propaganda. It would have to be said that he was totally unprepared to deal 
with any objections to the AMS, although the fact that he bypassed public 
debate ostensibly to ensure that the Agreement was signed, and that he did 
so within a short time of going to election, suggests that he doubted that the 
treaty would ever have been realised if he did not go through with it. In fact, 
Keating was concerned that a new Government, under Howard, would 
never be able to realise such an agreement, stating that "the Coalition would 
never have got it, and I wanted Australia to have it." [Gordon:96:317] 
 
In essence the Australia-Indonesia Agreement on Maintaining Security was 
a mutual security agreement, a bilateral arrangement reached between two 
neighbouring states with a history of suspicion, misperception and 
misunderstanding. With totally disparate and divergent religious and 
cultural evolutions neither nation was at ease, although the perceived 
differences had been appropriated as symbols of nationalism, and thus 
apportioned greater political than cultural significance. 
 
The opposition, in Australia, to Keating’s realisation of a security agreement 
with Indonesia, at the end of 1995, was ostensibly based on what was 
considered to be an inappropriate process of negotiation, whereby the 
Australian community was not privy to or asked to legitimise any outcomes. 
According to convention, once Gareth Evans and Ali Alatas had signed the 
Australia Indonesia Security Agreement 1995 , a bilateral treaty, the 
agreement came into force. The signing followed prolonged but secret 
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negotiations. Keating and Evans were well aware of parliamentary criticisms 
of the way the Labor Government had been making treaties and yet Keating 
pursued this line of communication. He explained that his approach 
followed the proper processes of the Westminster system, whereby the 
negotiation of a treaty was conducted by the executive, after which the 
treaty becomes subject to public debate in the process of consideration and 
ratification by Parliament. [Keating:00:148]  
 
What must be gleaned from this fact is that Keating was committed more to 
realising an agreement between Australia and Indonesia than he was 
concerned with domestic political processes. Why was this so? Alternatively 
the question can be put, why were the critics of Keating’s approach to treaty 
making more concerned with the process than with the outcome? 
 
In the long run Keating appeared to be pursuing a grand and visionary plan 
that moved Australia on from its secure and certain attachments to its age 
old alignment with Europe and the USA, to a less certain but adventurous 
excursion into Asia. A journey that could realise a bigger and brighter future 
for a small trading nation located in the centre of vast region that includes 
nations of the west South American and west North American coastlines, the 
East African continent, the Southern states of the Middle East and the Far 
East or South East Asia, and the Asian nations on the Pacific rim. There is a 
vast potential for Australia to be ally and partner of any or all these nations 
in the 21st and inevitably 22nd century. But to advance that cause Australia 
needed to extend its reach and to break new ground. Keating began that 
process. His cause was to suffer admonition and condemnation. Was this 
due to conservative objections raised within alliance structures, fear of 
uncertainty and the fears generated by change brought on by a reformist 
agenda, or the small mindedness that Keating saw as a possible impedance 
to realising the Indonesian agreement if the Australian public, and for that 
matter, the Australian Parliament had been privy to the negotiations? 
 
Thus the questions that must be put, and which could be answered in the 
affirmative, if the psychopolitical considerations demanded by this thesis 
were utilised, are several fold. Was this a hard headed but factual analysis 
by an astute prime minister?, the thinking of an arrogant man who couldn't 
see beyond his own imagination?, or the wisdom of a visionary leader, who 
had realised that attitudinal change was invariably a long time coming, and 
thus, while ensuring a peace between Australia and Indonesia may have 
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been a dream, the signing of the AMS was the beginning of that project, no 
matter how long the Agreement was to last, for the precedent had been set 
and change was ineluctable?  
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Chapter Twelve 
 
Conclusion 
 
Diagnosis of Treaties as Tools of Foreign Policy   
and of the Polyphonic Analytical Model 
 
Prognosis of Keating's Legacy 
 
Section Five offers a series of insights into how treaties are used as tools of 
foreign policy, but also of how treaties are used as tools of domestic policy. 
The fine line between domestic and external policy features throughout. In 
this final and concluding chapter the two strands of investigation are 
brought to a close. The general discussion about treaties as tools of foreign 
policy, which has followed an essentially theoretical track, reaches closure 
with an analysis of the validity of the polyphonic analytical model as a set of 
guidelines with which to assess treaties in general. The particularist 
discussion of elements of Keating's Vision for Australia, as presented in the 
case studies, is assessed for its likely legacy. 
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Chapter Twelve A 
  
Diagnosis of Treaties As Tools Of Foreign Policy and of 
the Polyphonic Analytical Model. 
 
Throughout this thesis the discussion regarding treaties as tools of foreign 
policy has evolved, both explicitly, through nuanced argument, and 
implicitly, by inferring or predicting possible comprehensions of insights or 
application of processes. Each theoretical insight encountered during the 
synthesis, which led to the development of the polyphonic analytical model, 
has illuminated tactics and strategies which can be employed by change 
agents, as well as obstacles with which they might contend. The conclusion 
that there is an interdependency between foreign policy and domestic policy 
is well substantiated here, but so too is the notion that in some instances 
foreign policy has little impact in the domestic political arena. But the 
discussion also reveals how treaties can be employed as tools of foreign 
policy, with either external or domestic objectives, or with an impact which 
will span both realms of policy activity,  
 
The application of the polyphonic analytical model to elements of the 
Keating Treaty Package in the case studies supports this statement.  In 
essence, the model can best be described as a very general application which 
is useful for a full interrogation of a treaty or agreement which has both 
external and domestic implications, as would pertain with APEC. Equally it 
can be used partially to uncover external pertinence of a treaty, whereby 
psychopolitical underpinnings come to bear when systemic constraint leads 
to interstate activity, and when leaders are moved to enter into arrangement 
which seemed outside the purview of national interest, as occurred with the 
realisation of the ARF. Again, the model can be applied to a treaty which 
may have been realised externally, but which has a predominantly domestic 
impact, although its implementation would occur in an external domestic 
situation, as implied by the AMS, which would see the need for Australia to 
place its trust in Indonesia.  
 
A further use of this model would involve the compartmentalising of 
individual analytical components, whereby a treaty would be assessed for 
its validity as a tool of foreign policy from a particular viewpoint, such as a 
source of international law; or as a change agent being employed by a leader 
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pursuing cultural transformation; or as an externally sanctioned tool to 
instigate attitudinal shifts within a constituency bogged down by entrenched 
notions which are impinging on societal development.  
 
The polyphonic analytical model can be used as a general rule of thumb 
when gauging a treaty's efficacy. This will be a useful guide for treaty 
makers, and give them insights into strategies likely to achieve success. For 
constituencies, the task of identifying possible means of proposing or 
opposing change, through treaty making activity, can be furnished by the 
model. In retrospect it is realised that the application of the model to expose 
the psychopolitical underpinnings of a treaty was a vast undertaking, which 
required much more detail than was possible within the scope of this 
project.  
 
However, the model opens up possibilities for further research into treaty 
making and the relationship between treaties and the political communities 
on which they impact. The mooted overlap between foreign and domestic 
policy continually expands, and the insights offered in this thesis support 
that conclusion but also extend the understanding of the reasons for that 
extension. The model also raises new ideas about how to comprehend 
influence on foreign policy. It gathers perspectives from a wide variety of 
literatures and adopts and adapts them as innovative ways of explaining, 
modifying and utilising the treaty making process to effect change. 
 
Overall the model brings together seemingly disparate comprehensions 
through the identification of ideational elements, like norms, perceptions 
and discourses, around which attitudinal and cognitive processes flourish. It 
probes the psychopolitical underpinnings of each selected perspectives, and 
concludes that in each instance psychosocial processes are at work. It is this 
realisation which confirms that treaties are tools, in that leaders can utilise 
agreements to achieve ends which often go beyond the text of the treaty, and 
where symbolism becomes the instigatory force behind change. Impetuses 
and imperatives are generated by formal agreement, and impact on the 
ideological patterns of societies party to agreement. In this sense, and most 
importantly, a full appreciation of the model must conclude that in any 
instance whereby change is the objective of the treaty maker, that to achieve 
success as tools of foreign policy treaties must be constructed  and construed 
so as to satisfy the psychopolitical necessities of all key actors, external and 
domestic. 
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Chapter Twelve B  
 
Prognosis of Keating's Legacy. 
 
Paul Keating’s treaty regime promised to be a major component of the 
ongoing construction of Australia’s place in the world, and to have a 
significant impact on perceptions of Australia as a regional actor, both in the 
region and within the Australian polity. An object of this thesis was to react 
to the challenges to the process of treaty making, which appeared to be a 
obstacle to the implementation of those treaties realised by the Keating 
Government. This reaction sparked an investigation into the psychopolitical 
processes which are engendered by change, and particularly those elements 
which inhibited societal advances. 
 
Bourne’s opposition to the “annual treaties farce” and its companion, the 
democratic deficit, may have been apt from the point of view of the domestic 
constituency, but if Keating's project was to oversee a competent assemblage 
of both international and global networking that would advance Australia as 
a significant and sophisticated participant in an evolving global commerce, 
which action was in the national interest?  
 
The debate about the salience of changes envisaged with the realisation and 
future implementation of treaty regimes should have been highly relevant to 
the domestic constituency, but the Parliamentary parties in opposition to 
Keating's Labor Government, including the Democrats, were more 
concerned about the treaty making process.  
 
At the polls in March 1996 Keating’s Big Picture was abandoned by the 
Australian people and the Age of Vision ended. It was important to attempt 
to understand why the electorate acted the way it did, and it was vital to 
ascertain Keating’s objective. Not to explain his intransigent failure to heed 
the warning of pre election polling, but to comprehend fully what his vision 
offered Australia in the future. And this has pertinence because the 
perplexity of governance regarding globalisation, as faced by both Hawke 
and Keating, continues to this day. This is not to suggest that Keating’s 
prescription should be adopted or adapted, but the possible realisations of 
its application must be considered, as a guide to the future. Its probable 
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implementation must also be taken into account, to ensure that such 
manifestations are included within government policy or excluded if they 
work against new found objectives. 
 
At the beginning of the 21st century another world order is beginning to 
focus. Keating became a memory when he lost the 1996 March election to 
John Howard. Keating's vision of an Australia engaged in the region 
contributed partially to his downfall. He was construed by the domestic 
constituency as a leader distracted by grand alliances who had forgotten that 
his responsibility lay in the domestic arena. He was a leader besotted with 
global and regional adventures and out of touch with the Australian people. 
His final act of arrogance was the signing of the security agreement which 
he negotiated privately with Suharto, for many the perceived enemy of the 
Australian people, because of East Timor, and the five dead Australian 
journalist killed in Balibo in East Timor in 1975. 
 
Howard paid allegiance to the economic possibilities promised by APEC 
and its free trade initiatives, although his government has used the 
multilateral body to engage in bilateral exchange. Further to this there was 
the likelihood that with the US presidency changing hands, and Clinton, a 
supporter of APEC, being replaced by Bush, a more conservative and 
isolationist realist president, APEC could well vanish into the dust of 20th 
century history. 
 
The ASEAN Regional Forum has continued to be solely the concern of 
Foreign Minister Downer. With Australia's commitment to free elections for 
East Timor in 1998 the ARF's possible role as a facilitator was usurped by the 
United Nations. Arguably this occurred because Indonesia was a most 
influential member of ASEAN and thus the ARF was caught in a possible 
clash of interests scenario. The sobriquet "talking shop" is still used to 
describe the ARF although its potential for "...building trust and confidence 
as a multilateral vehicle... [DuPont:98:2] is ascribed to, although it is 
suggested that "its planners and policy makers need to recognise that the 
region's security environment has undergone considerable transformation..." 
[DuPont:98:7] since it was established in 1993. 
 
As for the Australia-Indonesia Agreement on Maintaining Security it seems 
to have gone down the same path as its procreator, Keating, and ended in 
oblivion. The much vaunted problem of East Timor, which was arguably 
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defused by the AMS, grew to national dominance in Australia, with the 
resultant commitment of Australian troops to the INTERFET force. 
Sanctioned by the UN to enter East Timor to bring an end to the killing and 
wanton destruction of infrastructure carried out by pro-integrationist forces, 
following the successful vote for independence by the East Timorese people, 
a perceived breach of the AMS by Australia saw the treaty meets its 
inevitable demise.    
 
Was that the end of Keating's vision or would it achieve a Whitlamesque 
status and haunt policy makers for years to come, as Australia continues the 
struggle of finding a place in the world? 
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The Australia-Indonesia Security Agreement 1995 
 
THE GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF 
INDONESIA  (hereafter referred to as 'the Parties'), 
 
DESIRING to strengthen the existing friendship between them; 
 
RECOGNISING their common interest in the peace and stability of the region; 
 
DESIRING to contribute to regional security and stability in order to ensure 
circumstances in which their aspirations can best be realised for the 
economic development and prosperity of their own countries and the region; 
 
REAFFIRMING their respect for the sovereignty, political independence and 
territorial integrity of all countries; 
 
REAFFIRMING their commitment to the settlement of all international disputes 
by peaceful means in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and 
international law; 
 
RECOGNISING that each Party has primary responsibility for its own security; 
 
MINDFUL of the contribution that would be made to their own security and 
that of the region by cooperating in the development of effective national 
capabilities in the defence field and hence their national resilience and 
self-reliance; 
 
NOTING that nothing in this Agreement affects in any way the existing 
international commitments of either Party; 
 
THEREFORE AGREE as follows: 
 
  1. The Parties undertake to consult at ministerial level on a regular 
     basis about matters affecting their common security and to develop such 
     cooperation as would benefit their own security and the region. 
 
  2. The Parties undertake to consult each other in the case of adverse 
     challenges to either party or to their common security interests and, 
     if appropriate, consider  measures which might be taken either 
     individually or jointly and in accordance with the processes of each 
     Party. 
 
  3. The Parties agree to promote - in accordance with the policies and 
     priorities of each - mutually beneficial cooperative activities in the 
     security field in areas to be identified by the two Parties. 
 
  4. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of the later 
     notification by either Government of the fulfilment of its requirements 
     for entry into force of this Agreement. 
 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorised by their 
respective Governments, have signed this Agreement. 
 
[Signed by Senator Evans for Australia and Mr Ali Alatas for Indonesia on 18 
December 1995]. 
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The First Meeting Of The Asean Regional Forum    25 July 1994, Bangkok 
 
1. The First Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum  (ARF) was held in 
Bangkok on 25 July 1994 in accordance with the 1992 Singapore Declaration 
of the Fourth ASEAN Summit, whereby the ASEAN Heads of State and 
Government proclaimed their intent to intensify ASEAN's external 
dialogues in political and security matters as a means of building 
cooperative ties with states In the Asia-Pacific region. 
 
2. Attending the Meeting were the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN, ASEAN's 
Dialogue Partners, ASEAN's Consultative Partners, and ASEAN's Observers 
or their representatives(*). The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, 
served as Chairman of the Meeting. 
 
3. Being the first time ever that high-ranking representatives from the 
majority of states in the Asia-Pacific region came to specifically discuss 
political and security cooperation issues, the Meeting was considered a 
historic event for the region. More importantly, the Meeting signified the 
opening of a new chapter of peace, stability and cooperation for Southeast 
Asia.  
 
4. The participants of the Meeting held a productive exchange of views on 
the current political and security situation in the Asia-Pacific region, 
recognizing that developments in one part of the region could have an 
impact on the security of the region as whole. It was agreed that, as a high-
level consultative forum, the ARF had enabled the countries in the Asia-
Pacific region to foster the habit of constructive dialogue and consultation on 
political and security issues of common interest and concern. In this respect, 
the ARF would be in a position to make significant contributions to efforts 
towards confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific 
region. 
 
5. Bearing in mind the importance of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons 
in the maintenance of international peace and security, the Meeting 
welcomed the continuation of US-DPRK negotiation and endorsed the early 
resumption of inter-Korean dialogue. 
 
6. The Meeting agreed to:  
 a) convene the ARF on an annual basis and hold the second  meeting  
in Brunei, Darussalam in 1995; and  
 b) endorse the purposes and principles of ASEAN's Treaty of 
 Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, as a code of conduct 
 governing relations between states and a unique diplomatic 
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 instrument for regional confidence-building, preventive 
 diplomacy, and political and security cooperation . 
 
7. The Meeting also agreed to entrust the next Chairman of the ARF, Brunei 
Darussalam, working in consultation with ARF participants as appropriate, 
to: 
 a) collate and study all papers and ideas raised during the ARF 
 Senior Officials Meeting and the ARF in Bangkok for submission  to 
the  second ARF through the second ARF-SOM, both of which  to be held 
in Brunei Darussalam. Ideas which might be the subjects  of such further 
study include confidence and security building,  nuclear non-
proliferation, peacekeeping cooperation including  regional peacekeeping 
training centre, exchanges of non- classified military information, 
maritime security issues, and  preventive diplomacy; 
 b) study the comprehensive concept of security, including its 
 economic and social aspects, as it pertains to the Asia-Pacific 
 region; 
 c) study other relevant internationally recognized norms and 
 principles pertaining to international and regional political and 
 security cooperation for their possible contribution to regional  
 political and security cooperation; 
 d) promote the eventual participation of all ARF countries in the 
 UN Conventional Arms Register; and 
 e) convene, if necessary, informal meetings of officials to study all 
 relevant papers and suggestions to move the ARF process forward. 
 
8. Recognizing the need to develop a more predictable and instructive 
pattern of relationships for the Asia-Pacific region, the Meeting expressed its 
firm conviction to continue to work towards the strengthening and the 
enhancement of political and security cooperation within the region, as a 
means of ensuring a lasting peace, stability, and prosperity for the region 
and its peoples. 
 
(*) ASEAN consists of Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, and Thailand.  
ASEAN's Dialogue Partners are: Australia, Canada, the European Union, 
Japan, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, and the United States.  
ASEAN's Consultative Partners are China and Russia.  
ASEAN's Observers are Laos, Papua New Guinea, and Vietnam. 
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Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia 
 Indonesia  24 February 1976  
 
The High Contracting Parties :  
 
CONSCIOUS of the existing ties of history, geography and culture, which 
have bound their peoples together;  
 
ANXIOUS to promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect 
for justice and the rule or law and enhancing regional resilience in their 
relations;  
 
DESIRING to enhance peace, friendship and mutual cooperation on matters 
affecting Southeast Asia consistent with the spirit and principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations, the Ten Principles adopted by the Asian-
African Conference in Bandung on 25 April 1955, the Declaration 
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations signed in Bangkok on 8 
August 1967, and the Declaration signed in Kuala Lumpur on 27 November 
1971;  
 
CONVINCED that the settlement of differences or disputes between their 
countries should be regulated by rational, effective and sufficiently flexible 
procedures, avoiding negative aftitudes which might endanger or hinder 
cooperation;  
 
BELIEVING in the need for cooperation with all peace-loving nations, both 
within and outside Southeast Asia, in the furtherance of world peace, 
stability and harmony;  
 
SOLEMNLY AGREE to enter into a Treaty of Amity and Cooperation  
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